

RUSSIA AND ENGLAND
IN
CENTRAL ASIA.

M. A. TERENCEF.

ST. PETERSBURG:

1875.

Translated from the Russian

BY

F. C. DAUKES, B.C.S.


ATTACHÉ TO THE FOREIGN DEPT. OF THE GOVT. OF INDIA.

VOL. II.

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT PRESS.

1876.



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CHAPTER X.

ENGLAND'S MOVEMENT IN THE EAST.

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TOWARDS the close of the sixteenth century the English established a Russo-Indian Company in view of the possibility of opening up an overland route to India *viâ* Russia. This scheme was however abandoned in 1599, on the last day of which year Queen Elizabeth

affixed the Royal Seal to a charter conferring on the famous East India Company the privilege of a commercial monopoly over all the seas from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan for a period of fifteen years. Commencing operations with a capital of £80,000 Sterling, divided into 100 shares, the ventures of this Company were attended from the very outset with enormous success, to such an extent as in the course of ten years to yield a dividend of 170 per cent. to the shareholders.

The first English colony in India was founded in the year 1612 at Surat, after which factories were established at Madras and Bombay. Up to 1686 the right of establishing military settlements, which was possessed by the Dutch and Portuguese, had not been conferred upon the English, but in that year James II., in view of the incursions of the Mongols, and the rivalry of the French Company (which was established in 1604), granted the East India Company the right of maintaining troops and making peace and waging war with any people in India not Christians. From this date the Mercantile Company entered upon its political phase, which became more marked in the year 1707, when all the smaller private undertakings

became absorbed in it and formed one united whole.

The circumstances under which the English succeeded in penetrating into Northern India were as follows:—A Doctor named Mr. Boughton, who accompanied an English Embassy from Surat to the Emperor Shah Jehan at Agra, succeeded in saving the life of his favourite daughter, for which he was rewarded by the grant of permission to carry on trade without let or hindrance throughout the whole Empire. The Company purchased the right from Mr. Boughton and immediately established a factory at Hooghly situated on a branch of the river Ganges in Bengal, after which similar factories sprang up elsewhere.

In 1686 disputes arose between the Hooghly factory and the Nabob of Bengal, in consequence of which the English crossed to the left bank of the river where they founded Calcutta.

In 1700, taking advantage of the pecuniary embarrassments of the Emperor, the Company purchased lands surrounding the Hooghly factory, and erected Fort William, which, however, in 1756 was taken by the Nabob, the entire garrison being put to death. Colonel Clive, who

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was deputed to avenge this outrage, defeated the Nabob, and under the pretext that there was war between England and France, demolished all the French settlements then situated along the lower course of the Ganges.

By the terms of the Treaty of peace which followed these events, the English received from the Emperor the whole of Bengal as far as the river Jumna, agreeing to pay in return a yearly sum amounting to 2,033,375 roubles. The English troops, who were appointed for the protection of Bengal, were maintained at the expense of the Nabob, and in this way the foundation was laid for the system which the Company afterwards strictly observed, and which rapidly reduced almost the whole of India to tributary dependence. Such a line of policy was, however, not a novelty, Peter the Great having in 1717 despatched Bekovitch to Khiva and Bokhara with instructions to persuade the Khans to receive a Russian guard for their protection and to maintain it at their own cost.

Subsequently Clive and Warren Hastings distinguished themselves in the wars with the Mahrattas and Hyder Ali, the ruler of Mysore. The English did not hesitate to make use of

treachery, severity, perfidy, and bribery in the accomplishment of their designs, and after the death of Tippoo Sahib, the successor of Hyder Ali, who was killed at the capture of Seringapatam by Wellesley in 1799, the East India Company became a mighty power.

Amongst the English nation, however, or more truly amongst its representatives in Parliament, there were people of honest views, who more than once raised their voice against the system of plunder and robbery which was being practised by the Company's officials under the title of Governors-General. The first hero of the Company, Robert Clive, was also the first to fall under judgment, but, to the astonishment of every one, he stood before the public as a man of small means, who had plundered for the benefit of the Company, and not in order to enrich himself. After Clive came Warren Hastings, who at the age of seventeen years entered the Company's service as a writer, and seven years afterwards changing the pen for the sword, enrolled himself as a volunteer in Clive's army. At the age of forty-one he had already risen to the rank of Governor-General, to which post he was appointed in 1773. Hastings sacrificed his

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reputation for his employers, and there was no outrage however unscrupulous at which he hesitated, provided that it brought in an extra penny to the revenues of the Company. Whenever funds were wanting, he led out his troops to plunder, and frequently when they declined to surrender the booty, the Governor-General took the matter into his own hands: extorted by torture from the servants, eunuchs, and courtiers of some Native Ruler a confession of the place where were hidden the valuables, which were forthwith seized and confiscated. But Hastings was not a Clive; and whilst enriching the grasping merchants, he did not overlook his own interests. This gave him the opportunity of making princely gifts to the various personages of influence, who afterwards assisted him in his evil days. For ten whole years (1785-1795) Hastings stood in his trial, until at last the House of Lords acquitted him honorably. It was in vain that the famous Sheridan used his eloquence against a man who had plundered Indian rulers, tortured, and executed outcasts; and who was always engaged "either in tyranny, theft, or lying." All this was justified on the ground of Imperial necessities and

by the principles of a trading Company, which were thus described in the speech of indictment delivered by Sheridan in the House of Commons on the 7th October 1785 :—

“I remember to have heard an honorable and learned gentleman (Mr. Dundas) remark, that there was something in the first frame and constitution of the Company which extended the sordid principles of their origin over all their successive operations; connecting with their civil policy, and even with their boldest achievements, the meanness of a pedlar, and the profligacy of pirates. Alike in the political and the military line could be observed *auctioneering ambassadors and trading generals*; and thus we saw a revolution brought about by *affidavits*; an army employed in executing *an arrest*; a town besieged on *a note of hand*; a Prince dethroned for *the balance of an account*. Thus it was they exhibited a Government, which united the mock majesty of a bloody sceptre and the little *traffic of a merchant's counting-house*; wielding a truncheon with one hand, and picking a pocket with the other.”

The Company however, consisting as it did of “highwaymen in kid gloves” was clearly

bound to uphold their Agent. The most glaring bribery and the most lavish promises were used to procure his acquittal; and when it was found impossible to answer the arguments of the indictment, Hastings' supporters did all in their power to delay the ballot and to prevent the passing of any Resolution so long as the House was under the charm of Sheridan's eloquence. The sitting was accordingly adjourned, and the impression made by Sheridan gradually faded away, while at the same time the public press was bought over, and a series of articles appeared containing distortions of fact and disingenuous explanations which sought to cut away the very grounds of the indictment. Ultimately Hastings was acquitted, and only condemned to pay the costs of the trial, which were in fact defrayed by the Company, Hastings being rewarded by an annual life pension of £4,000.

Before however the trial commenced, Pitt the younger, on the ground that the undertaking had overstepped the limits of private enterprise, had in 1784 introduced a Bill having for its object the establishment of an Imperial Board of Control for the supervision of the affairs of the Company. The acquisitions of

the Company nevertheless still increased. In 1801 the King of Oudh, in exchange for the tribute due from him, ceded 32,000 square miles of territory, with fifteen million inhabitants, and in 1803 the Emperor of Delhi became a pensioner of the Company merely preserving his title, while the victories in Nipal in 1818 pushed the frontier of the English territories as far as the foot of the Himalayas.

In 1834 the commercial monopoly was finally brought to an end, after which the Company discontinued all transactions of trade and devoted itself exclusively to the duties of administration. All its property, both moveable and immoveable, including fortifications, factories, and lands, was transferred to the Crown, while the revenues and the administration alone remained in its hands. Thus the Company, which originated for purposes of trade, developed into a Governing body.

In 1853 the famous mutiny broke out amongst the sepoys or Native army of regulars, which, although successfully suppressed by means of a severity, peculiarly English, was nevertheless followed by an Act of Parliament, dated the 1st of September 1859, taking the administration of India out of the hands of

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the Company, and entrusting it to a Viceroy especially appointed for that purpose.

Availing herself of every opportunity to raise disputes with those European powers which possessed colonies in India, England succeeded in annexing all foreign settlements, and by this simple method freed herself from all competition. Thus it has been brought about that at the present time only five towns remain in the possession of France, namely, Mahe, Karakal, Pondichery, Yanaun, and Chandernagore, the land attached to which amounts to only ten square miles, with an entire population of 255,000 souls. The possessions of Portugal are limited to the colonies of Goa, Salsette, and Damaun, with seventy-three square miles of territory and 527,000 inhabitants, while those of the Dutch have entirely disappeared. A comparison of these figures with the statistics of the Anglo-Indian territories, *viz.*, 74,000 square miles of land with 239,000,000, shows clearly what the results of the English policy have been.

It would perhaps be going too far to assert that the Russians have never contemplated following the footsteps of the Dutch, French, and English to India. It is well known for

instance that Peter the First attempted to equip a caravan, destined for India, under the leadership of Lieutenant Kojhin, and thoughts of India have frequently occupied the minds of Russian Statesmen. In the year 1800 Paul I. conceived the idea of penetrating into the heart of India not under the guise of a mercantile undertaking, but with "fire and sword." This project, which took a tangible shape, and was all but carried into effect, requires a few words of explanation.

In the month of June 1799 England entered into an alliance with Russia, according to the terms of which troops were despatched at the expense of England from Reval to Antwerp under the command of General Hermann. Having sustained a defeat at Bergen, Hermann embarked the remnant of his troops in English vessels, which conveyed them to the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, and there left them to their fate. Dearth of provisions and want of sufficient clothing carried off many victims during the winter of 1800, while at the same time the English treated the conditions of the alliance as a dead-letter, and even went so far as to decline to convey the troops back to Russia. These proceedings—followed in the

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ensuing year by the intrigues of the English to undermine Russian influence in the Ionian Islands—aroused the deepest indignation on the part of Paul I. and compelled him in April 1801 to recall his Ambassador, while Hermann's corps became prisoners.

During the progress of these events, the relations of Russia with Napoleon grew more and more cordial. In July Napoleon liberated 6,800 Russian captives, and not only sent them to their own country, but restored to them their arms and supplied them with an entire outfit of clothing, together with provisions. Such an unprecedented act of courtesy and munificence on the part of a former enemy, especially when compared with the conduct of the English, could not fail to produce a complete change in the policy of an Emperor of such hasty impulses as Paul I. Friendly communications were exchanged between the two courts, which ripened into a mutual determination to take vengeance upon England. Hence arose the celebrated project of overthrowing the supremacy of Great Britain in India, and establishing the commercial predominance of France in the East (evidently a bait to Napoleon) by means of an expedition to be under-

taken by the combined armies of Russia and France, of which the following were the main features.*

It was agreed that the French and the Russians should contribute at the rate of 35,000 men each, the Emperor of Germany allowing the French army a free passage through his territories and conveying them down the Danube to the Black Sea. The Russians were to concentrate at Astrakhan 25,000 regular troops and 10,000 Cossacks, who were to proceed by sea to Astrabad, where the headquarters of the allies were to be formed, and magazines of all sorts established for their use. The French were to detach 35,000 men from the army of the Rhine and to convey them in twenty days to the mouth of the Danube, where Russian transport ships were to be in readiness to take them in sixteen days to Taganrok. Thence marching along the right bank of the Don to the Post Pyati-Izbyansk (the five huts) in about twenty days, they were to cross the river, and to advance in four days to Tsaritsyn, proceeding thence in five days on the Volga to Astrakhan (in boats), and lastly to Astrabad

* The details are taken from a Russian periodical (the *Ruskaya Starina*), 1873, Vol. IX.

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in ten days more. From Astrabad the allied forces were to march through Herat, Furrâh, Candahar, &c., reaching the banks of the Indus in forty-five days from that point. Thus it was calculated that the entire march to the Indus would be accomplished in 120 days, or, without forced marches, in five months. Supposing therefore the troops to start in the beginning of May, it was expected that they would reach the scene of action by the end of the following September.

The equipment of the expedition was to be as follows:—The French were to take their artillery and cavalry, without horses, but with all the necessary horse gear. No camp equipage was to be taken, nor provisions, with the exception of a supply of biscuits sufficient for one month. Commissaries were to be sent on in advance to Taganrok, Tsaritsyn, and Astrakhan for the purposes of hiring horses, collecting conveyances and boats, and purchasing provisions. The chief administrative officer in the Evangelical Colony in Saxony was to be requested to issue orders to the sub-colony at Sarepta to undertake the contract for supplying camp equipage of all kinds, also clothing and medical requirements.

The horses for the baggage train, artillery, and cavalry were to be purchased from the Cossacks and Calmucks, ammunition, arms, and military stores being supplied by the Arsenals at Astrakhan, Kazan, and Saratov. Provisions and forage were to be bought in Russia, and the necessary cattle for the supply of meat in Persia.

Regarding the method of the movement, it was arranged that before the Russians sailed from Astrakhan, emissaries should be despatched bearing proclamations so worded as to allay the fears of the Chiefs on the route, and to explain to them that the sole object of the movement was the expulsion of the English, "who were impoverishing these glorious regions, once so famous, powerful, and wealthy, that the deplorable condition of slavery and hardship, under which the nations of these countries were groaning, had awakened in Russia and France a lively sense of sympathy, and that in consequence of this the two powers had resolved to unite their forces for the purpose of liberating India from the tyrannical and inhuman yoke of the English." After this explanatory introduction, promises were given that no contributions would be

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levied without payment, and that the religion, laws, customs, and women of the countries to be traversed by the troops, would be duly respected. Engineers were to accompany the emissaries for the purpose of completing the maps, taking notes regarding the formation of the country, the rivers which would have to be crossed, and devising the best means of overcoming other local obstacles.

On the arrival of the first French division at Astrabad, an echelon of the Russian troops was to advance, consisting of from four to five thousand Cossacks accompanied by a body of regular cavalry, with pontoons, their duty being, where necessary, to throw bridges across the rivers and to post guards of sufficient strength at them.

Before advancing from Astrabad it was proposed to give several grand fetês, combined with military manœuvres, with the view of impressing the minds of the people, and at the same time to distribute amongst the Chiefs and Khans "with that profusion of politeness which characterizes the French" arms of Versailles manufacture, China of Sevres, watches, mirrors, silk and woollen stuffs, velvets, brocades of gold and silver, &c., which

gifts, it was supposed, would impress the people with the open-handed liberality, advanced state of manufactures, and power of the French nation, and would probably lay the foundation of a lucrative trade.

Napoleon criticized the plan of operations and expressed some doubts as to the possibility of collecting a sufficient number of craft for the conveyance of the troops on the Danube to the Black Sea. Paul replied that Russia could provide three hundred vessels, and that in case of any difficulties on the Danube, the French troops might disembark at Brailof and Galach, whence they would be taken on by a Russian squadron.

To another objection raised by Napoleon that the Turks might decline to permit a free passage on the Danube, Paul replied that he would simply compel the Porte to do as he desired.

Regarding the danger of an attack from the English squadron which, Napoleon thought, might sail through the Dardanelles, Paul replied—"If the English squadron chooses to come through the Dardanelles and the Turks should not arrest its passage, Paul will take the necessary measures, and he has better

means at his disposal than he is given credit for." Lastly to the doubt regarding the possibility of advancing from Astrabad "through a wild and barren tract extending over a distance of more than 300 leagues," Paul retorted that the region was neither wild nor barren; that the communications were good; that caravans accomplished the whole distance in 35 or 40 days; that sandstorms were unknown; that the country was intersected by numerous rivers; that pasturage was abundant, also rice, cattle, game, and a great variety of fruits; and lastly that even if the road should prove to be difficult, it would form no obstacle in the way of such troops as those of France and Russia, whose ambition, courage, patience, and endurance, combined with the talent of their officers, would overcome all possible obstacles.

In order to support the feasibility of the proposed expedition, Paul quoted the precedent of the campaign of Nadir Shah in 1739 and 1740, who marching from Delhi advanced to Candahar, Herat, Meshed and Astrabad, that is, on the same route that was proposed to be taken by the allies. "That which an army composed purely of Asiatics has accomplished" (it was said) "in 1739-40, can surely be accomplished by an

army of French and Russians." The project was undoubtedly a bold one, but far from visionary, for the possibility of invading India by way of Persia cannot be doubted.

All the arguments, however, of Paul I. were not sufficient to convince Napoleon and the confederation fell through, whereupon Paul resolved to undertake the expedition by Russian resources only, and in order that it might not throw any expense on the Imperial Exchequer, contemplated letting loose on India the bands of the Cossacks of the Don to whom, so to speak, he made a grant of the East Indies. "All the wealth of India shall be your reward for this expedition," he wrote on the 12th (24th) January 1801 to the Ataman of the Don troops, Wasili Petróvitch Orlof I. The Cossacks were to collect in bodies at the outlying posts (stanitzas), send out scouts, and afterwards advance *viá* Orenburg to Khiva and Bokhara, choosing one of three available routes, or if they preferred, by a simultaneous movement on all the three. Thence they were to proceed straight to the river Indus.

Success was pictured as certain. "The troops of that region," wrote Paul, "to whatever tribe they may belong, resemble you," (*i.e.*,

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in being irregulars), "but by the possession of artillery you have the entire advantage." This letter was accompanied by such maps as were available, but these were limited to the Khanate of Khiva. The persistence with which the Emperor acted is shown by the fact that on the same day he wrote a second letter in which he issued orders that all the factories, settlements, &c., of the English should be demolished; that the rightful owners should be liberated; that the lands should be placed in the same condition of dependence upon Russia as they had hitherto been upon England, and lastly, that trade should be diverted from England to Russia. On the following day in another letter, forwarding a detailed map of India, Paul reminded the Cossacks that "their business was only with the English, and that they should behave peaceably to all such as did not assist the enemy." He also recommended them to take such measures as would prevent Bokhara from "falling into the hands of the Chinese," and regarding Khiva, he spoke of the liberation of Russian captives to the number of several thousands. If infantry were found to be necessary, he promised to despatch them after the Cossacks, but added, "it would be

better if you accomplished it alone," in reply to which Orlof promised to carry the affair through single-handed. The Cossacks prepared for the campaign expecting to march about the beginning of May, but on the night of the 11th (23rd) of March the Emperor suddenly died and India was thus saved from invasion.

Alexander the First, who succeeded Paul, likewise did not shrink from the idea of an overland expedition against India, and it is very probable that on the occasion of the personal conferences with Napoleon at Tilsit and Erfurt, when the question was discussed of counteracting the English power by his "continental system," some discussion also took place regarding an expedition against India. It was to the advantage of Napoleon to divert both the attention and the forces of Russia to the remote plains of Hindoostan, and by so doing to saddle both his opponents with a war in the East, while he would himself be free to deal as he chose with the other powers of Europe.

Alexander however showed but little sympathy with Napoleon's "continental system," and the rupture which followed soon afterwards with the French removed the brilliant project

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of an Indian expedition into the region of political visions. The English, however, in spite of the expedition having been abandoned, clearly saw the feasibility of such a movement through Persia, and therefore endeavoured to make their influence supreme at the Persian court. The embassy of Sir Harford Jones in 1809 resulted in the conclusion of a treaty, according to which Persia bound herself not to enter into alliances with other European Courts, and not to permit foreign troops to pass through Persian territory to India, &c., while England on her part promised to assist Persia with money and troops in case she became involved in a war with any European power. When it is remembered that, at the time this treaty was concluded, Russia was at war with Turkey and Austria, the malevolent tendency of the policy which dictated this move on the part of the English is self-evident. Relying on the promised assistance of the English the Persians boldly provoked the Russians, and even went so far as to violate the Russian frontiers.

By the treaty of Ganjhin in 1732, Russia ceded to Persia the territories on the sea-board of the Caspian, which had been conquered by Peter the Great, and from that time up to 1804

the relations which existed between Persia and Russia were amicable. As early, however, as the year 1783, when Irakli, the Czar of Georgia, a vassal of Persia, was received under the protection of Russia, the political horizon became clouded. The successor of Irakli, George XIII., despairing of being able to support himself on the throne, in the year 1800 accepted complete subjection to Russia. The war, the object of which was to gain possession of the Trans-Caucasian regions, and which rendered famous the names of Zizianof, Gudovitch, Tormazof, and especially Kotlyarefski, was brought to a conclusion in 1813 by the peace of Gulistan, according to the terms of which Persia ceded to the Russians Georgia, Daghistan, and the Khanates of Karabagh, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbend, Baku, and Talish, the customs duties on Russian goods being lowered to the rate of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*.

In 1826 Persia again made an attempt to provoke hostilities with Russia by seizing Karabagh, and afterwards, in spite of the negotiations with Menshikof and the honors which they heaped upon our Envoy, the Persians crossed the Araxes. Circumstances at that time appeared to favor them, for an insur-

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rection had commenced in Georgia having the Crown Prince Alexander at its head, while at the same time Circassia was disturbed, and to make matters worse, Yermalof, "the terror of the Caucasus," was recalled and replaced by the then obscure Paskevitch.

But the Persians of those times were not a whit better than the Bokhariots of the present, and matters were speedily settled. Duke Madatof defeated Mahomed Mirza near Shamkhora, while Paskevitch routed Abbas Mirza at Elizabethpol, and the capture of Erivan, combined with a movement against Tabreez and Teheran, brought the war to a close. According to the treaty of Turkomanchi [10th (22nd) February 1828], the Russians received the provinces of Erivan and Nakshawan in addition to an indemnity of 20,000,000 roubles. The gifts despatched to the Emperor Nicolas and to Paskevitch, who had been shortly before rewarded by the title of Count of Erivan, cost another million, while Russia also obtained the exclusive right of maintaining a military flotilla on the Caspian Sea, and of establishing a sea-board station on the Island of Ashuradeh, situated at the entrance of the Bay of Astrabad, for the purpose of putting down piracy.

In the course of these hostilities with the Russians the English did not give one iota of assistance to Persia either in troops or money, and the treaty of 1809 was practically a dead-letter. The natural result of such treatment followed, and the relations between Persia and England became the reverse of cordial.

It was at this time that the influence of Russia reached its zenith at the court of Persia. In the end of 1830 Colonel Count Simonich,* who had brilliantly distinguished himself at Elizabethpol, was attached to the court of Mahomed Shah as a Russian military agent, in which capacity in 1838 he was the prime mover in the military operations of the Persians against Herat. The English, jealous of foreign interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, regarded this undertaking with a hostile eye, especially since they perceived that it was due to the influence of Russia. The breaking off of diplomatical relations with Persia had no effect, and the English therefore despatched Captain Pottinger to Herat in order to counteract the influence of

* Of Servia. His real family name was Gra Simonich, but on his arrival in Russia, he was rewarded for his services by Emperor Nicolas by the title of Count.

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Simonich. It is impossible to say what might have been the issue of the siege if Simonich had not been recalled by the Russian Government—a step which was due to the following circumstances.

Various Afghan Chiefs appeared in the camp of the Shah seeking for his friendship and protection. Seeing here the representative of Russia in his capacity of the principal manager of the siege, and perceiving the immense influence which he possessed with the Shah, they appreciated the might of Russia, which had only recently subdued such a strong power as they thought Persia to be, and had levied from her an indemnity of ten krores of tumans (20,000,000 roubles). These considerations, coupled with the effects of acquaintanceship with Vitkevich, then residing at Cabul, caused the Afghan Chiefs to contemplate the formation of an alliance with Russia on the condition that we should engage to afford them protection, and to guarantee to them the possession of their dominions. Such a guarantee Simonich gave without a moment's hesitation in the name of the Russian Government. Meanwhile, however, the English were on the alert. Their interests impera-

tively demanded that the projected alliance should by some means or other be dissolved, that the growth of Russian influence in the Court of Persia should be prevented, and that any further extension of Persian territory to the eastward should be arrested. These three objects were well worthy of a bold policy, and accordingly at this juncture the Russian Government received a menacing note from Lord Clanricard, dated 4th (16th) May 1838, which was followed by the immediate recall of Simonich under the pretext that he had exceeded his instructions.

Thus it happened that a blow was struck to the growth of Russian influence in Persia, from the effects of which it has never since recovered. No Russian military agents are now maintained in Persia, no Russian officers are despatched thither for the purpose of instructing the troops of the country, and the belief has thereby been engendered that we fear to instruct the Persians, lest by so doing we should raise a possible source of danger against ourselves. At the present time the instruction, &c., of the troops is in the hands of the English, French, and Germans. The Persians are aware that the Feringhees (Europeans) are

ready to tear Russia into pieces, and consequently conclude that, if foreign powers instruct their soldiery, their only object can be to strengthen them against Russia. Whether, however, such is the case or not, is a matter of no consequence, since no amount of instruction can convert an Oriental into a European. The native of Persia exhibits, in his character, the natural result of the climatic, political and other conditions of the country in which he lives. Easily swayed by influence brought to bear upon him from without, his character is eminently unstable, nor can any degree of effort change his nature in this respect. This susceptibility to external influence renders the Persians an easy tool in the hands of Russia. Still we cannot afford to disregard entirely the influence of other powers, in order to counteract which it would not, perhaps, be superfluous to permit Russian officers to accept service in the Persian army.

Professing the creed of Shias, and thus standing, as it were, in a dilemma between such fanatical Sunnis as the Turks on one side, and Khiva, Bokhara and Afghanistan on the other, Persia is completely isolated, and readily falls under the influence of any European power

willing to support her. Thus the situation of Persia, which as it were separates the Khanates of Central Asia from Turkey, their invariable protector, coupled with the fact that she is as much or perhaps more hated on account of her Shütism than we are on account of our Christianity, renders her our natural ally. Attached to the interests of Russia, she is able on the occurrence of an emergency to render great service, while if opposed to our interests she would be of equal service to Turkey or England.

Signs, moreover, are not wanting of the growth in Persia of religious doctrines, which in a manner approach Christianity, such, for instance, as the teaching of Bab;* or more recently, the tenets of other sects which have entirely repudiated the religion of Mahomed, and this fact surrounds Persia with a greater interest. The country, in fact, is one which Russia cannot afford to disregard.

To return now to the letter which was received in 1838 by the Russian Government from Lord Clanricard. The decay of Russian influence in Persia, which followed the receipt

* The founder of a sect, who styled himself "Bab," i.e., gate, in the same way as our Saviour.

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of that communication, was rapidly taken advantage of by England. The appearance of an English Squadron on the waters of the Persian Gulf, followed by the occupation of Bushire and the Island of Karrack, compelled the Persians to raise the siege of Herat. On the other hand, Burnes was despatched to Cabul in order to counteract the influence of Vitkevich, but all his efforts failed to attach Dost Mahomed to the interests of the English. Under these circumstances, the English resolved to dethrone the Dost and to restore the rule of the Duranees in the person of Shah Shujah, in whom they found a firm adherent.

There was, however, another consideration which prompted the British expedition to Cabul, and that was the desire to arrest the progress of the Russians in Central Asia before they should take up a position inconveniently near to India. England fancied that she saw in Perovski's expedition of 1839 hidden objects extending far beyond the Khanate of Khiva, and various circumstances tended to confirm such a conviction. It was at this time that the English Evangelical Mission, which, under the pretext of disseminating the word of God, devoted itself to very different objects, was

expelled from Orenburg. Russian agents—Simonich on the side of Herat in Persia and Vitkevich at Cabul—were at the same time undermining British influence nearer and nearer to India, while Russia by giving assurances that the contemplated Khivan expedition had only *scientific* objects in view (whilst the imposing preparations clearly pointed to some more serious aim), was endeavouring by every means in her power to mask her true designs. In order to anticipate the English movement on Cabul, regarding which information had already reached him, and also to counteract the successes of the English arms, Perovski pushed on the preparations for the expedition, but unfortunately the Russian Cabinet at this time took a false step by acting upon the advice of the English. The “Iron Duke,” Lord Wellington, who was regarded by the Russians as the first military authority of that time, owing to his success at Waterloo,* and who held the

* It should be observed that the Prussians ascribe the glory of that day to Blucher, and not without reason. The matter stands thus :—Wellington used perpetually to intrigue against the allies, a fact which was well known to Napoleon, who founded on it his plan of action. “If I attack Wellington, Blucher will immediately come to his aid, and I am weaker than the two combined. If, however,

honorary rank of a Russian Field Marshal, was not slow in giving his advice in unmistakable terms. "Sandy * wastes are only traversible by troops in winter, for snow means water," were the words of the English oracle. The Russians hastened to act upon the advice thus given, and it was only at a later stage that they discovered the fallacy involved.

An immense amount of fire-wood was indispensable, which necessitated an endless camel train with all its accompanying difficulties. The idea of converting snow into water appeared to possess peculiar advantages, since neither barrels nor "tursuks" (leathern bags) were

I attack Blucher, Wellington will not assist him, and I shall succeed; after which, having disposed of Blucher, I shall be able to advance against and defeat Wellington." The first half of this plan was successfully carried out, Blucher was routed; but when Napoleon attacked Wellington, Blucher, although defeated, marched to his assistance. The fate of the day had already been decided when the Prussians suddenly appeared on the field and snatched the victory out of the hands of Napoleon. A characteristic verse is attached to the portrait of Wellington engraved at Paris.

D'ou vient cet air d'etonnement
 Sur ce visage, où dût briller la gloire?
 C'est que le peintre a maladroitement,
 Peint le héros le jour de sa victoire.

It certainly is true that the Duke is represented in this portrait as having a look of astonishment.

(* Literally. "The great difficulty in a march over the steppes is want of water. In winter however there is snow, and therefore water on the steppes".—*Trs.*)

required, while at the same time it obviated loss by evaporation, leakage, &c. ; but unfortunately a large portion of the wood was brought into requisition in order to counteract the effects of the unprecedented cold. The fuel was used for warming the kibitkas of Perovski himself and some of the officers on his staff, while the rest of the troops had to depend upon their own "animal heat" (a very excellent contrivance!), and in order to procure water, were obliged to melt the snow in bladders upon which they slept at night. The disastrous results of Perovski's expedition are well known. Nearly the entire baggage train and a third of the troops perished in the wilderness; but before the curtain fell on this catastrophe, the English journals alarmed public opinion to such an extent, and the debates in the British Parliament displayed such bitterness and virulence, that the Whig Ministry then in power was obliged to introduce a series of measures which carried the English Government far beyond the limits of discretion and prudence.

The first ill-advised step taken by the English was the Afghan Expedition of 1839. The month of August found the British in

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possession of Cabul, Candahar and Ghuznee: Dost Mahomed fled and Shah Shujah was raised to the throne. After this, English agents were despatched into all the Central Asian Khanates in order to excite them against Russia; Conolly being sent to Kokan, Stoddart to Bokhara, Abbot, and afterwards Shakespear, to Khiva. The instructions given to these agents were, if they found it impossible to set on foot a Mahomedan confederation against Russia, to induce the Khans to avoid everything which could be possibly construed by the Russians as a pretext for hostilities, or which might result in the latter gaining a footing on the Rivers Syr and Amu.

Abbot strove to take an active part in the Russian affairs with Khiva, going so far as to offer the Khan a ransom for the Russian captives, who formed the chief *raison d'être* of the expedition. But the English agent confined himself to promises and had not the money with which to carry them into effect. Moreover, when the Khan demanded to be shown the authority under which he was acting, no credentials were forthcoming, upon which he was subjected to the bastinado, and afterwards thrown into prison by the orders of the infuriated Chief.

The almost simultaneous movement of England and Russia into the heart of Asia produced a violent agitation amongst the Khans, who, however, after the failure of Perovski's expedition, were encouraged to adopt their former tone of careless arrogance. Indeed, it may be said that the failure of the Russians was most disastrous to the English, against whom the whole tide of vengeance was turned. In the autumn of 1840 an insurrection was produced in Afghanistan by the apparent intention of the English to establish themselves permanently in that country,—an intention which was evinced by the fact that some of the British officers wrote for their wives and children to join them at Cabul. Deep feelings of discontent were also excited by the unceremonious treatment to which the native women were subjected at the hands of the foreigners. Secret assassinations followed, while the increasing difficulties of procuring supplies obliged the English to despatch their own foraging parties—a measure which was particularly offensive to the Afghans, and soon produced open collisions. The British foraging parties were entrapped into ambuscades and mercilessly slaughtered, and afterwards when their strength was increased, a petty incessant

warfare was the result. The Afghans as a nation are not particularly choice as to the means which they employ to secure their objects, and were less so than usual in settling matters with the English. All Asia knew what the habits of the English were in such matters; how admirably they adhered to their word, and how philanthropic, honorable and nice in the choice of their means they had always shown themselves to be!

The time however had come when the English had to reap what they had sown, and things gradually reached a pass which it was beyond the power of the British force to counteract. The first step was taken by the flour contractors, whose supplies proved to be poisoned.* After this, several of the more influential natives under the mask of friendship advised the English to leave Cabul before the setting in of the winter, and in return for promises to supply them with a sufficient number of camels for the baggage train, received an advance of money which they applied to the armament of their own retainers.

The incapacity of General Macnaghten was

* The English, discovering this to be the case, forced the merchants to eat in their presence a handful of the flour before tasting it themselves.

obvious. Not only did he omit to crush the rising in its infancy and actually fed the insurrection with English money, but when, on the 2nd (14th) November, Burnes, who had been attached to the Court of Shah Shujah, was hard pressed by the infuriated mob in Cabul, Macnaghten held aloof and afforded him no assistance whatever. This omission cannot be explained by mere incapacity, but was an instance of villainy of the basest description. The English General completely lost his head—a fate which literally overtook him at a later stage. Having ridden out to conduct negotiations with the Afghan leaders, General Macnaghten fell into an ambuscade within eyesight of his own camp. Forty picked Afghan marksmen, who had concealed themselves behind the precipitous banks of a small stream no sooner heard the word “Allah” (the preconcerted signal) than they fired a volley on the English escort. Macnaghten was murdered, and his head was passed from hand to hand amongst the assembled Afghans, while not a finger was raised in the English Camp, where the troops were glad to have got rid of their General. Thus fate retaliated on Macnaghten for his conduct towards Burnes.

A representative of the former ruling family of Payendeh Khan, who had offered to supply the British with camels, stood at the head of the general rebellion, devoting thereto the funds which he received from the English. When called upon by the English Generals for his accounts, he deceived them by fictitious documents purporting to show the number of camels purchased, the number that had perished, &c. ; while, when asked to show the camels, he invariably replied that the animals had unfortunately been sent to graze in some distant and out of the way spot.

Thus matters were protracted until the winter, when, as it appeared unadvisable to remain any longer at Cabul, Elphinstone concluded a treaty, according to the terms of which he made over to the Afghans nearly all his artillery and superfluous baggage (ammunition and provisions), and paid them a heavy contribution, in return for which he received a promise that the Afghans would not place any obstacles in the way of the departure of the British troops. The deep snow combined with the intense cold were sufficient of themselves to make the movement extremely difficult, while the column was at the same time surrounded by Afghans

thirsting for British blood, and every loiterer or straggler became a victim, to whom no mercy was shown. Spurred on by the Afghans the English hastened forward, but were nevertheless unable to escape the harassing attacks of the enemy. Want of fire-wood and provisions completed the work, and rendered the position of the ill-fated British troops almost inextricable. With the view of rescuing the women and children, who accompanied the detachment, from these privations, the English entered into negotiations and made over their families to the Afghans, trusting only to the word of the latter for their future safety. This was the solitary instance of a treaty which the Afghans carried out in its integrity, for the simple reason that they hesitated to do otherwise, the family of Dost Mahomed being at that time in the hands of the English.

After the surrender of the women and children, the English Generals, who had left the camp under the pretext of conducting the negotiations, surrendered themselves to the Afghans, and in this way the troops, forsaken by their leaders, were abandoned to famine, cold and inevitable death. These British Generals preferred captivity and plenty to liberty

and starvation ; their feelings of honor were deadened by a foretaste of the pangs of hunger ; while the dread of everlasting ignominy was not strong enough to overcome the desire to procure for a time that personal comfort which they found it so difficult to give up.

When it is remembered that there were as many as 38,000 camp followers and servants attached to the first Bengal Column as compared with only 9,500 regular troops, the disorder which must have prevailed may be more readily imagined than described. So complete was the destruction of the troops, that on arriving at the entrance of the Khyber Pass only 4,500 British troops and about 12,000 camp followers survived, while not one of these lived to carry the tale of the disaster to India. Such was the ignominious end of an expedition which had cost as much as 210,000,000 roubles or £,30,000,000 Sterling.

This catastrophe had the effect of reviving the spirits of the Central Asian Khans, in consequence of which the position of the English agents in the various Khanates became most precarious. Conolly, in order to save his life, was obliged to flee from Kokan to Bokhara,

where, together with Stoddart, he was publicly executed by order of the Ameer. Regarding these two agents Mr. Hutton gives the following details :—“ In 1838 Colonel Stoddart, a brave but imperious and overbearing soldier, was sent to Bokhara from Teheran by Sir John McNeil, and seems to have acted imprudently in giving some sort of assurance that he would very shortly be accredited to that Court by the British Government. Fourteen months having elapsed without any letters of credence arriving from England, the Colonel was thrown into prison and so barbarously treated that his nervous system gave way, and he was prevailed upon to profess faith in Islam in the hope of saving his life. General Ferrier states that he could have left Bokhara in company with M. Khanikof (and Butenef), but that he was too proud to owe his life to Russian intercession. If this be so, he betrayed a strange inconsistency in renouncing his religion for the sake of that which he scorned to accept under an obligation to a friendly and Christian Government.”

So far, however, from Stoddart's conduct being inconsistent, as stated by Mr. Hutton, it appears to me to have been perfectly natural.

Having renounced Christianity, he very naturally refused to accept a service at the hands of a Christian. To say that Stoddart acted imprudently would be more correct, inasmuch as in order to save his life he resolved to change his religion in preference to the simpler method of humiliating his pride.

On the other hand, great sympathy is displayed by the English for the kindly and gentle Captain Conolly, who was despatched from Cabul to Khiva in 1840, and thence proceeded to Kokan by way of Jizzakh, carefully avoiding Bokhara, where Stoddart was languishing in confinement. Forced to flee from Kokan, he accepted the invitation of Ameer Nasir-Ullah, and visited him when encamped at Mehrem near Kokan. Notwithstanding the Ameer's assurances, he was seized, plundered and carried off to Bokhara, where he was thrown into a dungeon.

On the 17th June 1842 Stoddart and Conolly were executed, but accounts vary as to the manner of their death. Abbot declares that Colonel Stoddart was bastinadoed on the feet till the skin peeled off, and being carried back to prison was secretly murdered in the night. Captain Conolly, he adds, refused to pur-

chase life at the cost of his religion, and was murdered at the same time as his fellow countryman. The accounts of the universal feeling of dissatisfaction with which the news of the execution of the English officers was received by the people are not deserving of the slightest credit. The pity of the Bokhariots is not as a rule easily excited, especially as in the present instance they could have had no reason to fear the English.*

Abbot and Shakespear, on the other hand, pocketed their British pride and were saved by the Russian agents Nikiforof and Aïtof, although it was only with the greatest difficulty that they succeeded in reaching Russia, more than half dead from the effects of the cruel treatment to which they had been subjected. This, however, did not prevent Shakespear from asserting that the liberation of 500 Russian captives by the Khan of Khiva was due, not to the intelligence received at Khiva regarding the preparations at Orenburg for

* A few years previous to this occurrence an English Lieutenant by name Wyburd had been sent to Khiva, and being plundered there fled to Bokhara, where he was murdered on his refusal to accept the faith of Mahomedanism. Subsequently the following were also executed at Bokhara: Giovanni Orlando, Flores Nazelli, and a Greek named Joseph.

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a new campaign, but solely to the influence which he possessed over the Khan and to the demands and threats which he brought to bear upon him. This English Don Quixote verily considered his prison to be a palace, and the permission to depart in company with the Russians as an injunction to conduct his preservers to the place of their destination.

As opposed to the difficulties with which the English agents had to contend, it is curious to notice the mode of action adopted by Captain Nikiforof at Khiva. This officer in the first place never addressed the Khivan dignitaries otherwise than as a victor; he did not ask, argue, or endeavour to persuade them, but demanded and insisted on his demands. If at a later stage the Khivan authorities endeavoured to re-open some point which had already been settled, Nikiforof, declining further discussion, ordered his Cossack escort forcibly to expel them from his quarters. Granted that this is neither a particularly polite nor diplomatic way of cutting short an audience (and as a matter of fact Nikiforof failed to establish permanently good relations), still it should be remembered that envoys are not bound, provided

always that they show no signs of fear, to study their behaviour in a country where they meet with no consideration whatever. On the other hand, it has been proved over and over again that negotiations conducted in a spirit of European politeness have effected no practical result. Engagements procured in this way, as for instance Colonel Danilefski's Treaty with Khiva, are regarded by the Khans simply as waste paper. Treaties in fact, as such, are worthless with Asiatic rulers, but the practical effect of a written engagement must depend on the line of action adopted by the envoy who conducts the negotiations. To lay down any hard and fast rule for regulating the conduct of an envoy is, of course, not possible, since it must vary with circumstances and depend to a certain extent on the personal character of the particular officer; but the reader will have no difficulty in judging in the present instance whose influence was the greater, that of Shakespear, who was fed on bread and water in a foul and fetid dungeon, or that of Nikiforof, who conducted himself towards the Khivan dignitaries as towards menials. Thus the intrigues of England against Russia terminated in failure.

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The destruction of the English agents disclosed the weakness of English influence, whilst interference in the affairs of Afghanistan covered the British army with disgrace.

In order to restore the honor of their arms, the English in 1842 undertook a second Afghan Expedition, which terminated in the sacking of Cabul. On this occasion, however, the British troops did not overstay their time in the country, but hastened to return to British territory.

The policy of the East Indian Government at this time with regard to Cabul underwent a great and rapid change, owing to the retirement of the Whigs and the elevation of Robert Peel to the Premiership. Perceiving the uselessness of supporting by means of English money and English arms some claimant to the Cabul throne, against whom the simple fact of receiving this support from the English was sufficient to raise the hatred of the nation, the Government resolved to adopt a policy of non-interference with regard to Afghanistan. Since that time also the English have ceased to undertake the risk of sending their agents into the Khanates of Central Asia; and, if they have occasionally endeavoured to weave a net over the Russian

bear, they have preferred to do it by the hands of others, sending not European agents but picked natives of India, who were mere spies.

The last occasion upon which the name of the English was sounded as a watch-word for a Mahomedan confederation against the Russians was recently in 1853, that is, during the Crimean War, but Russia had by that time succeeded in establishing herself on the Syr Darya. As early as 1847 the Fort of Raim had been erected near the mouths of that river, and in 1853 the Russians were in occupation of the middle course, having captured after a long siege the Fort of Ak Musjid (the present Perovsk). This perpetually forward movement on the part of Russia was, it is true, eminently calculated to forward the views of the English, and to facilitate the formation against Russia of a general confederation of all the Khanates in Central Asia. Ak Musjid properly belonged to Kokan, but the possession of that point gave us the command of the caravan routes from Bokhara and Khiva. Moreover, Khiva then claimed supremacy over the whole of the left bank of the Syr, to which our Cossack settlers occasionally crossed over for the pur-

pose of procuring fodder and fuel, and which served as a camping ground for the Kirgiz under Russian authority. Under these circumstances, nothing appeared easier than to incite the discontented Khans to a general rising against Russia, as a means to which end the English cleverly resolved to appeal to the religious prejudices of the people. "The infidels (Russians) intend to annihilate once and for ever the head of the true believers, that is, the Sultan of Constantinople."

It should here be remarked that the Central Asian Khans, although not considering themselves as vassals of the Sultan of Turkey, always apply to him for assistance in their hour of need, and on such occasions extol him as the head of all true believers, who holds the banner of the Prophet, and the sword of Islam, &c. The Sultan in reality is regarded by them in the light of *primus inter pares*, first by virtue of the fact that he has the right of guarding the "kibla" (temple) or "Bait ul Haram" (Sacred House), *i.e.*, Mecca, and, secondly, since he rules over a tract of country, taken by force from the hands of unbelievers, namely, the peninsula of Balkan, and holds beneath his power the sacred spot of the whole

Christian world, the "Bait ul Mukaddas," (Sacred House), *i.e.*, Jerusalem.

The Town of Jerusalem is also regarded by the Mahomedans with reverence as being the place whence their Prophet ascended to Heaven. On the same stone on which Abraham intended to sacrifice Isaac, prayed Mahomet, and up to the present day the impression made on the stone by the head of the Prophet has not been erased, while the pilgrim may also see the marks of the hands of the Archangel Gabriel (in Arabic Jibrail), who held back the stone when it tried to fly to Heaven in the wake of the steed of Mahomet. For these reasons alone the Mussulmans consider that Jerusalem ought to remain in their hands, and the English entirely agree with them in this view.

In the choice of means the English have no delicacy whatever and are restrained by no considerations of morality or propriety. A Christian power which uses the name of Mahomet in order to incite the Mussulmans to rise against another Christian power is naturally undermining every respect that is paid to Christianity in general and to itself in particular; and in the present day it is only

necessary to mention the name of the English in Asia to appreciate the truth of this statement.

The Mahomedans imagine that amongst the Feringees (*i.e.*, Europeans) there are sects corresponding with the Shias and Sunnis and that irrepressible hatred arises therefrom. We have often had occasion to explain to the inquisitive Asiatic that the English churches assimilate more with the Russian than any others, while on the other hand, history has shown the English to be our most persistent enemies. The matter is one which, in fact, does not depend upon religion but on material interests; even if we had been of one faith with the English, the latter would not have hesitated to incite against us both the Mussulmans on the pretext of supporting Mahomedanism, and other heathens in the name of their peculiar gods.

There is however another side to the question. The fact that a considerable number of English were killed, at the time of the rising of the Kafirs and Hottentots against the British Colonists in Southern Africa, was due to British merchants who kept the insurgents well supplied with muskets and ammunition, finding therein a most profitable speculation. If, then, this commercial people do not stand on cere-

mony with their fellow countrymen, little can be expected from them when dealing with other nations.

Whatever may have been the cause, the fact is certain that in 1853 the public mind in Central Asia was deeply agitated by reports as to the intention of Russia to eradicate Mahomedanism ; to annihilate the Mamlakat-i-Rim (literally, the Rimian Kingdom, or Turkey) ; to take from the Mussulmans the tomb of Hazrat-i-Isa (Jesus Christ), and to reduce all the Khanates to slavery. It was also loudly asserted that Allah had opened the hearts of the English ; that they had listened to the voice of the Prophet ; that they would not allow Mussulmans to be insulted or Turkey to be destroyed, and that they would insist upon Turkey being confirmed once and for ever in the possession of Jerusalem. To gain these ends, it was added, it was indispensable that the Khanates should bind themselves together into one general confederation and crush the Russians on the Syr Darya.

The result of these machinations was a really formidable movement in the end of 1853, which, however, was at once checked towards the close of the month of December by the

entire defeat of the Kokanians by Captain Shkupa under the walls of the present Fort Perovsk. After this repulse of the Kokanians, which exalted the name of the Russians in the eyes of all Central Asiatics, the projects of the English met with no further sympathy. The Ameer of Bokhara not only refused to take any part in the proposed confederation, or to permit the passage of English troops through his territory, but also issued an order that the emissary who had been sent to his Court should be executed.

With regard to the Kokanians, they ceased from all further action on the side of Perovsk, and changed their field of operations towards Vernoë. The Khivans, true to their old custom, took no open part in this movement against Russia, but Khivan agents were busily engaged in spreading alarm amongst the Kirgiz, and the Khan supported in every possible way the disturbances which were set on foot in the Orenburg steppes by Isset Kutebar, who had for many years been a thorn in the side of the Russian authorities.

In this way the English showed their perpetual watchfulness, and it only required the faintest sign of life on the part of the Russians

to excite their attention. Not a single step could be taken in advance without evoking innumerable questions on the part of English diplomatists, and without exciting the alarm of the East Indian Government, which poured money, promises and agents throughout all the Khanates of Central Asia.

The plan of uniting the Orenburg and Siberian lines of forts appeared to the English, as also to many Russians, to be merely a question of extending on the map the limits of the Russian dominions, since the extension of territory, thereby involved, comprised only an uninhabited, barren steppe where no opposition was possible. Such, indeed, may have been the case, but neither the Russians nor the English were prepared for the results which followed, for neither nation knew the true character of Cherniayef, to whose lot it fell to carry forward the line of frontier. Even at the present time the name of Michael Gregoryevich, the whole of whose exploits were accomplished in the short space of two years (1864-65), still lives not only in Russia and England, but also throughout Central Asia.

At the very outset Cherniayef saw clearly that his task could not be satisfactorily accom-

plished within the territorial limits and under the restrictions prescribed by his instructions. So long as Turkistan and Chemkent remained unoccupied in its front, it was scarcely possible to maintain the new frontier, and, while a variety of reports and representations were still hovering about, the deed was done. The towns of Turkistan, Chemkent, and soon afterwards Tashkent, were rapidly occupied, and the frontier of Russia was thus by one stroke brought to a distance of little more than 500 versts from India.

This succession of utterly unexpected successes raised a serious panic in England. The pens of the Cabinet of St. James were set going: questions were asked, answers given, notes exchanged, and a diplomatic campaign commenced. Correspondence, however, of this nature with our glorious Chancellor, Prince Gortchakof, who had only recently succeeded in outwitting all the Cabinets of Europe in the matter of the Polish campaign, could have but one result. The questionings of England *alone* could have but little significance after the fact that the Russian Minister had not hesitated to defy the whole coalition of European powers. The English

were naturally forced to accept the obvious argument that our advances are the result of the irresistible force of circumstances, that the result of our abandoning a position which we have once occupied would be only to oblige us to retake it,—for example, Pishpek, which would be wholly unmeaning as a frontier boundary unless coupled with the possession of certain other territory. This will always in future form our stereotyped answer to any such questions, and the English would act much more wisely if they once and for all ceased to raise any questions of the kind. Let them rest satisfied with the recognition of an accomplished fact, and things will go on more smoothly and more conformably to what is right and proper.

General Romanofski, who succeeded Cherniayef, remained in office only a few months, and although he gained for Russia the possession of Khodjent, Oratippe, and Jizzakh, still these were only small acquisitions when compared with the exploits of Cherniayef. It is only the recent victories over the Bokhariots and the celebrated Khivan Expedition that have already placed General Von Kauffman in the foremost rank of administrators. The extensive powers which were confided to him, and the

honor which all his subordinates have, so to speak, consented to accord to him, have produced the title of Yarym-padshah, or half King, which has been given to the Governor-General, not only by the lower classes of the native inhabitants, but also by the Khans themselves.

To return to the English. It is well known that a frightful massacre took place after the storming of Jizzakh. Confined in a corridor between two outer walls, the defenders crushed each other to death in their efforts to reach the narrow postern gate which led to a field lying exactly opposite the spot which was being stormed. Into this mingled mass of human beings, horses and pieces of artillery, the soldiery who had broken into the fort, fired in cold blood. Afterwards when the corpses were cleared away, the bodies were found of some Europeans clearly discernible by their exterior and the texture of their wearing apparel. No one doubted at the time that they were Englishmen, but no one took sufficient interest in the affair to discover the truth, and the unknown foreigners carried away with them their secret. In view of the fact that various suspicious personages, who were proved to be English

agents, have subsequently penetrated into Russian territory from India, there is nothing strange in the supposition that those at Jizzakh belonged to the same category. At all events nothing certain has ever been discovered regarding them.

CHAPTER XI.

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

Effect of our successes on the East Indian Army—Recall of Sir John Lawrence—Influence of public opinion and the personal views of the Ministry on the policy of England—Review of the line of action adopted by the new Viceroy Lord Mayo—Was there any reason to expect any sudden change in the Russian mode of operations?—The English enter into friendly relations with Ameer Shere Ali—Opinions of the London and Calcutta papers regarding the Umballa Conference—The English in Shere Ali's Insurance Office—Subtle policy of the Viceroy—Shere Ali, the patron and protector of England, appears in the character of a suppliant—Difference between the present subsidy paid by the English to the Afghans and that formerly paid—Objects of the English according to Hellwald—Are there any foundations for the apprehensions of the English?—Views expressed in the *Times*—Question regarding Herat—Routes to India—Treaty with Dost Mahomed in 1857—The Russians warned not to approach India, and advised to occupy themselves with the barbarous tribes—The whole world, including England, a gainer by the Russian conquests in Central Asia.

THAT the rapid successes of Russia in Central Asia should have alarmed the public mind in British India is only natural. The military element of the East Indian public, condemned to inaction owing to a prolonged peace, regards the successes of our troops with envy and impatience. A simple and disinterested line of policy will never be suited to the taste of the

English nation, and the justice of this remark is especially clearly seen in the ranks of the East Indian Army. The glorious achievements of the first English regiments in India, the truly heroic exploits of isolated detachments, combined with historical tradition and the love of glory, naturally keep alive amongst the troops in British India a longing for active warfare. The Russian troops, standing face to face against opponents more formidable than the English had to encounter in India, have accomplished in a very short time several brilliant campaigns; and the fresh laurels thus gained have excited in the East Indies feelings of jealousy and enmity. In England, too, public opinion is beginning to be familiar with the idea that there are times when it is more profitable to afford an army active occupation in war than to leave it to inaction and discontent. The Abyssinian Expedition, owing to the shortness of its duration, the smallness of the trophies, and the barrenness of its results, did not fully satisfy the appetite of the Indian Army. Moreover, it is well known that out of the number of the captives, whose release cost such an immense amount, many subsequently returned to Abyssinia, while the treasures of the Crown of Theo-

dore have no intrinsic value, and barely even attract the curiosity of visitors to the Kensington Museum. In short, England has been forced to recognize the fact that the taking of Magdala is not worth the five millions of pounds sterling which were wasted upon it.

The English Press, under the influence of its Indian correspondents, has exaggerated our forces, putting them down at 100,000 men, and while attributing impossible designs to Russia, and heaping reproaches on a former Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, for inactivity in view of our successes, it demanded from the English Crown that a more decided and firmer position shall be adopted with regard to Russia. "Guided by such ideas," wrote Baron Brunnow in his despatch dated 20th October (1st November) 1867, "they attribute ulterior motives to us, and charge us with making premature preparations to secure the success of an advance up to the very frontiers of Hindoostan, in order that we may be enabled to make a diversion from that side when the practical solution of the Eastern question causes a rupture between Russia and England." With regard to the English Government, Baron Brunnow stated his opinion that, although it does not reveal its

alarm by ill-regulated manifestos, such as were given out in the time of Palmerston, still in deference to public opinion it keeps a sharp eye on events, and is silently making preparations to meet any possible contingency.

The views of Sir John Lawrence may be briefly stated to be that India could not have anything to fear *from without*, and that the possible dangers to which she was exposed were *internal*, that Herat is not the only key of India, for there are others such as Astrabad, Khiva, Meshed and Balkh, that at the present time the true key is the range of the Hindu-Kush, and that if a Russian army should ever succeed in reaching that range, it would inevitably be extirpated to the last man on emerging from the passes and defiles. For these reasons Sir J. Lawrence considered that the English might look with equanimity on all advances of Russia, so long as they were confined to the further side of the Hindu-Kush.

Nevertheless, the rapidity of the Russian successes seriously alarmed the English; the Press took up the popular cry, and as a concession to public opinion, the English Government resolved to recall Sir John Lawrence. "A rational line of policy, however good it

may be," wrote Baron Brunnow in a despatch dated 20th June (2nd July) 1868, "in a country which like England is ruled by public opinion, cannot be maintained when once it ceases to be popular. Such was the fate of the Government of Sir J. Lawrence. He was charged with having facilitated Russian successes in Central Asia by his policy of masterly inactivity, and this charge, unjust as it is, found supporters even in India. Under the influence of those views, successive Viceroys have naturally felt the necessity for exhibiting more energy and activity in order to restore the prestige of England amongst the peoples who live in the neighbourhood of the English territories in India."

In the opinion of the author the charge thus brought against Sir J. Lawrence was not altogether justifiable, for that he did take some sort of measures is proved by the Europeans who were killed in the defence of Jizzakh. It is a matter for regret that this circumstance was not sufficiently cleared up at the time, and that we are in ignorance regarding these unknown champions against Russia who sacrificed their lives for Bokhara. On the other hand, it may reasonably be asked what other

measures Sir John Lawrence could have taken from the remote seat of his Government. If he had actually advanced with troops in the direction of Russian territory in Central Asia, which could only have been done by way of Afghanistan, it would not have caused us the slightest injury, as he would never have reached our frontier. The only remaining methods were diplomatic correspondence and the use of agents, to which means Sir John Lawrence appears to have freely resorted.

Sir J. Lawrence was succeeded by Lord Mayo. As the direction of English policy depends to a very considerable extent on public opinion, which had already declared itself opposed to a system of non-interference, it was natural to expect a sudden change in the action of the East Indian Government with regard to Central Asia. The personal views of the different Members of the English Government retain their influence over the politics of the Cabinet only during such time as those holding them continue in office, and thus it happens that it is impossible to guarantee that any one opinion, which carries authority to-day, will continue to prevail to-morrow. If, for instance, Lord Stanley, the supporter of

peace, should declare a preference for an unquiet neighbour to the danger of acquiring a tract of country, inhabited by a turbulent and faithless nation, and consequently should decline to entertain the idea of extending the frontiers of India on the side of Afghanistan, this opinion has a signification for us only during such time as Lord Stanley might remain in the Ministry, and his successors may possibly hold entirely different views.

In the same way the personal opinions of each successive Viceroy may influence the line of policy adopted by England. Lord Stanley declared that the personal convictions of Lord Mayo were not inclined towards the views of the Russophobists, but that he had to act in the midst of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy at Calcutta, whose instincts with respect to Russia were those of mistrust and hatred.

Thus it happened that the personal views of Lord Mayo naturally had an interest to our Statesmen. Baron Brunnow made our Minister for Foreign Affairs acquainted with these views in his despatch dated 17th (29th) November 1868, in which he represented Lord Mayo as not ascribing to us the deliberate intention of attempting to undermine the security of Bri-

tish dominions in India, which were so far distant from the frontiers of Russian territory. On the other hand Lord Mayo considered that the best means of providing for the security of India were the erection of railroads which would enable England to concentrate in six weeks' time at any given point 40,000 troops, while an advancing enemy, however good their organization might be, would arrive on the scene of operations exhausted by a long march over a barren country. In such a case, moreover, a hostile army being separated by a long interval from its basis of operations would naturally have to experience insufficiency of provisions and military stores, which could not happen to the English army provided that it possessed a system of railroads. Lord Mayo therefore directed his attention principally to building a net work of railways with ramifications from the centre of India to the North-Western Frontier, which he considered would constitute the most durable system of defence.

It was natural to expect that while the recall of Cherniayef would be followed by a falling off of energy and enterprise on the part of the Russians, that of Lawrence, which happened almost at the same time, would produce a

development in both these respects on the part of the English. But such was not the result. A positive fever for further conquest raged amongst our troops—an ailment to cure which no method of treatment was effective, especially as the correctives applied were freely interspersed with such stimulants as honors and decorations. Not only the Russian Generals, but even the youngest Lieutenants, raved after further extension of territory, while those of the officers, who were entrusted with any sort of independent command, carried into effect their individual schemes. In this way it was that Abramof, in command of troops near Jizzakh, took Yani-Kurgan, which formed a tempting morsel owing to its proximity to his camp. It was indeed impossible to expect that such desires should be resisted, when by gratifying them it was possible for a Lieutenant in four years to become a General.*

This state of affairs was well known to the English, and in one of the official documents it was unequivocally stated that the English Cabinet, while it placed full reliance on the sincerity of the assurances given by the

* In the beginning of 1864 Abramof was a Lieutenant, and in the middle of 1868 he was promoted to the rank of General.

Russian Government regarding its unwillingness to extend Russian acquisitions in Central Asia, at the same time was apprehensive as to the results of the enterprise of subordinate officers, who in seeking after honours and rewards were easily induced to transgress the territorial limits prescribed by superior authority. Thus it was that the seed which had been sown by Cherniayef promised for some time to come to produce an increase of energy and activity on the Russian frontiers, while as regards India, there were no grounds for supposing that any sudden or unexpected change would take place.

Since the policy of non-interference, which Sir J. Lawrence had uniformly adopted, met only with dissatisfaction from the public, while the views of the English Cabinet were entirely opposed to armed interference, it was natural to expect that England would adopt some sort of intermediate line of action, such as might, as far as possible, be satisfactory to both countries. Such a line of action the English thought they could find in upholding the power of Shere Ali, whose sympathies were already enlisted in their favor. The *Times* took advantage of the celebrated

Umballa Conference in 1869 between the late Viceroy Lord Mayo and Shere Ali, the Afghan Ameer, to give forth the following utterances:—"At each step the Ameer was met by impressive proofs of our strength in India. He travelled on our railroads, by means of which, in case of necessity, troops and war-like material could be rapidly brought to bear upon the frontier of Peshawur. In several places too there were displayed before him bodies of troops at least four times as numerous as the entire number of the Russians in the whole of Turkistan. No doubt could possibly remain in his mind regarding the immeasurable superiority of the British power in Asia over that of the Russians, and he could not possibly make any mistake as to the side from which Afghanistan was threatened by the greater danger." In short, since Russia was so far distant, and her displeasure consequently not quickly perceptible while England was at his very doors, and could at any given moment make her presence felt, it was clear to which of his neighbours Shere Ali ought to incline. This, indeed, is so self-evident, that it is difficult to understand why the English should have undertaken to

pay Afghanistan an annual subsidy * of 800,000 roubles. Thus argue the English public, who, so far from being apprehensive, boast of their position, but in India things are better appreciated. In that country it is very well understood that even if the English forces numbered tenfold instead of fourfold those of the Russians, their position would still be a very critical one in view of the native population, numbering two hundred millions of oppressed and discontented people. There they recognize the fact that after all Shere Ali is hardly such a simpleton as not to appreciate perfectly well what the true position of the English in India is. Afghanistan, single-handed, could not of course cope with the forces of India, but if in any future time it should befall the English merchants to have to stand at the bar on account of all their misdeeds, barbarities, executions, and robberies according to the bill of the natives of the country, supported by such an advocate as Russia, it is by no means certain in whose favor fate might determine this ancient litigation.

* Incorrect. The British Government never agreed to pay the Ameer an annual subsidy.—*Trs.*

After the Umballa Conference, when in England "public opinion became disenchanted on discovering that no treaty of any kind had been concluded with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and that England had received no substantial return for the liberal subsidy of £120,000 Sterling," in India this matter was regarded in an entirely different light, "this subsidy is undoubtedly a heavy burden for the finances of India, but it is a sacrifice, to which we can reconcile ourselves as being the premium paid for the security of the northern boundaries of India." Thus we see how the English import their commercial ideas into politics, and, far from regarding it as a humiliation, freely pay *tribute* to the Afghans and others, and thus purchase peace by gold,—a purely mercantile transaction, for England has, so to speak, *insured* her East Indian possessions over the counter of Shere Ali, and pays annually a premium on the insurance bond.

In her innermost heart no doubt England congratulates herself on having got the better of the ignorant Afghan in the transaction, because, as a matter of fact, Afghanistan is not liberally paid in comparison with the work to be done. It is clearly impossible to guarantee

the security of East India on the North for such a small annual payment as 800,000 roubles, and Shere Ali will assuredly either over-reach the English in his turn, or take advantage of some forward movement of the Russians, though it should be only the occupation of the mouths of the Amu Darya, to demand an increased payment on the part of the English Government.

In order to oblige the Ameer to give his consent to be present at the Umballa Conference, and thus to take a step which, since it would have had the appearance of the weak seeking the good graces of the strong, would unavoidably lower him in his own estimation, the English had recourse to the following artifice:—After holding out promises of money and arms to Shere Ali, they declined to despatch their delegate for the purpose of conducting the necessary negotiations, upon which Shere Ali, tempted by these promises, agreed to absent himself to a distance of 500 miles from his dominions, and thus presented himself before the eyes of the Asiatic world as a monarch suing for the support of Great Britain.

In justice to the line of policy adopted by

the English, it must be admitted that they have succeeded in preserving their own dignity in the eyes of their short-sighted neighbour, since by resolving to pay a yearly donation, they have compelled their ally, the Ameer of Afghanistan, to appear in the character of a suppliant praying for assistance. Journies for a personal conference are not customary amongst Asiatic rulers, none of whom would ever dream of setting out for the territory of a foreign power in order to have a personal interview with its ruler, since such a proceeding would amount to an admission of subjection. Hence it is that in spite of sufficiently unmis-takeable hints and of the written invitation of the Governor-General of Turkistan, neither the Khan of Kokan, nor the Ameer of Bokhara, have ever consented to avail themselves of the high honor of a personal interview. Certainly they have on rare occasions gone so far as to send their sons for this purpose, but they regard this as the greatest possible concession, and as conferring an especial mark of honor upon the Russians. Meanwhile, these Khans are regarded not only by the English Press, but also by the Russians themselves as being wholly dependent upon the

Russian power. To such an extent do we close our eyes to the true position.

However, the means adopted by the English were effectual in accomplishing their object. The occupation of Samarcand by the Russians in 1868 produced such an effect in Central Asia and such a panic amongst Anglo-Indians, that it was natural to expect a countermove of some sort or other on the part of the English, such as should counteract, as far as possible, the influence which had been gained by the Russians, and should restore the prestige of the British power. Such a move was seen in the Umballa Conference.

The English hastened to make every possible preparation for a spectacle which they had planned with the object of exhibiting their strength, since the whole of Central Asia was to be a spectator in the person of Shere Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan. The pageant had also an inner signification. "He who has eyes to see, let him see, and he who has ears to hear, let him hear," and the idea was that Shere Ali should be impressed as much as possible by an imposing display of England's strength. Whether the spectacle was a success or a failure, whether the eyes saw

and the ears heard what was intended by the English, is a different question altogether. The gifts made by the English to the Ameer were valued at 700,000 roubles.* Lord Mayo even presented Shere Ali with his own private sword, perhaps as an indication that it would never be unsheathed against Afghanistan—thus at all events must be understood the words “We English will always be your friends,” which on the occasion of the presentation were addressed by the Viceroy to the Ameer.

With regard to the Umballa Conference the *Times* wrote—“Afghanistan in itself has no sort of signification whatever to England, and is only important as a buffer against future aggressive designs on the part of Russia. The existence of Treaties is clearly inconceivable in a region where law has no force whatever, where the Ameer is surrounded by numerous independent Chiefs who descend from their inaccessible mountain abodes only for plunder and pillage, and where the death of each successive Ameer is a signal for intestine disturb-

* The English *Times* estimates the value at 840,000 roubles, but this includes the value of the muskets and cannon which cannot be regarded as a personal gift to the Ameer.

ances." These views are, in our opinion, just, not only as regards Afghanistan, but also in the case of all the Asiatic Khanates. From our own experience we may add the observation that not one of the Khans has ever considered himself bound by the Treaties concluded by his predecessors, while at the same time he fulfils only by force of compulsion the Treaties concluded by himself, and then only to such a degree as suits his advantage.

Formerly, when the Whig Ministry was in power, it was usual for the Governors-General of India to give the Afghans a money subsidy for the purpose of purchasing peace from their warlike neighbours. At the present time this custom has been revived with an important difference, that the object of the subsidy is now to purchase *an ally*. The whole distinction consists in the fact that, whereas formerly the English paid the money, but at the same time prohibited the export into Afghanistan of arms and elephants, without which the transport of artillery in the hills is impossible, now, the English not only permit military stores to be imported into Afghanistan, but also give the Afghans abundance of rifles and cannon, binding themselves moreover to main-

tain on their own account a portion of the Afghan forces, to drill them, and to supply them with armourers, gun-founders and munitions of war.

If it is remembered that all this is being done for a nation which only thirty years ago most treacherously extirpated a British army numbering nearly 48,000 men,—for a nation, moreover, which as a body even up to the present day detests the English,—such an entire revolution in policý becomes the more significant. Clearly some peculiarly exceptional circumstances must have occurred to compel the English to adopt their present line of action. These exceptional circumstances as a matter of fact exist, but only in the imagination of the East Indian bureaucracy. Disquieting thoughts of the future are sharpening the brains of the East Indian officials and deranging their nerves, and the result is that the Calcutta Press is proclaiming the necessity for taking active measures against the aggressive designs of Russia on India. Supposing the idea of an invasion of India to be only the fruit of the excited imagination of a small official *clique*, nevertheless the earnestness which characterizes the measures now adopted by the English would not thereby

lose its signification, and would still prove, firstly, that such an invasion is considered feasible, and, secondly, that the English do not regard it as wholly unattended by danger.

The objects which England has endeavoured to attain are excellently described in Von Hellwald's brochure* *The Russians in Central Asia*. Regarding the Umballa Conference Von Hellwald expresses the following views, which are clearly taken from an English source:—"Shere Ali consented to absent himself to a distance of 500 miles from his frontiers, and appeared before the eyes of the Asian world as a monarch suing for the support of Great Britain, but he was received with such a display of pomp as to appear to his own subjects to be thereby exalted and strengthened in spite of the supplicant's part which he was enacting. The Ameer, it must be concluded, returned to Cabul the friend of England, and if such is the case, the advantages to England are very considerable. Practically it amounts to this, that the English thereby ensure a year's notice of any hostile movement on the part of European troops against the Indian frontier. Three days are suffi-

* Not the book of the same name, but apparently a smaller pamphlet.—*Trs.*

cient for Shere Ali to give information to the Commissioner of Peshawur of any danger threatening him. From Peshawur the telegraph lines branch off in all directions, and in the course of three weeks half a dozen Engineers, five mountain batteries, twenty officers, such as defended Kars (against the Russians), and also an advance of five years' subsidy could without difficulty reach Cabul. Thus supported, the Afghans could with their own troops arrest the progress of the Russians, or at any rate greatly impede their advance into Afghanistan, while a formidable army of the fourth military power in the world, together with vast pecuniary resources, unique in Asia for their inexhaustibleness, would be concentrated by means of railroads on the frontiers of India."

Herein we see the true secret of the Umballa agreement, and the means by which the English hope to arrest our progress.

The apprehensions of England however are entirely groundless. The primary and sole object of our recent movement in Central Asia has been the strategical connection of the Siberian and Syr Darian lines of fortifications. The prosecution of this object has involved us

in a series of wars with Kokan and Bokhara which have terminated in the entire triumph of the Russian arms, and in the acquisition of an extensive territory, although these achievements which were never anticipated in the original plan of the Russian Government. If this extension of territory has resulted in the approximation of our frontiers to those of British India, our objects are nevertheless far removed "from carrying the matter to its legitimate conclusion," and the apprehensions of the English are at all events premature. How far a Russian invasion by way of Afghanistan is feasible the English must necessarily be the best judges, and therefore we ought to accept their alarm as an indication that our present position, gained without any premeditated plan, is already regarded as dangerous to India. This is clearly recognized, not only by the English, but by all politicians who have any acquaintance whatever with the scene of action and the geographical, ethnographical, and political conditions by which we are surrounded in Central Asia. Adjutant-General Ignatief, our Envoy Extraordinary at the Ottoman Porte, thus expressed his opinion on this question in a despatch dated 28th June (10th July) 1868:

“The friendship of America combined with the advantageous position which we have gained by conquest in Central Asia, must of necessity influence the future attitude of England in the event of a European crisis, which may be precipitated by the French. So long as we do not directly threaten the peculiar interests of England, she will think twice before allowing herself to become involved in a war with us.” The following advice given by Baron Brunnow in his despatch dated 26th September (8th October) 1868 may be properly quoted here—“prudence demands that we should not place too great confidence in the stability of the resolutions adopted by England. Without raising any useless questions, it would be well that we should be perpetually on the alert with regard to her attitude.” In order to pacify public opinion in England, our Minister for War forwarded to Lord Stanley a detailed statement regarding the number of Russian troops in Asia, and the fact that their total strength was very considerably less than 100,000 men ought to have been a sufficient proof that they were not intended for aggressive purposes.

Reference has already been made to the powerful influence which public opinion exer-

cises in England. The particular paper, which at any time sounds the note of alarm, is a sufficient index of the particular section of the public or the political party that inspires it, and the number of subscribers to any given paper may as a rule be taken to show how far the views promulgated in it are shared by the general public. As regards the influence of the various papers the *Times* occupies the first place, and is not unreasonably called "the sixth Great Power." If, therefore, we wish to know the views of the English Government, we must not ignore the opinions expressed by the English Press. It must be remembered that, although the Queen is the supreme power in England, it is the nation at large who by means of their representatives really guide the administration, and these representatives are of course bound to listen to the voice of their constituents.

The view of the English Press regarding Central Asian matters at the time when the news was received of the earliest Russian successes may be gathered from the following extract from the *Saturday Review* :—"At all events, the Russians must not be allowed to take up a position on the Amu, or to extend their terri-

tory in the direction of Herat. Even as matters are at present situated, the Russian frontier is only 500 miles distant from Herat, while the distance from the latter place to the frontiers of India is 800 miles. The left bank of the Amu, and the mountain ranges which form the southern boundary of Herat, constitute the first line of our Indian defences, and therefore an English detachment ought always to be in readiness at Herat, to be moved to any point which may be threatened on the left bank of the Amu. The presence of such a detachment would strengthen very considerably the position of our diplomatic representatives, and therefore if it is to be done, it should be done without delay, so that we may not be anticipated." Thus the writer of this article proposed the English occupation of Herat as a counter-move to the Russian advance to Tashkent.

The most practicable route to India is perhaps *via* Persia and Herat. From Herat one route lies through Candahar, Quettah, the Bolan Pass (nearly 120 versts in length), and thence into British territory. To overcome the difficulties of the Bolan is far from easy, since the country is inhabited by ma-

rauding tribes, and it is impossible to say whether their attitude would be friendly or the reverse. From Astrabad the length of the entire journey *via* the Bolan Pass is about 2,000 versts, Herat being situated about half way. From Candahar there is an alternative route branching off to Khelat in Beloochistan, and beyond Khelat, a road, traversible by carts, 466 versts in length, leads to Kurrachee. From Khelat Shikarpoor also may be reached, though there is the danger of encountering robbers in the mountain pass. A second road from Herat branches off *via* Ghuznee, and thence by the Gomal Pass to Dera Ishmael Khan, but here again there is the risk of attack by the hill tribes. All these routes however are sufficiently practicable to make the English most averse from seeing either Persia or Russia established at Herat, while with regard to Persia, England fears that she would not only be powerless to prevent the progress of Russian troops, but would actually open out the route for them.

Again without passing through Persian territory, there would be no difficulty from our present positions on the Amu Darya in advancing to Herat *via* Merv, which is situated

at the threshold of the former town. The possibility of such a move has compelled the English to resolve on some fixed line of action, and they have determined, if such an advance is ever accomplished, to occupy the Bolan Pass and subsequently the town of Quettah, in which case British troops would be actually on the road to Herat and a crisis would be precipitated.

It should be remarked here that the question regarding Herat has previously on more than one occasion formed the subject of discussion. About the year 1840 when the Persian troops besieged Herat, amongst the suite of the Shah was present a Russian Agent by name Count Simonich, whose presence produced a diplomatic correspondence between the English and Russian Cabinets. In order to oblige the Persians to raise the siege, the English demanded satisfaction for an outrage to which a courier of their mission had been subjected, and occupied the island of Karrack, a movement which excited the most profound astonishment on the part of the Shah, since up to that time his relations with the English had been of the most friendly nature. The second occasion on which the Herat question was raised was in 1857,

at the time of the open rupture between Dost Mahomed and the Persians. The English again occupied the island of Karrack and the town of Bushire, and thereby compelled the Persians to abandon their designs on Herat, when, as had been the case in 1838, the Persian movement was again attributed to the promptings of Russia and to her designs in view of a route to India *via* Herat.

Sir John Lawrence arranged a meeting with Dost Mahomed at Peshawur, where on the 26th January 1857 he concluded a Treaty consisting of thirteen Articles.

The 1st Article recited the fact that the East India Company from friendship with Dost Mahomed agreed to assist him in his war with the Persians, who had occupied Herat in opposition to assurances given to the British Government, and that for this purpose a monthly sum of one lakh of rupees would be given to Dost Mahomed. The remaining Articles ran as follows :—

2. The Ameer shall keep his present number of cavalry and artillery, and shall maintain not less than 18,000 infantry, of which 13,000 shall be regulars divided into thirteen regiments.

3. The Ameer is to make his own arrangements for receiving the money at the British treasuries, and conveying it through his own country.

4. British Officers, with suitable native establishments and orderlies, shall be deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government, to Cabul, or Candahar, or Balkh, or all three places, or wherever an Afghan army be assembled to act against the Persians. It will be their duty to see generally that the subsidy granted to the Ameer be devoted to the military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their own Government informed of all affairs. They will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops, or advising the Cabul Government; and they will not interfere in any way in the internal administration of the country. The Ameer will be responsible for their safety and honorable treatment while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted with all military and political matters connected with the war.

5. The Ameer of Cabul shall appoint and maintain a Vakeel at Peshawur.

6. The subsidy of one lakh per mensem shall cease from the date on which peace is made

between the British and Persian Governments, or at any previous time at the will and pleasure of the Governor-General of India.

7. Whenever the subsidy shall cease the British Officers shall be withdrawn from the Ameer's country; but at the pleasure of the British Government, a Vakeel, not a European Officer, shall remain at Cabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Cabul.

8. The Ameer shall furnish a sufficient escort for the British Officers from the British border when going to the Ameer's country, and to the British border when returning.

9. The subsidy shall commence from 1st January 1857, and be payable at the British treasury one month in arrears.

10. The five lakhs of Rupees which have been already sent to the Ameer (three to Candahar and two to Cabul), will not be counted in this Agreement. They are a free and separate gift from the Honorable East India Company. But the sixth lakh now in the hands of the mahajuns of Cabul, which was sent for another purpose, will be one of the instalments under this Agreement.

11. This Agreement in no way supersedes

the Treaty made at Peshawur on 30th March 1855 (corresponding with the 11th of Rujjub 1271), by which the Ameer of Cabul engaged to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honorable East India Company; and the Ameer of Cabul, in the spirit of that Treaty, agrees to communicate to the British Government any overtures he may receive from Persia or the allies of Persia during the war, or while there is friendship between the Cabul and British Governments.

12. In consideration of the friendship existing between the British Government and Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, the British Government engages to overlook the past hostilities of all the tribes of Afghanistan, and on no account to visit them with punishment.

13. Whereas the Ameer has expressed a wish to have 4,000 muskets given him in addition to the 4,000 already given, it is agreed that 4,000 muskets shall be sent by the British Government to Tull, whence the Ameer's people will convey them with their own carriage.

This Treaty with Dost Mahomed was, as circumstances afterwards proved, entirely superfluous, for the Persians evacuated Herat, compelled to do so, not by the Afghans, but by the

English occupation of Bushire. Admitting that the extra expenditure thereby involved of some lakhs was an imperceptible item in the English accounts, still the important point to be considered is not the actual loss of the money, but whether or not it was applied to useful purposes. It may be stated with certainty that all these subsidies to the Afghans have neither increased nor diminished the influence of the East Indian Government. Indeed to the mind of an Asiatic the payment of a subsidy presents itself in only one way. He regards it, as he did in the present instance, as a proof of weakness and incapacity to gain unaided certain desired ends. In the case of the Afghans this was the more natural owing to the blows which they had already exchanged with the English. Perceiving that their old enemies desired to purchase their friendship, the Afghans argued then, as they do now, that the English required their services, being unable of themselves to cope even with Persia. Such an opinion can hardly be regarded as flattering to, or desirable for, the British Empire in India.

It was not however for long that Dost Mahomed enjoyed his subsidy, for on the 4th

March the Persians made peace and a treaty was signed, one of the first conditions of which was that the Shah should, immediately after its ratification, grant a full pardon to all those Persians who had compromised themselves by communications with the British troops. The Persian troops were bound to evacuate Herat, and all other Afghan territory occupied by them, in the course of three months after the ratification of the treaty, while at the same time the Shah, on behalf of himself and his successors, renounced all claims whatever to Herat, and bound himself to a policy of non-interference with regard to the internal affairs of Afghanistan. In the event of any misunderstanding with Afghanistan, Persia was to have recourse to the intervention of the English, who in their turn promised to adjust any dispute in such a way as might be conformable to justice and agreeable to the honor of Persia. If the Persian frontiers should be violated by Afghan subjects, the Persians, in the event of not receiving satisfaction, were to have the right of commencing military operations, provided that the Persian troops should be withdrawn immediately that their object had been effected. A

condition was also inserted that the captives of either power should be exchanged without payment of ransom.

Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, the British Mission was to return to Teheran, where the Persian Government promised to receive them with the ceremonies and apologies prescribed in a Note, signed on the same day as the treaty, by the plenipotentiaries of the contracting parties. Three months after the return of the Embassy, a mixed Commission was to be appointed at Teheran to investigate claims brought forward by British subjects, the settlement of such as were considered well-founded being carried out in the course of one year. The British Government at the same time agreed to renounce the right of protecting Persian subjects not in the actual service of British Agents, on the ground that such a right was enjoyed by no other power. The treaty of 1851, which provided for the annihilation of the slave-trade in the Persian Gulf, was at the same time confirmed, and it was stipulated that the British troops should not be bound to evacuate the ports which they had occupied until such time as the Persians had fully complied with all the above conditions.

It is unnecessary to say that the terms of this treaty were distasteful to Persia, and but little calculated to dispose the Persian Government favorably towards England, who by the simple method of seizing some town on the seaboard had forced compliance with her demands. Moreover Herat, to which place converge all the principal roads from Astrabad, Khiva, Bokhara, Cabul, Khelat and India, is a point of such vast importance to Persia that she has invariably striven by every means in her power to gain a footing there. There is no doubt that a hint of support is only required to induce Persia to throw off her present involuntary inactivity and to occupy Herat, but such support cannot be promised by any power, since to give effect to such a promise would necessarily require not only a land army but also a fleet.

Western Europe, from time immemorial hostile to Eastern, *i.e.*, to Russia, lends a willing ear, as has always been the case, to every absurdity regarding Russia which is promulgated to her detriment by idle politicians. Seeing that the French in 1870 showed themselves wholly ignorant of the geography of their own particular country, they cannot be

expected to know much of Russia. Wholly ignorant of the nature of Central Asia, and the labour which every forward step has involved and will involve before the tribes inhabiting the territory occupied by the Russians can be brought into a complete state of subjection, the Western Press has most seriously assured its readers that the natural consequence of Russia's conquests in Turkistan will be the expulsion of the English from India, followed by the inroad into Western Europe of wild hordes of Kirgiz, Bashkirs, and Kokanians, under the leadership of Russian Generals.

The *Times* and *Daily News* have discussed in all its bearings the question regarding Herat, and, justly considering that Khanate as the gate to India, have refused to be comforted even by the fact that there is an intervening distance of about 1,000 miles between that point and the mouths of the Indus. They assert that when the time comes, which, according to the Indian correspondent of the *Times*, will be when the Turkish question is reopened in Europe, the Russians will not allow their advance to be arrested at Herat. "The only reason for the failure of Russia in her attempt on Constantinople in 1853-55 was

the fact that the Russians omitted to operate simultaneously in Central Asia against the English. At the present time they are correcting this error. Their steamers ply on the Syr and Amu Darya, their outposts have been advanced to a distance of 300 miles from our frontiers, while their relations with Persia are most cordial, and they enjoy unlimited popularity amongst the inhabitants of Central Asia."

In order to allay the anxieties of the English public, the *Times* enumerated all the obstacles which a Russian army would have to encounter on its way to India, and showed beyond all possible doubt that such an army would perish, if not during its march to Afghanistan or in Afghanistan itself, at all events in the stifling atmosphere of north-western India. "First of all, the real distance of East India from Russian Turkistan must be calculated, not from the most advanced Russian outpost, but from the centres where the Russian forces are actually concentrated." This is to some extent correct, but the facts regarding these "centres" do not appear to be clearly understood by the English themselves, for no centres properly so called exist either

in Turkistan or in the East Indies, both of which countries form only advanced posts of Russia and England, and, looking at the matter in this light, the position of the Russians in Asia is the more favorable of the two.

“The intermediate strip of territory,” continues the *Times*, “is characterized by very severe cold in winter and unbearable heat in summer. The region round the Caspian Sea is in the highest degree unhealthy, and roads do not exist. Under these circumstances, how could it be possible to convey artillery and military stores for a numerous army through barren deserts, and how could reinforcements be brought up?”

The reply to all these questions is to be found in our recent expedition against Khiva, and now that we have established ourselves on the mouths of the Amu Darya, the transport by sea of stores and reinforcements has been considerably facilitated. If all the difficulties enumerated by the *Times* should fail to arrest the progress of the Russian soldiers, a new difficulty is said to exist in the shape of the Afghans. “The brave, energetic, but false and treacherous population of Afghanistan will first receive with hospitality and caress the hostile

army, but afterwards betray and annihilate them. The endless defiles, gaping abysses, eternal snows, and tempestuous torrents of rain will inevitably assist the Afghans in the work of destroying the hated strangers." Again if even all these difficulties should be overcome, what would then remain before the Russian troops? "Exhausted by their march, almost without artillery and stores, these children of the North would enter the burning plains of India—to them a new world—in order to make war with an enemy who are fighting at their homes, who are supplied with all the necessaries for war, and who possess the power of choosing their own time both for attacks and retreats." The result of such conditions is self-evident.

Still in spite of all this, in order to divert the attention of the Russians from India, the *Times* points out to them a "much greater" task, namely, the occupation of the extensive provinces of Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to China, and from the Altai Mountains to the Himalayas. "The pacification of barbarous tribes would be a much more advantageous task than a war against the climate and troops of India."

On this condition only, *viz.*, that we should

not advance in the direction of India, the English are prepared to tolerate our presence in Asia, and indeed profess to consider that it would not be without certain advantages to themselves. "We by no means wish," continues the *Times*, "that this huge extent of territory should always remain the haunt of semi-barbarous nomad tribes. *Russian civilization is at all events superior to that which at present exists in those parts*"—a flattering admission which places us in a position only a trifle higher than that of the Kirgiz and Turkomans!

Fearing however that the greediness of the Russian Bear would not be satisfied with such insignificant morsels as Bokhara, Khiva, and Kokan, the whole population of which Khanates scarcely exceed in number that of London, the English impress* upon us the importance in view of Russian interests of the Amu Daryan region "as being," it is said, "most adapted for the grand Siberian railroad, the construction of which, owing to its important significance to the whole world, should not be delayed." If the occupation of this region should not satisfy Russia, we are advised to

* Letter of an Ango-Indian, Nos. 21 and 29 of the *Golos*, 1873.

occupy ourselves in annexing the Western Provinces of China, "the occupation of this territory would give Russia thirty-five millions of new subjects, the maintenance of order, and the diffusion of civilization amongst whom would form a worthy task for the Russians." Thus an honorable and remunerative line of action is proposed for Russia, namely, to introduce order and civilization amongst the savage nomads of Central Asia. The views thus expressed by an Anglo-Indian differ entirely from those of the *Times*. The former neither threatens nor endeavours to terrify us, as public opinion does of England, but on the contrary delicately and in insinuating tones refers to the various bonds which bind England with Russia, both commercial, literary, social, and even episcopal (an allusion to the endeavour to unite the English and orthodox churches), urging that for these reasons both nations sympathize to a considerable extent with each other, that the English formerly regarded the Russians through Polish eyes, and that at the present time there are indications of a favorable disposition on the part of England towards Russia in consequence of the glorious reforms of the present reign, &c., &c.

Most English writers as a rule display on the one hand either entire self-confidence or, on the other, a nervous timidity which is alive to every rumour. There are very few who regard with equanimity the gradual movement of Russia and see in it firstly historical necessity, and, secondly, a pledge for the maintenance of peace and good order in the future. One of the most prominent of such writers was indisputably Sir Roderick Murchison, the President of the Royal Geographical Society, but even of those who profess to share his convictions regarding the advantages of the pacification of Asia by Russian bayonets and by Russian influence, the greater part only do so on compulsion, because of the impossibility of arresting our progress. With the resolution produced by despair they exclaim " We have no reason to fear the fall of Bokhara and even of Cabul. Let the Russians establish themselves at the very doors of India. We can have no objection to their being our neighbours. In fact we ought to rejoice in the neighbourhood of a durable Empire, which will respect treaties, instead of a number of barbarous and treacherous tribes who are ruining us by the necessity of sending yearly expeditions against them."

100 *Russia and England in Central Asia.*

In other words, there is no evil without some good in it. The more candid openly declare that "in advancing into Central Asia the Russians are forwarding the interests of England as well as their own," that is, that Russia is ingenuously bearing the heat and burden of the day in order that England may reap the benefit. The *Times* explains the question somewhat more in detail. "If Russia were to be left to herself," writes that paper, "she would not delay to establish her authority over the whole of Central Asia. England alone can prevent this, and the whole question is whether it is worth while to oppose Russia, and if so, in what way? The interests of England certainly do not demand that the Russians should be deprived of their conquests. The dominions of Russia on the Oxus and Jaxartes and even in Bokhara do not threaten the English sovereignty in India with the slightest danger. The world at large is positively benefited by the conquests of Russia, since it would be difficult to find another region where a change in the Government was so desirable as in Central Asia. The apathy and religious fanaticism of different Rulers, combined with the want of all good qualities whatsoever, has con-

verted many fruitful valleys into barren wastes, and many flourishing and wealthy towns into ruins. The country and the population can only gain by a change from the present state of anarchy to a condition of good order under Russian guidance, in spite of the officialdom and routine by which Russian administration is accompanied. And what can England lose by this? In the far future she is threatened by the possibility of a rival for dominion in India. But before an actual strife for India can become possible, Russia will be obliged to subdue not only Khiva and Bokhara, but also Afghanistan, and this will not be accomplished in a single day. On the other hand, the conquests of Russia are, in a commercial point of view, profitable to England. The competition of Russian manufacturers cannot place such embargoes on English commerce as the prevailing anarchy or the robberies of Asiatic despots." It is strange to notice how in spite of such a belief in the advantageous results to be derived from Russian influence in Central Asia, the English Government is endeavouring at the same time in every possible way to counteract and nullify that influence.

In 1869 a question was put in the English Parliament regarding Central Asian affairs,

and in the debate which ensued, an observation was made that England ought to keep an eye upon another frontier of India, *i.e.*, on the side of Persia. This observation resulted in the English Cabinet striving to strengthen its influence in Persia and acceding to the request of the Shah, the British Government deputed some officers for the purpose of drilling and reorganizing the Persian army on a European model. A similar policy has been followed by England with regard to Afghanistan.

It cannot be doubted that such measures as these on the part of the English Government are not reconcilable with a policy of entire non-intervention and strict neutrality. We of course are only stating what has, as a matter of fact, taken place, without having the slightest chance of counteracting it, even if the interests of Russia were inconvenienced thereby. Our diplomatists have never sounded an alarm on account of any measures of the English Government with regard to Asia, nor have they ever asked any questions, nor made any representations on the subject, while, on the other hand, the Russian Government has been incessantly forced to allay the anxieties of the Company of Merchants, otherwise styled the British Empire!

CHAPTER XII.

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.—(Continued.)

Which is the stronger power?—Routes from Kashgar to India—Can Mr. Forsyth be believed?—Evidence of Mr. Shaw—Means of arresting our progress on the way to India—Neutrality of Afghanistan—Views of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Interview between Prince Gorchakof and Lord Clarendon in 1869—Opinion of the *Times* regarding the neutrality of Afghanistan—The mere fact of neighbourship with Russia a danger to England—Lord Mayo on the unsatisfactory state of affairs in India—Illiberality of the English in the matter of taxation and their carelessness for the well-being of the people—Influence brought to bear on Shere Ali Khan—Exchange of friendly and amicable assurances—Negotiations of Mr. Forsyth regarding the neutrality of Kashgar—Benefits to be derived by Russia from neighbourship with England—Agitation caused by the Khivan Expedition—Revival of the question regarding a neutral zone—Embassy of Count Shuvalof—Conclusions drawn by the *Times* and *Morning Post* regarding the recognition by the Russians of the neutrality of Afghanistan—Opinion of Mr. Bright regarding the Anglo-Indian Empire—Can a change of the policy be expected on the part of England owing to the marriage connection recently entered into?

If the English in spite of all their advantages consider their position in India as not free from danger, we certainly on the other hand have more reason for endeavouring to secure ourselves against all possible contingencies.

The English have at their disposal in India a larger number of troops than the Russians in Central Asia, and possess better means of communication with their frontiers. Afghanistan is regarded as the future basis of operations, where, on the first alarm, they would concentrate all the available forces of India, which, together with the Afghans in British pay, would amount to such a number as would effectually arrest our progress. According to the conditions concluded at the Umballa Conference, the English, on receiving the first news of a Russian advance on Afghanistan, are bound in the course of three weeks to assist the Ameer with five mountain batteries of artillery, twenty-five officers (including six Engineers), and besides this with an advance of the subsidy for five years, or 4,000,000 roubles.

According to the statistics of 1873, the Indian Government has at its disposal an army numbering 190,264 men, of whom, however, only 60,632 are British soldiers with 2,880 officers, while the Native troops number 123,470 men. The entire forces comprise 50 battalions of infantry and 72 squadrons of cavalry, with 402 pieces of artillery. Adding to these the troops of the dependent Native Rulers,

including the Afghans, the grand total of the forces may be estimated at 300,000 men.

With regard to the Russians, the entire number of the Turkistan forces, according to the statistics of 1875, amounted to 33,893 men, consisting of—

(1.) *Regulars*—18 battalions, 5 companies, with 48 pieces of artillery, and 13 depôts.

(2.) *Irregulars*—1 battalion, 37 “sotnias” (cavalry) with eight pieces of artillery.

Total, 19 battalions, 5 companies of infantry, 37 sotnias of cavalry, 56 pieces of artillery, and 13 depôts.

It is only necessary to compare these figures with those of the British forces in India to show whether the Russians or English are most capable of undertaking an offensive movement, and it is clear that the Russians ought not to be behindhand in taking such precautionary measures as may be possible, as for instance improving the present means of communication and acquiring an advantageous basis of operations.

The connection of the Caspian with the Aral by means of a railroad, combined with the establishment of steam navigation on the Amu Darya, would place us in an equally good if not

better position than the English, for we in any case shall be nearer to our military centres than India is to its metropolis. With regard to the choice of a basis of operations, perhaps we may have to choose Kashgar, but this is a question which must be decided in the future. Through Kashgar lies the only natural road, which at present exists for the English, into Russian territory. The caravan road from Ladakh to Yarkund, according to the first report of Mr. Forsyth, crosses the Karakorum range *via* the valley of Chang Chenmo. The cold in these hills is less severe than in the Himalayas, and the road is suitable for camels and consequently baggage. The English have already entered into communications with Yacoob Beg; have conveyed to him muskets and cannon, and there is no doubt that, sooner or later, they will avail themselves of the road by Yarkund, if we do not anticipate them at this point. Despatching during recent years almost annually an expedition to Kashgar, the English are endeavouring at the same time to make us believe that the road through that country, over ranges of hills higher than Mont Blanc, is entirely unsuitable for military operations. Such, however, is hardly the infer-

ence to be drawn from the conveyance to Yacoob Beg of such cumbersome gifts, as pieces of artillery. We admit, however, that the present statements of the English regarding the inaccessibility of the passes of the Karakorum are more reliable than former accounts regarding the ease with which they could be crossed, and that the mountains do as a matter of fact present a range similar to a series of Mont Blancs, but this is immaterial, for Russian troops have frequently overcome similar obstacles.

In our Central Asian literature the question of the possible routes to India has been frequently discussed. Venukof has devoted to this subject a series of special articles, and has also given lectures regarding it in the Academy of the General Staff, which, although originally intended as a supplementary course for the students of the Academy, were also, contrary to all expectation, largely attended by the general Russian public. The English Press took up the subject, and, in treating these lectures as "a sign of the times," and as an expression of the public opinion and of the designs of Government, perpetrated a most absurd blunder. It is galling to the English journalists that there

should be in Russia a man who keeps a sharp eye upon their writings, and does not pass by unnoticed a single article in the English papers, in which mention is made of Asia, while in due course he also informs us of every new project, movement, or intrigue on the part of our rivals. If the English desire that Russia should remain ignorant on all these points, let them cease to publish them in the public journals and in pamphlets, for a word once printed becomes the property of the whole world. English sources of information, however, require careful scrutiny, although a guarded enquirer will not be led astray even by premeditated falsehoods, unless he belongs to that class of people who take their ideas from the last book which happens to have come into their hands.

At first* Mr. Forsyth was most extravagant in his praises of the route *viâ* the Karakorum

* The author is here labouring under a misapprehension. The route at first favoured by Sir D. Forsyth was that *viâ* Chang-chenmo, which *avoids* the Karakoram. The latter route goes straight across a very mountainous region ascending high ridges, and descending again into the deep gorges of the rivers. It was found that by going round a little to the east the heads of these rivers can be turned or crossed at a high level, the whole surface of the country being there almost as high as the ridges crossed on the Karakorum route. Steep ascents and descents are thus avoided, but at the cost of remaining for days at heights which are very

to Yarkund, but afterwards he asserted that this route is only traversible at a certain time of the year, and then only with the greatest difficulty, while at the same time it involves the crossing of several parallel ranges with passes of a higher altitude than Mont Blanc, *viz.*, Banihâl 10,000 feet, Zodji 11,000, Kardung 17,500, Sasseer 18,000, the Karakorum 18,300, Suget 18,200, Kilian 16,000. In spite of the fact however that Mr. Forsyth assures us to the contrary, there is little doubt of the existence of an alternative route which is easily traversible and obviates the necessity of crossing the mountain ranges. Of recent years the intercourse between India and Kashgar has become more frequent, and even cannon* have been conveyed to the latter place which it is difficult to believe could have been transported

unfavorable to animal life. This is the Chang-chenmo route. Sir D. Forsyth, who at first thought that its gradients would counter-balance its other disadvantages, has of late preferred the Karakorum route which, although presenting greater physical difficulties, does not keep the traveller so long a time at those enormous elevations. It is a choice of evils. Some people prefer one, and some the other.—R. B. S.

* The cannon taken from Europe by the Kashgar Envoy were mere toys, so small as to be carried each on the back of a single *yak* (*bos grunniens*) and they undoubtedly went across the mountain passes of Karakorum.—R. B. S.

by the route across the mountain passes. Formerly the route *viâ* the Karakorum was considered an excellent one, and one which gave the Indian Government ground to feel apprehensions of what might happen in the event of the Russians occupying Kashgar, and thus commanding the Karakorum Pass. At the present time, however, when YacooB Beg has fallen entirely under the influence of the English, when the latter have taken the necessary measures to guard against a surprise, when Mr. Forsyth has gained his object by procuring for himself an important post on the frontier, the latter is apparently endeavouring to divert the eyes of Russia from the breach * which nature has provided in the Karakorum Mountains. The present work was ready for the press when Mr. Hutton's book on "Central Asia" was received in St. Petersburg. Glancing over the pages of this book I came upon some very interesting items of information which are given as an Appendix to Chapter XV. The following is an extract:—

"In his account of Central Asian discoveries

* There is no depression in the water-parting between Eastern Turkistan and India lower than 17,500 feet.—R. B. S.

published in the Royal Geographical Society's 'Proceedings,' Mr. Shaw remarks :—

“‘In a letter to our late President, Sir Roderick Murchison, I described my astonishment in walking across an open plain from waters which run towards Central Asia to others which flow into the Indus; while the mighty mountain range, topped with glaciers and perpetual snow, which for days before I reached it had seemed to bar all access to the southern regions, was found, on a nearer approach, to be riddled through and through by the streams which rise on the northern plateaux. More recently a striking proof of the same fact reached me. Last year I had recommended certain shooting grounds north of the Karakorum to some officers of the 37th Regiment in search of sport. Captain Skinner and his companions finding themselves on the Upper Karakash river, and their time being scanty, thought to return by a short cut to the Indus, leaving the Karakorum Pass to the west of them. On arriving at Leh, their first enquiry of me was—‘What has become of the Karakorum range? Has it vanished?’ In fact they had been tempted to follow a broad opening southward from the Karakash

river, expecting always to cross the lofty range marked on the maps; but after traversing several high barren plains had found themselves on the banks of a stream running into the Indus without having crossed any range at all. Having thus abolished the Karakorum chain, we may, I think, proceed to do the same with several others, and notably with Humboldt's Bolor or Belut Tagh. The explorations of the Russians from Khokand and Samarcand, and of Major Montgomerie's men from the Upper Oxus, seem to show that the highlands of the Pamir, Alai, &c., participate in the character of the country I have just described. High snowy ranges there are, but they do not determine the main flow of the rivers; on the contrary, the crossing from one great river system to the other is generally over an almost insensible rise. The same might be gathered from a statement of a Kashmiri prisoner whom we met with in Kashgar. He had been captured in one of the wild valleys south of the watershed (near that where the unfortunate Hayward was afterwards murdered). In accordance with the customs of that region he had been sold as a slave. Wounded, bare-footed, almost naked, he had been tied to the tail of his master's horse

and led, with other slaves, across into Central Asia. In such a plight he would probably have magnified fourfold any difficulties of the road, but he could not, when asked, remember having crossed any mountain pass on the journey, and only after repeated enquiry recollected a certain spot where the waters had been shed into opposite directions.'**

* The nature of the argument has been misunderstood owing to its being divorced from the context. The discussion was a geographical one, and an attempt was being made to prove that the enormously elevated water-parting between the basins of the Indus (Shayok) and of the Yarkand River could not properly be called a *range*. It is needless to enlarge on the question here; but that it was *not* intended to put forward such an absurd statement as the existence of a "gap" or "breach" or "broad gate" through the Himalayan Mountain system, is shown by the following quotation from a paper read before the Society of Arts in London on the 14th March 1873 by Mr. Shaw. After speaking of easy passes across the water-parting, the writer of the paper continued: "But we must not misunderstand this fact as some writers have lately done. In those regions, such is the physical character of the mountains that the actual passage across the watershed is the least of the difficulties of the routes. The terrible Karakorum itself, as regards the actual Pass, might be taken for a mere railway embankment to be climbed over. The *gorges* on both sides, leading to these elevated regions, form the real difficulties. To compare great things with small, the approaches to the Passes into Central Asia are like the gorge of the Devil's Bridge, while the water-parting itself resembles the plains of Andermatt and Hospenthal, from which the descent is by a continuous 'via mala.' This, enlarged into hundreds of miles of road, is the character of these routes."—R. B. S.

Mr. Shaw completed his excursions with the knowledge and under the auspices of Mr. Forsyth, and hence the question arises, if Mr. Shaw knows as a fact of the existence of some other road, can it be possible that Mr. Forsyth should be ignorant of it?

And thus nature has left open for us a broad gate to India. These are the regions which Russian explorers ought to examine, and towards which the attention of the Russian Government ought to be directed, since private individuals are seldom gifted both with an ardent desire for exploring hazardous regions and with the necessary means for prosecuting their explorations. It is clear that either the public or the Government must come to their assistance, and neither trouble nor money ought to be grudged in the exploration of this route to India in view of the immense advantages which we should gain from a discovery of England's vulnerable point.

The last expedition of Mr. Forsyth consisted of 138 men and 250 pack animals. They were divided into three parties and proceeded on three separate routes. From Ladakh two roads lead to the Karakorum, over which three passes have to be surmounted, and in the

winter season ten days' marches must be accomplished without fodder or water. The third road *vid* the Chang Chenmo reaches an altitude of 16,000 feet, and afterwards across passes at an elevation of 15,000 feet emerges at the fortress of Shahidulla. Upon the whole, the question regarding the routes to India from the side of the Bolor and Kashgar is as yet very misty and undefined, and until such time as reliable Russian explorers (not mere *dilettantes* without a knowledge of either surveying or the vernacular dialects) penetrate to these regions, we shall never obtain any satisfactory information regarding them. Supposing for the sake of argument that the English, as they would have us believe, meet with almost insurmountable hindrances and obstacles on the road to Central Asia ; that their caravans have to labour over a whole series of high mountain passes, to run the gauntlet of several thousands of robbers, and to make their way across sandy steppes, yet the question remains whether the objects to be gained are, supposing all these difficulties to exist, worth the trouble and money expended upon them.

It is difficult to see what it is that attracts

England towards Kashgar, Bokhara, and Khiva; surely not commercial considerations, for in view of the 250 millions of consumers, whom England can count upon in India, Persia, Afghanistan, Beloochistan, and Cashmere, the comparatively insignificant population of those Khanates in Central Asia (hardly numbering ten millions) could hardly hold out sufficient inducements. The true reasons for the outcry of England regarding the restrictions that we are said to have placed upon her trade, the aggressive attitude of Russia, and the danger which is supposed to threaten India from proximity with us, &c., are not to be sought in commerce, but in a desire to gain a political vantage ground and in a feeling of solicitude for the safety of her pet colony. The perseverance with which these outcries are periodically repeated has been such as almost to convince even Russia that the English are really apprehensive of Russian designs, and this fact has compelled us to explain to England the reasons for each successive movement, to comfort her with assurances that there are no grounds for alarm, and to justify our policy before her. Such a necessity has naturally left its mark upon the nature of our operations,

which have been characterized by indecision and evident fear of rousing useless alarm on the part of our rival.

The wish to allay the suspicions of England and not to afford her any reason for protests has, moreover, obliged us to wink at a number of more or less glaring violations of international law on the part of Khiva, Bokhara, Kulja, and Kashgar, not one-half of which irregularities would ever have been tolerated by England. Our self-restraint however in this respect has been entirely thrown away. We have failed to gain the confidence of the English, and if at times England appears more inclined to trust us in a friendly spirit, such appearances are only misleading. The English nation in fact appear to share the views expressed by Vambéry in his article on the "Rivalry of Russia and England in Central Asia." "At the present time," he writes, "when Russia has taken up a firm position on the Caspian and Sea of Aral, when she has completely subdued the Caucasus, and has acquired immense advantages in Central Asia, it would be useless to endeavour to force her to give up her position. That which was possible and easy of accomplishment twenty years ago, is at the present time impracticable,

and if England does not wish to be subjected to the usual fate of such commercial Empires as Carthage, Venice, Genoa, Holland, and Portugal, she has only one means of saving herself, *viz.*, to keep an ever watchful eye on the doings of her rival, and to take without a moment's delay all such precautionary measures as may be possible."

We are bold enough, however, to think that even twenty years ago the Russians would have maintained their position. If England had been in a position to oblige us to retire, or if she had been strong enough to arrest our progress to our present positions, she would long ago have done so without a moment's delay. The secret, however, is that she is powerless, and therefore has confined her action to recording protests and objections through the public press, in order to place impediments in the way of our advance, and thereby to preserve as large a tract as possible of neutral ground between English and Russian territory. In justice it must be added that up to the present time success has certainly attended her efforts in this respect.

As a means of arresting our progress towards India it has occurred to the English to make

Afghanistan and Kashgar neutral territory. The correspondence which arose on this question between the Cabinet of St. James and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs led to an interchange of opinions on the subject and terminated in an agreement, which was however far from being couched in such definite terms as England desired. Regarding Afghanistan, the Russian Minister declared that it was a country situated *outside the sphere of our interests and political influence*. The Cabinet of Great Britain, on the other hand, declared its readiness to abandon all idea of extending English territory in the direction of that country, and the sole object of English interference was explained to be a desire to aid the Afghans in extricating themselves from the prevailing state of anarchy.*

It is difficult, however, to place confidence in such a declaration, or to ascribe the assistance given by England to Afghanistan as due only to a purely disinterested wish to aid a country which had fallen a victim to chronic anarchy. Still less can such a view of the matter occur to the mind of the Afghan, who

* See despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Baron Brunnow, dated 30th June (12th July) 1869.

must first be educated not to regard his country as the vanguard of England against Russia, and not to adopt a line of action opposed to the magnanimous assurances of his patron. The English themselves are well aware how they are detested by the Afghans. When on the death of Dost Mahomed, the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, deputed an officer to congratulate Shere Ali Khan on his accession to the throne, the English Envoy could not show his face in the streets of Cabul without a strong Afghan escort, and the feelings of the fanatical population were so excited that, without such a precaution, the Envoy would have been torn to pieces by the mob.

According to Vambery, the Afghans actually boast and pride themselves on occupying such a position as enables them freely to travel over India for purposes of trade, while not a single Englishman dares to show himself in Afghanistan. Hitherto the treaties between England and Afghanistan have been altogether one-sided, the former having had to bear all the disadvantages, while the latter has enjoyed all the benefits. Thus in 1857 when under the auspices of Lord Canning, Sir John Lawrence had an interview with Dost

Mahomed at Peshawur, and concluded a treaty of alliance with him against Persia, we find that while, on the one hand, the English supplied the Dost with 8,000 muskets and 300,000 roubles in cash, promising also to make him a monthly payment of a lakh of rupees during such time as the war with Persia might last, on the other hand, they failed even to obtain Dost Mahomed's consent to the maintenance of an Agent at Cabul, the Dost evading the request and declaring that he could not be responsible for the personal safety of an officer thus deputed.

The deduction appears to be that the English place too great reliance upon the Afghans. According to Vambery, "not only the Chiefs and Sirdars, but also every Afghan soldier and every shepherd on the Helmund, have grown familiar with the idea of entering into communications with the Russians, and I have had abundance of opportunities of convincing myself how gladly these people would enter into an alliance with Russia against the English. Whether such an alliance with Russia would be beneficial in its effects to the interests of Afghanistan, the people have never taken into consideration. The Afghan,

like every Asiatic, is short-sighted to a degree, and while he looks only at the losses which the Afghans have had to suffer in Cashmere and Sind in consequence of the establishment of the English supremacy, he has a lively recollection of the former sojourn of the 'red-coats' in Cabul and Candahar."

Sir Henry Rawlinson looks on the matter from another and more hopeful point of view, and discussing the question of the necessity of occupying Herat and Candahar writes:—

"The only parties from whom we should experience ill-will would be the priesthood and a few of the Duranee Chiefs; and they might be called upon to retire to Cabul. Most assuredly, as far as the disposition of the natives is concerned, we should not have more difficulty in governing Candahar and Herat than the Russians encounter in governing Tashkent and Samarcand; whilst our long familiarity with Eastern administration, our special knowledge of Western Afghanistan, our consideration for Mahomedan prejudices, our prestige, our high reputation for justice and good faith, ought to make the task of maintaining the position far more easy to us than to our less experienced Northern neighbours."

Thus the English deceive themselves. In such profuse terms does Sir Henry Rawlinson flatter his countrymen, that we are almost led to regard the English as veritable professors in the matter of conducting the administration of Asiatics, and to imagine that their influence is supreme, and that the words "justice and good faith" are identical with the name of an Englishman.

But it is only necessary to remember how the British conducted themselves at Cabul in 1839, and how a nation, ordinarily so apathetic and careless of death as the Afghans, was roused to incessant riots, to see clearly that these professors have something yet to learn! The influence of the English is undoubtedly very considerable, but it has received a severe shock from the recent successes of the Russian troops; and as regards their "justice and good faith," the English are most decidedly in error, inasmuch as Asiatics regard their character from a precisely opposite point of view. Of course it may be said that Asiatics cannot really understand the full signification of the word "justice" and are therefore unable to appreciate English "good faith," and this may be a possible explanation of the mistaken

opinion which they have formed regarding the English, and which finds expression in a saying connecting the name of a Briton directly with that of his Satanic* Majesty!

To make the Afghans understand the meaning of the word neutrality, and to familiarize them with the idea that the money and arms, which they receive from the English, are given simply in order that they may be enabled thereby to enjoy the blessings of peace and quietness, is by no means an easy task. From the time of the Umballa Conference up to the present, not a single Afghan has ever regarded the matter in this light, and the majority of the nation consider themselves as betrayed† to England, who, in their opinion, has resolved by some means or other to make them pay blood-money for the victims of 1840.

In a despatch addressed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Baron Brunnow, dated 30th June (12th July) 1869, there occurs the following passage:—"If Afghanistan should consider that she is destined to be the vanguard of the British Empire against the Russians, Russia must in that case unavoidably

(* Literally "the Englishman is a very demon."—*Trs.*)

(† Literally "sold."—*Trs.*)

take her own measures for the security of her political and mercantile interests. These measures will in their turn tend to excite the distrust and suspicion of England, and lead to combinations which will either diminish the distance between the Asiatic territories of England and Russia, or, on the other hand, will create that very rivalry which the English are so anxious to avoid. If, on the other hand, the Afghan Chiefs are fully persuaded that the support which they receive from England is given with the sole object of creating a strong and powerful Government in the immediate neighbourhood of the British dominions—an empire destined to enjoy the blessings of peace in a condition of neutrality—then the sincere desire of the Imperial Cabinet may be realized, *viz.*, that Central Asia should form an arena in which the two great powers can devote themselves to such a line of action as may be agreeable to friendship and tend to the well-being of the country—each acting in her natural sphere, with the entire absence of any other species of rivalry than that legitimate competition which has the sole object of promoting the development of commerce and civilization. Instead of indulging the former spirit of distrust and

rivalry, both powers will jointly direct their best endeavours towards enlightening, curbing, or, if the necessity should arise, suppressing the unbridled passions of the people and their rulers, the development of whose civilization is the immediate problem of the future."

Lord Clarendon on the occasion of a personal conference in 1869 with the Russian Chancellor said—"We have strongly advised Shere Ali Khan to restrain from all such action as could possibly give Russia any reason for suspicion, and we have told him that if he insists on adopting a contrary line of action, he will under no circumstances meet with any sympathy or support whatever from England. This has already been said to him and will be repeated so as to avoid the possibility of any future misunderstanding. We fear," continued Lord Clarendon, "not the designs of your Government on Central Asia, but the undue zeal of subordinate officers, the excessive ardour of your Generals in their search for glory and their desire of increasing their personal significance, paying no regard to the views of the Russian* Government."

* See the report of the Chancellor, dated 22nd August (3rd September) 1869.

The reply of the Chancellor, that all our efforts were exclusively directed to the development of trade in every form, and were dictated by the wish of opening up more direct and more secure routes for commerce in the regions of Central Asia, and that from this point of view our past and future action ought to be regarded, appears to have completely satisfied and even delighted Lord Clarendon.

As the northern boundary of the neutral zone Lord Clarendon proposed the following: the upper course of the Amu Darya as far as the meridian of Bokhara, and thence a line due west, which would intersect all the caravan routes to Khiva and Bokhara. "The English Government," says a memorandum of the Asiatic Department, dated 16th (28th) April 1869, "does not appear to entertain any doubts that Russia will at no distant date annex the Khanates of Bokhara and Khiva. In the event of such being the case, the English Cabinet regards the boundary, which it has proposed, as the line beyond which it will not permit the extension of the Russian territories in Central Asia. To accept this proposal would therefore be unbefitting the dignity of Russia." The proposal of Lord Clarendon was

therefore declined as being derogatory to the dignity of Russia, and our Government without acknowledging the neutrality of Afghanistan, in a letter from the Imperial Chancellor, dated 7th (19th) March 1869, confined itself to a declaration of its positive intention not to interfere in Afghan affairs. It was also agreed that the Ameers Shere Ali Khan on the one side, and Syud Muzaffar on the other, should be moved not to enter upon any hostile undertakings one against the other. The importance which was attached in England to the question of the neutrality of Afghanistan (a Switzerland in Asia); may be seen from the following extract from the *Times* :—“ If the independence of Afghanistan from Russia and the friendly relations of the former with England could be secured, then, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the Central Asian question might be said to have ceased to exist.”

Taught by her bitter experience in 1840, England at the present time sees no advantages in the incorporation of Afghanistan within her Indian dominions. “ Russia has no fears on the score of England seeking to annex Afghanistan, the benefits to be derived from which country require that she should be

independent. So long as she preserves her independence, Afghanistan will protect the English frontier from external enemies, whilst if she ceased to be independent, she would herself stand in need of the protection of the English. If our politicians succeed in procuring a recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan, the English Government will only have itself to reproach in the event of being taken unawares by any future attack."

It is not easy to see why the English should endeavour so assiduously to procure a recognition on the part of Russia of the neutrality of Afghanistan, when they themselves are perpetually asserting that they have no fears on account of India. A single glance at the map is sufficient to convince an enquirer how difficult it would be even to reach the frontiers of India from our present positions. It is true indeed that after the Khivan Expedition the doubts regarding the efficiency of the Russian troops, and their ability to overcome all obstacles, ought to be considered as silenced, but at the same time we must recognize the fact that English are not Khivans, and that if we should at any time meditate undertaking an expedition against the latter, it must be done after

careful circumspection, and in no case with undue haste.

Clearly, however, it is not such an expedition which England fears, but the true reason for her anxiety is to be found in the fact that even the neighbourship of Russia would be too much for her in view of the many secret elements of hostility which lurk throughout her Indian dominions. The proximity of a strong power would naturally weaken the authority of England, and would show clearly that after all the British colossus has only legs of clay.

The following is an extract from what Lord Mayo wrote in 1872 :—“ A feeling of discontent and dissatisfaction exists amongst every class, both European and Native, on account of the constant increase of taxation which has for years been going on. My belief is that the continuance of that feeling is a political danger, the magnitude of which can hardly be over-estimated. We can never depend for a moment on the continuance of general tranquillity, but I consider that the position of affairs at the present time is more serious than it has ever before* been.” Shortly after recording this

* The following is an exact quotation of what Lord Mayo wrote (*Torrens' Empire in Asia*, page 392) :—

“ A feeling of discontent and dissatisfaction exists among every

candid statement, Lord Mayo, as is well known, was murdered by the hands of a fanatic, which was preceded a year earlier by the murder of the Chief Justice of Bengal.

In the Island of Ceylon riots have been of frequent occurrence in 1817, 1823, 1834, 1843, and 1848, while on the mainland there were disturbances from 1820-1824, afterwards from 1827-1830, again in 1852 and 1857-1858, and lastly in the years 1863, 1868, and 1873.

The taxation regarding which Lord Mayo complained had already been more than once the cause of disturbances and popular agitation. Thus in 1810, when a window tax was imposed on the people of Benares, the inhabitants immediately closed all workshops in the town and insisted on the tax being withdrawn. In 1848 in Ceylon the people rebelled

class, both European and Native, on account of the constant increase of taxation which has for years been going on. My belief is that the continuance of that feeling is a political danger, the magnitude of which can hardly be over-estimated; and any sentiment of dissatisfaction which may exist among disbanded soldiers of the Native army is as nothing in comparison with the state of general discontent to which I have referred. . . .

We can never depend for a moment on the continuance of general tranquillity; but I believe that the present state of public feeling as regards taxation is more likely to lead to disturbance and discontent, and to be to us a source of greater danger than the partial reduction which we propose in the Native army can ever occasion. Of the two evils I choose the lesser."—(*Trs.*)

against the tax on dogs, arms, and shops, and also against a tax in kind on all species of goods and produce in transit. The incidence of some taxes in India is out of all proportion to the means of the people, as is shown by the fact that while salt in Bengal at the place of manufacture is worth six copeks per hundred weight, the tax on that amount is two roubles sixty-two copeks. The people consequently use it sparsely, and the natural result is prevalence of sickness.

The average incidence of the taxes of all kinds per head of the population is, it is true, moderate, falling at the rate of not more than seven shillings per head, whereas in England it amounts to 19 roubles (about 56 shillings); but it must be remembered that the productive powers of England represent an annual gross return of £ 900,000,000 sterling, on which the payment of taxes, amounting to seventy-two millions, is an easy matter; India, on the other hand, with a gross income of £ 300,000,000 sterling—has to pay £ 50,000,000 as taxes, *i.e.*, a sixth. At this rate of taxation, therefore, India, if her productive powers were equal to those of England, would have to pay £ 150,000,000 as taxes; in other words, more

than double the amount paid by England. Thus in India while the taxes on each pound sterling amount to three shillings and four pence, in England they amount only to one shilling and eight pence. If in addition to this fact it is remembered that in England $\frac{1}{20}$ of the total amount raised by taxation, that is nearly the whole, is devoted to the benefit of the tax-payers, whereas the millions taken from India are, for the most part, exported out of the country, it becomes doubly clear that the taxation of India, not only as compared with that of England, but absolutely in itself, is extremely heavy. At the same time the British Government neglects to make such arrangements as might on the one hand protect the country from inundations, and on the other provide a reserve of water in case of drought. No attempt is made to store corn for the purpose of meeting bad harvests, and in fact the Government, while taking everything from the people, gives them nothing in return. Hence arose the inundations of 1832, 1835, 1849, 1852, 1857, 1858, 1863, 1867, and the excessive drought of 1834, 1837, 1840, 1841, 1866, all of which occurrences are, as a rule, accompanied by severe

famine. In Bengal in 1870 nearly a third of the population (about 10,000,000 souls), and in Orissa in 1866, out of a total population amounting to 2,600,000 souls, more than one million (that is, nearly a half) perished from the effects of famine.

The English have endeavoured to stifle all manufacturing industry in India, in order to make the natives producers of raw material only, by which means the latter become at once suppliers to the English manufacturers and consumers of English manufactured goods. The means by which the object has been accomplished were of a most simple nature, and consisted in the imposition of a heavy prohibitory duty on all kinds of machinery and implements of manufacture. Everything, from an oil press to a loom, and from a boat and a hatchet, was rendered liable to the payment of duty, which was followed by the entire prohibition of the importation of machinery of all kinds. It is well known that India was celebrated for her manufactures before she fell under the selfish supremacy of England. At the present time native manufactures have one after another disappeared, and the Indian cultivator disposes of his cotton to the

English purchaser at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ copeks per pound, in order to receive it back again in its manufactured state at fifty copeks. Irrespective of the crying injustices committed by such men as Warren Hastings, of the perfidious, dishonest, and unjust line of policy adopted by many Governor-Generals of India, and of the unjustifiable severity which the English use in quelling any popular riots, the financial arrangements of the country alone are sufficient to excite general discontent and widespread murmurings amongst the people.

In spite, however, of the utter want of sympathy on the part of the English, the nation is gradually developing itself, and perhaps it is this very absence of sympathy which tends towards their development. Even as early as 1851 there were as many as forty Native printing establishments in Calcutta. The paper known as the *Indian Sun* is published in Persian, Hindee, English, Oordoo, and Bengalee. It is easier, of course, to conduct the administration of an enlightened people, but only on the condition of observing the requirements of justice and humanity, of neither of which can the English be said to be guilty. The reader can now see clearly how it is that

the English press, and even English diplomats, bewail and lament on each occasion where a Governor of Turkistan may chance to grow weary of inactivity.

To return to Shere Ali Khan. When Lord Mayo informed the Ameer of the entire harmony of feeling which existed between England and Russia regarding the mode of action in Central Asia, adding that Afghanistan ought therefore to refrain from any undertaking hostile to Russia, the Ameer of Cabul replied that he not only had every intention of refraining from any action which might be calculated to injure Russian interests, but also that he would not afford shelter within his territories to people who might not be well disposed to Russia.

Sir A. Buchanan on the occasion of an interview with the Emperor at Baden showed His Imperial Majesty the contents of a letter addressed by Lord Mayo to the Ameer, and expressed his hope that the influence of Russia might secure for the Ameer of Cabul similar treatment at the hands of his neighbours. To this His Majesty replied that, so far as he was concerned, he entirely sympathized in that hope.

The arrival in Russian territory of Abdul Rahman Khan, the nephew and political opponent of the Ameer of Cabul, afforded the Governor-General of Turkistan an opportunity of entering into direct communications with Shere Ali and explaining to him our exact views with regard to the political position of his kingdom. On the receipt of this letter Shere Ali referred it to the Viceroy of India, and in conformity with his advice issued orders to the frontier Sirdars not to interfere in the affairs of their neighbours. A copy of the Ameer's letter was communicated by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Cabinet, which in reply sent its Ambassador to St. Petersburg for the purpose of expressing to the Imperial Government its acknowledgments for the frank and entirely amicable disposition of Russia towards England. In this way the question regarding Afghanistan was brought to an end.

As regards Kashgar the arguments of Mr. Douglas Forsyth, to whom the duty of carrying on negotiations with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was entrusted, led to no result whatever. Not only did we refuse to recognize the neutrality of that Khanate, but our friendly relations with China obliged us to decline to

admit its independence. Besides this, the probability of the collapse of the Government of Yakoob Beg in a region liable to periodical revolutions, and the possibility of its being again made subject to the Chinese, have forced us to act cautiously in a matter of such importance.

The sole result of the negotiations of Mr. Forsyth with our Government was the assurance that if, in the course of time, Russia should be obliged against her wish to occupy the whole or a part of the Khanate of Bokhara, she would not undertake any conquests in the direction of Afghanistan, and that England on her part would not allow the Afghan ruler to disturb his northern neighbours.

The direct correspondence between the Governor-General of Turkistan and the Ameer of Cabul, which placed beyond all doubt the general tendency of our policy in Asia produced an important result, namely, that in matters of a purely local character the right was allowed to the Governor-General of corresponding directly with the Viceroy of India.

The English having failed in their attempt to procure a recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan and Kashgar, occupied themselves in improving their relations with the

latter and making their influence supreme in that Khanate. At first Yakoob Beg, influenced by the promises of material advantages which were held out to him, inclined towards the English, but in 1872, having interchanged embassies with us, he appears to have shown a preference for the protection of Russia to receiving the money of England ; and it seemed to us that the time was not far distant when Kashgar would be included amongst the number of those territories which are vassals of the Russian Empire.

The idea of a neutral zone which was proposed by the English Government, had the object of preventing the direct proximity of Russia, the English apparently considering that such proximity might possibly lead to actual collision. It is certainly unnatural that it should be considered necessary to take measures for preventing the union of civilized nations, and the only explanation is that the efforts of England to gird herself round by a neutral zone had the sole object of securing India from the possibility of Russian invasion.

In this matter our interests are of course precisely opposed to those of the English.

On the continent of Europe there are still

so many unsettled questions which require reconsideration that our Government considers it absolutely necessary to do everything in its power to secure a favourable disposition on the part of England, in order that we may be able to count upon her vote in any European Congress. Experience has shown that, to gain this object, it is necessary that we should become near neighbours of England, for the greater the distance that separates us the more difficult it is to come to a full agreement with her. In support of this view, it is sufficient to point to the change in the English policy regarding the Polish question which took place when the news reached London of the arrival of a Russian squadron in New York, sent to cruize on the shores of Australia, which adroitly evaded observation, and slipping past the Skagerrak, Kattegat Straits, sailed *viâ* the German Ocean round the north of Scotland.

The advantageous position which we have since occupied in Central Asia (owing to the taking of Aulieta, Turkistan, Chemkent, Tashkent, Khojent, Uratippe, Jizzakh, Samarcand, Katta-Kurgan and Kulja) combined with the change which took place amongst European powers owing to the Franco-Prussian war,

resulted in the fact that when the Russian Government took up the question of the Treaty of Paris, the abolition of some of its Articles which were most important to England (regarding the Black Sea Fleet) met with no opposition whatever from her.

English diplomatists, in common with the English Press, at last became convinced that our object is not to carry out in Asia a series of useless conquests (as was shown, for instance, by the taking of Karshi and Shahr-i-Sabz and their restoration to the Ameer of Bokhara), but that if the necessity should arise we shall not be deterred by anybody or anything, being assured beforehand of success both from a military and from a political point of view. This conviction produced a change of tone both amongst English Statesmen and in the English Press, who judged it wise not to display any superfluous solicitude or anxiety regarding Russian successes in Central Asia. Hence we concluded that the peaceable understanding which existed with England would not be affected even if we went so far as to occupy all the Cis-Amu-Daryan Khanates, but in this we were entirely mistaken.

The moment our preparations for the Khivan expedition of 1873 became publicly known, the

English Press sounded the note of alarm. The most bitter articles, the tone of which was altogether unbecoming, appeared in the English papers. "We must arrest the progress of Russia and show her what her true position is" wrote one; "our concessions and our moderation" wrote another "are ill appreciated by the Russians. We must prescribe boundaries beyond which they must not be allowed to advance." "Asia must belong to England alone" wrote a third "as being the representative of justice, civilization, commerce and peace. She must interpose an obstacle to the further advance of a power which brings with it only desolation and robbery, and which is influenced solely by desire of conquest." Never before had England given expression to such apprehensions and positive fright, which could not have been greater had immediate invasion threatened the British Isles.

The Khan of Khiva finding that he was not permitted to hold any communications with the Russian Government except through the Governor-General of Turkistan, and unwilling to yield both from sheer obstinacy, and also because he felt that he already too far committed himself, at last despatched envoys to

Constantinople and Calcutta. The English took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded them to take part in the matter, and again renewed their efforts to obtain from the Russian Government a recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan, including Budukshan and Wakhan which lie on the banks of the Amu Darya (see despatch from Lord Granville, dated 5th (17th) October 1872).

The objects of this proposal are not difficult to see. By advancing Afghan territory as far as the Amu, the English would be in a position to introduce their own factories and steam navigation upon that river, and the Afghan flag would lawfully wave over English enterprise. Many people in Russia who profess to be authorities on Asiatic matters, and pride themselves on being politicians, regard the question concerning "some place called Wakhan in those parts" as being so immaterial that discussion would be wasted upon it. Devoid of all geographical knowledge of Central Asia, they do not even know on which side of the Amu Wakhan is situated. The Russian Minister, however, regarded the matter as one of the greatest importance and was not easily induced to yield to the impor-

tunity of England. In a despatch dated 7th December, Prince Gorchakof replied that Budukshan, and the territory which was dependent thereon, had never been formally incorporated in the dominions of Shere Ali, and did not therefore, strictly speaking, constitute a portion of the Afghan Empire, consequently that the recognition of neutrality could not be extended to that Province. Lord Granville on the 12th January 1873 retorted that Shere Ali had gained Budukshan by conquest; that the leaders of the various tribes had formally tendered submission to the Ameer, and that if the latter chose to place a special Governor in charge of the province instead of taking the administration directly into his own hands, that was the concern of no one but himself, and had only been temporarily done by way of an experiment. With regard to the fear that the recognition of Budukshan as being under the authority of the Ameer of Cabul might serve as an encouragement to him to extend his possessions at the expense of neighbouring countries, it was said "Her Majesty's Government will not fail to impress upon the Ameer in the strongest terms the advantages, which are given to him in the recognition by Great Britain and Russia of the

boundaries which he claims, and of the consequent obligation upon him to abstain from any aggression on his part." Besides this exchange of written despatches, direct negotiations were carried on in London between the Cabinet of St. James and Count Shuvalof, who had been specially delegated for that purpose from St. Petersburg.

The well known position of Count Shuvalof gave his words great authority in the eyes of the English, and the justice of the wishes of England having been recognised, the negotiations were brought to a speedy termination. In a despatch dated 19th January 1873, addressed by Prince Gorchakof to Baron Brunnow, it was said, that, although according to the views of Russia, Budukshan and Wakhan enjoy a certain degree of independence, still taking into consideration the fact that the English had more precise information on the subject, and especially having regard to the desire not to give to this question of detail a greater importance than it admits, "we do not refuse to recognize the English line of demarcation." This expression was interpreted however by the English Press to mean that Russia "had voluntarily given way to the

demands of England, who had prescribed the line of boundary."

The *Times*, commenting on the diplomatic correspondence after it had been published, remarked that England ought to congratulate herself on her success, and that the concession, which had been made by Russia, acquired the more important signification from the tone in which it had been made, &c. But afterwards the same paper raised the question, whether it was to be understood that all the territory to the north of Afghanistan was to be sacrificed to the Russian policy of conquest, adding that such a position should certainly not be admitted in view of the responsibility for the conduct of Shere Ali which had been undertaken by the English.

According to an opinion expressed in the *Morning Post*, the main object of the English Government in these negotiations was to silence the pressure brought to bear upon them by Parliament and the Press. A series of facts brought forward in that paper tended to show that the Gladstone-Granville Government had adhered to their old policy of political "surprises"—that is a policy which professed to do a great deal for the country,

but in reality did nothing. The success on which the *Times* so complacently congratulated itself is made in the *Morning Post* a subject of severe criticism. "In the present position of affairs," it was said, "the frontier of Afghanistan becomes a part of the frontiers of England, who in this way is brought into the immediate neighbourhood of Russia, * * * the latter is now free to advance and to occupy, by virtue of treaties, a position for which she has long striven, and this will create, in course of time, a series of difficulties to England, for which she is indebted to the extraordinary desire of the present Cabinet to avoid a breach of the peace."

Russia has certainly gained nothing by the recognition of the neutrality of Afghanistan, except that the English papers have ceased to lament over the Khivan expedition, although even this could not be effected without an explicit declaration on the part of Count Shuvalof that Khiva would not be incorporated in Russia. It is well known that this promise was fulfilled to the letter, for has not the *Capital* of the Khanate been evacuated by the Russians ?

A marked change in the tone of the Eng-

lish Press followed this declaration, and even the *Times* indulged in the following observations:—"We have followed the course of the Khivan expedition with feelings rather of friendship than of envy. We have paid a just tribute to the Russian Generals and to the brilliant achievements of the Russian troops." These expressions however are modified by the following:—"But never has the necessity for a close connection between England and Afghanistan been so pressing as it is at the present time. We cannot deny that the main object of the Umballa Conference between the late Lord Mayo and the Ameer of Cabul was the adoption of a decided line of policy against Russia. Lord Northbrook was in a position to continue this policy, though under different conditions. The springing into existence of a Mussulman State in Kashgar, and the Russian expedition to Khiva, gave a new direction to the relative position of England and Afghanistan. Whilst Russia has steadily advanced in Central Asia, England has slackened her hold upon Afghanistan."

The above extract appears to imply that nothing is left for England except the direct

occupation of Afghanistan; but let the English remember the words of Bright: "I have come to the conclusion that the edifice, which we have erected in India, is too extensive. It was unwise and hazardous to annex territory which ought to have been left independent, and to carry on wars which were as unnecessary as unjust. The huge empire which has been gained by conquest is too extensive for the good conduct of the administration. The foundations are weak and it has more than once appeared as though it were on the verge of falling to pieces." Bright is not Vambery, and his words may be accepted.

The present amicable relations between Russia and England appear to many Russian politicians to have been strengthened by the recent intermarriage of the reigning Houses. It must, however, be remembered that in England "the King reigns but does not rule," and that the opinions of the majority of the English Parliament have far more signification for us than the personal views of the Sovereign. The English regard this Royal relationship in another light, and do not suffer it to interfere with their own interests. For instance, they recently despatched to Persia an English Mili-

tary Agent, Captain Napier, who was nominally deputed only with the object of exploring the Persian frontier from Meshed along the course of the Harirood, and the caravan road to Herat, collecting full particulars regarding the sources of the River Atrek, completing a detailed map, and entering into communications with the Tekkes; but we should be glad to know how it was that 6,000 English rifles suddenly made their appearance amongst the Turkomans. This question, however, is easily answered. The Russians have advanced as far as the Rivers Atrek and Amu Darya; the road to Herat is open before them the only possible obstacle to their further advance is to be found in the Turkomans, ergo, the Turkomans are presented* with arms. The British Government denies this fact, but popular rumour supports it, and it is only necessary to add that the English contemplate the occupation of Quettah, which is situated at the entrance of the Bolan Pass, to be convinced that the English line of policy has undergone no change, and that the duty of Russia is to abandon vain hopes and to keep a careful watch on the course of events.

[* Of course incorrect.—*Trs.*]

CHAPTER XIII.

OBJECTS OF THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA.

Questions and answers—Object of our labours in Asia—Protection of frontiers and trade, and gaining an *étape* on the road to India—The view taken by the English of the Russian movement—Measures adopted by them in British India—Importance of Railroads—Who will be the victor?—Are natural boundaries in Central Asia sufficient?—For what are we striving?—A lever which may be used against England—Curious history of England's ultimatum regarding the Polish question in 1863—Our relations with England improve as the distance which separates us is diminished—Views of Sir H. Rawlinson regarding the significance of our present positions—Herat, the key to India—Measures taken for strengthening English influence in Persia.

THE reader has been made familiar in the preceding Chapters with the general characteristics of the Russian movement in Central Asia, and with the various phases of our policy in that country. I propose now to say a few words on the subject of the *possible* tasks which we may have to undertake; of the views which have been expressed on this question by the European press; and lastly, of the method by which we conduct our political intercourse with the Khanates.

In Russian society one frequently meets people who have only to become aware that

any one has been in Central Asia to pursue him with questions regarding the objects of the Russian conquests, the absence of tangible benefits conferred thereby on the Empire at large, and the waste of public money upon a country which in their opinion is not worth one single farthing of the millions spent upon it. Such questions clearly arise from ignorance on Central Asian matters, which it is only natural to expect from the Russian public, inasmuch as nowhere has so little been written on the subject as in Russia; out of Russia, on the other hand, the Central Asian question has been thoroughly analysed in all its aspects, and every possible combination, political, military, and financial, has been examined in detail, while the Russian public seems to dread facing what it considers to be the terrible future, and strives in every conceivable way to evade discussion of this momentous subject.

All who have hitherto been at all intimately connected with Central Asian matters seem to act up to the letter of Talleyrand's well known maxim—"language is given us the better to conceal our thoughts"—the natural result of which is the existence of an entire want of confidence in official reports and statements;

but there is another aphorism—"if you want to deceive your enemy, tell him the truth," for a man trained in the school of diplomatic falsehood will certainly regard the truth out of the mouth of his enemy as the reverse. Falsehood and prevarication have become a second nature with politicians, and to place any confidence in their assertions is impossible. Let us for once cast off all evasion, and enquire honestly into the true objects of our labours in Central Asia.

The reply may be drawn from the preceding pages. Our movements in the East are not the result of any premeditated plan, but have been the immediate consequence of the necessities of the moment. Savage nomads, who recognize no law except that of might, have overrun our frontiers and have kidnapped Russian subjects, selling them by thousands in the bazaars of Central Asia. The retaliatory attacks by Russian detachments only produced further complications, and increased the mutual feeling of hatred. It thus became necessary to try another method for securing our frontiers, *viz.*, the erection of forts on the steppes. This system was a partial success, but it was soon found essential to connect the

forts one with another, and thus arose lines of fortifications. The necessity of connecting the Orenburg and Siberian lines led to the occupation of positions on the rivers Syr Darya and Chu, which paved the way for hostility on the part of Kokan, Bokhara, and Khiva, and a series of wars with these Khanates resulted in a further annexation of territory.

We may boldly assert that during the whole course of our progressive advance, not so much as a thought of India has ever occurred to us. "Russian subjects are killed, and retaliation is unavoidable." This simple sentence, which, because it is the truth, politicians fail to comprehend, contains the whole secret of our advance in Central Asia.

Regarding the benefits we gain from our conquests, the best answer to this question would be obtained from the inhabitants of the frontier provinces of Orenburg and the Ural. We are told, it is true, that the military element in those provinces is not disinterested on account of the decorations conferred for services in Central Asia. This, however, is not the case, the truth being that the people fully appreciate the peace and security which the advance of the Russian frontier has gained

for them, and it is in this fact that we may see the first great benefit of our conquests in Central Asia, namely, that a guarantee is thereby afforded for the maintenance of security in our Trans-Ural border provinces.

The second benefit consists in the increasing development and safety of commerce, as is proved by the following figures. Previous to the year 1850 the value of goods annually imported from Asia to Russia amounted to Roubles 800,000, the exports from Russia to Asia amounting to Roubles 600,000; whereas seventeen years afterwards, that is, in 1867, the imports had increased to 13 millions, and the exports to $16\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and this has happened in spite of a series of wars with Bokhara and Kokan, and of the restrictions imposed by Cherniayef on trade with Bokhara.

The third benefit which we have gained consists in the fact that from our present position our power of threatening British India has become real and ceased to be visionary. In this respect our Central Asian possessions serve only as an *étape* on the road to further advance, and as a halting place where we can rest and gather fresh strength. If in the time of Paul I. an overland expedition to India was

considered feasible, it is certainly much more so at the present time when we have shortened the interval by such an immense stretch of country.

Asia will not of course ever form the avowed object of dispute between England and Russia, but in the event of a war produced by European complications, we shall clearly be obliged in our own interests to take advantage of the proximity to India, which is afforded by our present position in Central Asia.

The English themselves fully appreciate the possibility of a Russian movement against India, and have seriously deliberated on the question. They regard, and rightly so, railroads as the principal means for opposing such a movement, and, since the time of the Russian occupation of Tashkent, have been actively engaged in constructing them. By the 1st of April 1872 the entire length of the lines in actual use in India was 7,761 versts, while 2,414 versts were under construction, and 1,757 versts more had been sanctioned, thus giving the total length of lines constructed, under construction, and sanctioned, as 11,932 versts. The position which the British Government has taken up in regard to these undertakings is

clear from the fact that the Railway Companies between the years 1849—1871 received as guaranteed interest alone sums aggregating 204,560,779 roubles, while the total receipts from traffic amount to an average of 4,737 roubles per verst.

Taking into consideration also the fact of the existence of 3,000 versts of canals, 200,000 troops, 400 pieces of artillery, and lastly the flourishing state of the English * national finances, we see clearly how well prepared British India is for war. The result of such a war it is impossible to foretell, but it is at all events certain that the attitude of the English is one of expectancy and full preparation, coupled with sincere desire to stave off the evil day as far as lies in their power.

Besides the English, however, there is another nation whose attitude is also one of expectancy for the Russians, *viz.*, the natives of India. The East India Company is nothing less than a poisonous unnatural plant, engrafted on the splendid soil of India—a parasite which saps away the life of the most fertile and wealthy country in the world. This plant

* In 1874 the income amounted to Roubles 463,677,436, and the expenditure to Roubles 461,668,723.

can only be uprooted by forcible means, and such an attempt was made by the natives of the country in 1857, though it failed for want of sufficient skill. Sick to death, they are now waiting for a physician from the North, are hastening on his advance with eager prayers, and making him the text for discourses in their temples.

I do not propose however to enlarge upon the causes which have produced this hatred on the part of the native public towards the English; and far from deploring the fact of its existence, I trust that it will increase until such time as it produces its natural fruits.

The English fully understand their critical position, and endeavour to prop up their decaying power by lavish expenditure on railroads* and similar defensive projects. At a moment's notice they flatter themselves that they can concentrate at any given point a force sufficiently strong either to meet an external enemy, or to suppress internal disturbances.

Some time will naturally elapse before the natives of India will care to repeat the experiment of 1857, and so far as can be foreseen

* The word in the original is the equivalent of "iron" which may include armaments, &c.—*Trs.*

the English will have to deal only with disconnected outbreaks, but it cannot be said with any certainty that such small sparks of rebellion may not, if supported by an impetus from without, produce a general conflagration throughout the length and breadth of India, in which case the British Government will be unable to reckon on the support of the native troops numbering 124,000 out of a total of 200,000, and the small remnant will barely be sufficient to guard the most important points.

It should also be remarked that the Indian Government has now lowered the rate of pension allowed to British officers serving in the Native army, the result of which has been that many of them, particularly those of the rank of Colonel, have either entered other branches of the service, or have altogether retired, in order to get the benefit of the pension according to the former scale. The change of officers thus brought about must necessarily affect injuriously the efficiency of the Native troops.

In order to prevent giving any cause for another mutiny, the English have adopted the clever expedient of arming the native troops with Snider rifles (somewhat similar to our

Krynka breech-loaders) with *metallic* cartridges. I have met in the *Invalide Russe* with an opinion to the effect that *in spite of* the doubtful loyalty of the Sikhs, the English have nevertheless armed them with breech-loaders. It is only necessary to go a little below the surface to see that the English have made no mistake in this respect, for the cartridges are distributed very sparingly, and on the occurrence of disturbances would be quickly expended, the rifles being thereafter, for all practical purposes, useless. Therefore for the expression "*in spite of* the doubtful loyalty," should be substituted "*on account of* the doubtful loyalty," that fact being the true reason for the distribution of the breech-loaders. The guns of the old model are distributed by the Indian Government amongst the Turkomans, Kashgarians, and generally to every one who wishes to make use of them against Russia. Thus after all the Sikhs are not thoroughly reliable; and regarding the railroads and telegraph lines, they are certainly not insured against destruction. The outcome of the whole argument may be said to be that in the event of any really serious complications, it may not improbably happen that the English will not find

themselves in a position to be "at a given notice in any given place with a force strong enough to oppose an advancing enemy."

If the sole object of our conquests in Central Asia were India, we should hurry on and not waste valuable time in long and profitless political discussions with the Khans. In reality, however, our advance is regulated by the action of these very Khans, as every unusually glaring piece of folly committed by any of them is followed by one step in advance on the part of the Russians.

The integrity of the Russian boundary in Central Asia can only be maintained by Russian bayonets, for no physical obstacle can withstand the dashing onslaughts of Asiatic horsemen. A river they will swim across on horseback, or more truly alongside of their horses, and a range of mountains they will cross even with a train of camels, though it should be necessary to hew out steps across the mountain passes. Physical bulwarks are useless, and not only have numerous marauding bands of natives frequently succeeded in swimming across the Syr Darya into Russian territory, but also the Cossacks of Piskors and Skobelev have times innumerable accomplished the same feat under the walls of Chinaz.

On the other hand, our boundary with Bokhara is defined neither by mountains nor by rivers, yet the Bokhariots are forced to preserve the peace and respect the frontier owing to the proximity of Russian bayonets. Until, in short, our neighbours do not act upon the lessons of international law, which our battalions are with a certain degree of success teaching them, we can never rest assured that frontiers of to-day will remain the frontiers to-morrow ; and in this way we may very possibly be driven forward to a position much nearer to India. This state of affairs, however, ought not to give us any anxiety, for every Russian, who carefully considers the question, must regard with favor a nearer approach to the British territories in the East Indies.

Both in Europe and in Asia our sole object is to establish such relations with our neighbours as will enable us to live in peace and quietness, to devote ourselves to our internal well-being, and to develop our natural resources, our industry and trade, without which it is impossible for any empire to fulfill its natural vocation of securing the moral and material well-being of the nation. And thus the sole object of Russia is peace, but

peace cannot be gained by inactivity, and must be fought for. The respect due to the law of nations, which springs from the laws of might, of war, and of victory, can only be maintained by the fear of punishment, and of exciting the wrath of an over whelming majority, while in the absence of such a sanction all international laws would be violated with impunity. Thus history affords us thousands of examples of the violation of sacred treaties. Napoleon I. for instance was an adept in this respect, and regarding England it is sufficient to say that it is only by means of an entire disregard of the dictates of conscience, and of the most arbitrary and unprincipled treatment of weaker powers, that she has gained the position which she at present holds. Hence we are not prepared to assert that England respects the law of nations any better than Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokan, nor are we convinced that it will be of greater advantage to us to have England for a neighbour than Khiva. On the contrary, we are firmly persuaded that in the latter case, we should be obliged to adopt the English system, *viz.*, to consider sacred only those treaties, the conditions of which are disadvantageous to our opponents, and to treat as waste paper such as

are injurious to our own interests. But we have a powerful lever to use against England, *viz.*, the fear of losing her dearly valued colony, and the stronger this fear, the more peaceable will be her attitude regarding all questions not directly affecting her interests.

Europe has still to find a solution for several vital questions, with which she has hitherto shown a reluctance to grapple; and of all the European Powers, England has displayed the greatest anxiety to avoid entering upon questions, the settlement of which might imperil her national position for the sake of a doubtful future. Without speculating however upon the possibilities of the future, which are surrounded by doubt, it is sufficient to mention the question of the day, *viz.*, the "Eastern Question," for the sake of which Russia has undergone innumerable sacrifices, gaining therefrom, thanks to England alone, no advantages whatever.

England was the prime mover in the Anglo-French coalition of 1854-56, at which time France with her own naval resources alone would never have undertaken the risk of attempting to effect a landing in Russia. It was England who wanted to demolish the fort of

Sebastopol, and to inflict a blow upon our supremacy on the waters of the Black Sea, to gain which objects she induced France to enter into an alliance with her. In the present day however the aspect of circumstances is very different. We have lessened the distance between Russian and English territory in Asia by 2,000 versts, while in consequence of this fact the tone of our communications with England has undergone a great change. Thus for instance Russia declares that it is not her intention to observe the Articles of the Treaty of Paris (1856) regarding the Black Sea, and England, who had before so strongly insisted upon these very Articles, readily gave her consent. Anxiety for the safety of her colonies is in fact a lever which may be employed to oblige England to agree on all possible questions.

In 1863 England induced France and improvident Austria to join with her in sending to Russia a remonstrance regarding the Polish question, but thinking that France and Austria had gone too far to draw back, she suddenly adopted an overbearing tone, and threatened to recognize Poland as an independent power. The text of a despatch to this effect had already

appeared in the English public prints, while the despatch itself was *en route* to the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and a rupture appeared inevitable. The English had indeed calculated the length of the interval before the Chancellor's reply could be received, and had come to the conclusion that, allowing for the time required for the usual formalities, war could not be declared before the autumn, and that operations might commence with the opening of the navigation in the following spring. Suddenly however the clouds dispersed. The Cabinet of St. James hastened to recall its despatch before it could be communicated to the Imperial Government. Their tone ceased to be overbearing, and the three powers quietly swallowed the pill offered to them by Gorchakof in much less time than had been expected. This sudden change is easily explained. On receipt of the first collective note, it was clear that the matter would not rest here, and the Russian Government resolved to strike a bold stroke. Six of the fastest vessels of the Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Lisofski were despatched, as it were incognito, to sail round the Hebrides (since their presence might have been noticed in the

English channel) and to make their way direct to New York, where they were to be in readiness to sail at a moment's notice to Australia. If we remember that this happened at a time when England had fallen foul of the United States in the matter of the recognition of the South as a belligerent power, we can readily understand how our squadron was received in New York with open arms. No sooner did the news reach England of the arrival of the Russian ships at New York, than public opinion awoke to the danger of the situation. To exchange Australia for Poland was clearly out of the question, and the coalition had to rest quietly under the rebuke administered to it by Gorchakof.

In view of the sensitiveness of England on matters touching the well-being of her colonies, it is indispensable that we should endeavour to gain positions as near to them as possible. Again the friendliness of the attitude of England towards Russia varies inversely with the distance which separates the two powers. The greater the interval, the more marked the want of cordiality, while a feeling akin to respect is produced as we gradually advance into her immediate neigh-

bourhood. Our policy, therefore, should be to approach the English as nearly as we can, since by so doing not only should we render our relations with England secure from all unexpected and undesirable complications, and remove all hostile feeling, but we should also display to the world an example of irrefragable concord on the most complicated questions of European politics.

The view which the English take of our objects in Central Asia has already been described in Chapters X, XI, and XII. As a complement to what has already been said on this subject, we may quote here a few passages from Sir Henry Rawlinson's book "England and Russia in the East." This work has only very recently been published, and forms a sort of collection of all the articles which its author had from time to time published in various periodicals.

The opinions of Sir H. Rawlinson carry greater weight in England, since he formerly occupied the post of English Ambassador at the Persian Court, and thereby was in a position to gain an intimate acquaintance with the local conditions affecting the question under discussion. Moreover, on the death of Sir

R. Murchison, he was elected President of the Royal Geographical Society. Again in their discussions with us, the English Statesmen not unfrequently support their arguments by quotations from his writings, and for these reasons we cannot but attach considerable significance to his opinions regarding Central Asian matters.

Speaking of the conquests of Russia, Sir Henry Rawlinson remarks:—"It remains to consider what is the most probable issue to passing events, and what line of policy it will best suit the interests of England to adopt. We have no intention of impugning the good faith of the Russian Government in its recent proceedings, but experience has proved, as indeed might have been perceived pretty clearly before, that Russia cannot stop midway in the career on which she has now entered Kokan itself will be a standing menace against Tashkent, precisely as Tashkent was against Chemkent, and still earlier Chemkent was against Turkistan. Indeed, the further she advances, the more imperative will it become for her to take complete possession of the country." Looking, however, upon Kokan as a formidable enemy to

Russia, Sir H. Rawlinson expresses his opinion that her advance in that direction will be a matter of some time.

“What England, then, has to apprehend from the progress of affairs in Central Asia, is not the immediate, or even proximate, invasion of our Indian empire, which is a notion peculiar to the panic-mongers of London and Calcutta, and which we should have thought hardly required the serious refutation that was given to it in the Anniversary Address—admirable in all other respects—delivered by the accomplished President, Sir Roderick Murchison, at a recent meeting of the Royal Geographical Society of London. What we really have to apprehend is, that an Asiatic Russia will arise to the north of the Hindu-Kush, possessing within itself a germ of vitality and vigour that will enable it to replenish rather than exhaust the parent stem, and will render it, in due course of time, a formidable rival to our Indian Empire. What we may not unreasonably expect is, that under the condition of Russian colonization, the principle of development may be reasserted, which seems to be peculiar to this favoured region of Turkestan, and of which the world has already

seen such memorable instances in the career of Jenghiz Khan, of Timour, and of Baber, each of whom, it should be noted, nursed their nascent fortunes in the valley of the Jaxartes before pushing on to foreign conquest and dominion. But the growth of such a Satrapy, acquiring the strength and consistency of an empire, will be a work of time—a work, perhaps, of ages; and a ‘chapter of accidents’ may at any moment intervene to deliver us from the threatened ‘incubus.’ In anticipation however of the ‘chapter of accidents’ the ‘incubus’ continues to alarm the minds of the warlike sons of Albion, who are trembling for the fate of their precious colony.

“As far as can be judged from the tone and comments of the Indian press, there would seem to be coming on—even while Russia is still at so great a distance—that same disturbed and dangerous state of native feeling which was observable at the time of the first Persian siege of Herat, and which has been so well described by Kaye in his ‘History of the Afghan War.’

“We have no wish to discuss dangers which may not after all be realized, but it must be obvious that the nearer the Russians approach

to India, the greater will be their disturbing influence, and the more difficult it will be to maintain order in the frontier districts. If, indeed, an army of 70,000 Europeans is required for the garrison of India under present circumstances, an augmentation of 50,000 would not be an extravagant estimate for our enhanced necessities, when confronted with Russia on the Indus; and considering the strain put on our home resources to meet the present demand, where, let it be asked, is such an additional force to come from?"

With regard to the extension of Russian territory in the Eastern provinces Sir H. Rawlinson says:—

“Any one who traces the movements of Russia towards India on the map of Asia cannot fail to be struck with the resemblance which these movements bear to the operations of an army opening parallels against a beleaguered fortress. The first parallel would thus be the Russian frontier of twenty years back, stretching from the upper end of the Caspian by the Orenburg and Siberian lines northward of the steppe to the Irtish. This may be considered strategically as a mere line of observation. The second parallel, which would

constitute her line of demonstration, would be the frontier which she is now preparing to take up, and which, according to Romanofski's plan, would be drawn from Krasnovodsk Bay, about the centre of the Caspian, south of Khiva to the Oxus, and along the course of that river to the Pamir plateau, thus including the whole of the Uzbek territory, and placing at her command the entire waterway of the Oxus and Jaxartes. This parallel is above 1,000 miles in advance of the first line, but it does not directly menace India, inasmuch as the intervening Afghan mountains constitute a strong military defence. The third parallel, which would be the natural result of the preceding preliminary operations, and which, if Russia survive revolution in Europe and catastrophe in Asia, she will assuredly some day attempt, would be drawn from Asterabad at the south-east corner of the Caspian along the Persian frontier to Herat, and from thence through the Hazareh uplands to the Oxus, or possibly by Candahar to Cabul. Established upon such a line, her position would indeed be formidable. Troops, stores, and material might be concentrated to any extent at Asterabad. The country between

that port and Herat is open and admirably supplied. A line of military posts would connect the two positions and effectually control the Turcomans, thereby conferring an essential benefit on Persia and securing her good-will and co-operation. Herat has been often called 'the key of India,' and fully deserves its reputation as the most important military position in Central Asia. The earthworks which surround the town are of the most colossal character, and might be indefinitely strengthened. Water and supplies abound, and routes from all the great cities to the north, which would furnish the Russian supports, meet in this favoured spot. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that if Russia were once established in full strength at Herat, and her communications were secured in one direction with Asterabad through Meshed, in another with Khiva through Merv, and in a third with Tashkent and Bokhara through Mymeneh and the passage of the Oxus, all the native forces of Asia would be inadequate to expel her from the position. Supposing, too, that she were bent on mischief—and it is only hostility to England that would be likely to lead her into so advanced and menacing a position—she

would have the means of seriously injuring us, since, in addition to her own forces, the unchallenged occupation of Herat would place the whole military resources of Persia and Afghanistan at her disposal."

"Russia has only to point to India as the traditional plunder-ground of Central Asia, as the prize which has ever rewarded the victorious hordes rushing down from the northern mountains, and she at once enlists their sympathies in her behalf."

Next discussing the measures which should be adopted for opposing Russia, the same author puts the question :—

"Are we justified, then, in disregarding this danger merely because it is remote? Ought we not rather, while there is yet time, to provide against the possibility of being thus taken at a disadvantage? Russia could never establish herself at Herat and keep up her communications with Asterabad without the co-operation of Persia, and against the risk of that co-operation our efforts should be accordingly directed.

"The doctrine which prevails at present in our Eastern diplomacy is simply this, that Persia is too weak and faithless to justify any

extraordinary expense in keeping up cordial relations with the Shah. We are content for a while to occupy a subordinate position to Russia at Teheran, trusting that when the time comes for action we may regain our lost ground by increased expenditure and redoubled activity; but this is after all a very short-sighted policy. The good-will of a nation,—that which we once possessed, but have now lost in Persia,—is not to be purchased in a day. It is the growth of time; of steady, unremitting attention. If we desire then to check the advance of Russia towards India—if we desire above all to render impossible, or at any rate indefinitely to postpone, her occupation of Herat, it is indispensable that we should bestir ourselves in Persia at once. The vast expenditure that we incurred in the days of Harford Jones and Malcolm in expelling the French from Teheran is no longer required. What is required is an indication of renewed interest in the country and a disposition to protect it against Russian pressure. Our officers should be again placed in positions of confidence and power with the Persian troops, as in the days of Christie, of Lindsay, and of Hart. Presents of improved arms, and perhaps artillery, would

testify to our awakened interest. The Persian nobles should be encouraged to send their sons for education to London rather than to Paris. Investments of English capital in banks, in railways, in mining operations, and other commercial enterprises are freely proffered, and if supported by our authorities, would create a further bond of union between the countries. Among a people, again, who are so fond of display, and attach so much value to outward forms, it is of the first importance that our mission should be kept up on a very liberal scale, and that presents should be freely distributed—that the diplomatic establishment in fact at Teheran should be Oriental rather than European.”

The accuracy of the picture drawn by Sir H. Rawlinson is confirmed by the following extract from an article by Vambéry, entitled “The Rivalry of England and Russia in Central Asia.” “During Sir H. Rawlinson’s mission to Persia the English influence seemed to be on the ascendant, but from that time it has steadily been on the wane... In proportion as the English policy in Persia was distinguished, in the time of Malcolm, by open-handed generosity and circumspection, so in the time of McNeil it was marked by stinginess and inactivity.”

Returning again to the fancied designs of Russia, Sir H. Rawlinson says :—

“ At the present moment, indeed, it may be assumed that the attention of Russia is steadily turned in the direction of Merv and Herat, and that she will be mainly guided in her general Asiatic policy by considerations affecting this special question. Whether, for instance, the Khan of Khiva be continued in the nominal Chiefship, or whether he be superseded by a Russian Governor, will depend upon which arrangement promises best for the control of the Turcoman tribes; and even the great engineering works, the ship-canal and railway between the Caspian and the Aral, which are about to be commenced, are probably regarded by Russia as of more value in strengthening her position on the Oxus, with a view to the occupation and restoration of Merv, than as improving the communications with Turkistan.”

And thus recent events in Central Asia induce the English to believe that they stand on the threshold of an unavoidable danger.

Amongst the measures recommended by Sir Henry Rawlinson, there is another, *viz.*, the occupation of Herat by English troops. The thoughts of the English have on several pre-

vious occasions been directed towards Herat, and it is only its distance from British territory and the difficulty of maintaining communications across mountain ranges, occupied by robber tribes, that has hitherto restrained English enterprize in this direction. Speaking of the necessity of occupying Candahar and Herat in the event of any further advance on the part of the Russians, Sir Henry Rawlinson expresses in the following words the light in which he would wish the world to regard such a step:—

“It should be rather understood that we had no views of aggrandizement or territorial conquest, but on the contrary, that the occupation of Candahar and Herat was purely a measure of military defence forced upon us by the aggressive attitude of Russia. If the Ameer went along with us in this policy, and placed the resources of Western Afghanistan at our disposal for the purposes of the expedition,—as was the case in our former occupation of the country,—there would be no occasion to supersede the ordinary civil administration, or, in fact, to behave otherwise than as temporary visitors in a friendly country.”

Such discussions naturally have the effect of urging on the Indian Government, and

strengthening it in the resolution to adopt even the most extreme measures, and thus it has happened that difficulties of communications, distance, and the prevalence of robbers have ceased to appear insurmountable obstacles in the eyes of the Viceroy of India.

At the present time, in consequence of our having taken up a position on the Amu Darya, the English are preparing themselves for an important move, *viz.*, that of anticipating us on the road to Herat. For this purpose they propose to advance through the Bolan Pass and to occupy the town of Quettah, which belongs to Khelat, considering themselves justified in adopting such a course of action on the strength of their treaty engagements with the ruler of that country.

In this way England is busy in making a sort of lightning conductor against any future storm, but since it is a well known fact that lightning conductors, so far from preventing, actually attract passing flashes, it is very possible that, in the event of the English occupying Quettah, they may have to meet us a stage earlier than would be altogether agreeable to their wishes.

CHAPTER XIV.

VIEWS OF FOREIGNERS REGARDING RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA.

Views of the European press regarding the objects of our movement in Central Asia—Impartiality of a German writer (Von Hellwald)—Views of the French author, Lejean—What will Russia be a century hence?—Peculiarities in Vambery's writings—He adapts himself to the prevailing tone of public opinion—Can Vambery be regarded as an authority?—What our "brother" Americans say of us—Ambiguity of M. Schuyler's report.

THE Russian movement in Central Asia has, owing to its vastness, elicited a mass of correspondence in the press of Western Europe, and independently of the English public prints, the pages of which have been filled with obvious nonsense, the German, French, Austro-Hungarian, American, and other journals have also been infected by the general spirit of excitement. A few extracts from foreign *brochures* and journals are appended, as showing the judgment which the European literary world has formed of Russian affairs.

F. Von Hellwald in his *brochure* "Die Russen in Central Asien" writes, "Russian

policy may aim at three different objects in Asia, none of which, however, excludes the others. The first, the conquest of India, is of all the most improbable; the second, the attempt to bring the Eastern question to a solution from the east, is possible and probable; and the third, the striving after the monopoly of commerce in Asia, which is their undoubted aim. Every one who, like ourselves, regards the progress of events in Central Asia from a purely scientific point of view, should always bear in mind that the immediate result of Russian conquest in Asia has been the sending forth of scientific expeditions, which have rendered us familiar with these recently semi-fabulous regions, while at the same time civilization steadily follows the victorious flight of the Russian Eagle. Russia is, by the introduction of European civilization, fulfilling a real mission in Central Asia. We, as impartial observers, ought to recognize the fact that Russia is enlarging the circle of human knowledge, is introducing new tribes into the family of civilized nations, and is thereby conferring upon the world at large benefits greater than those which have ever been derived from wars since the time of Alexander the Great."

This extract needs no comment. Every unprejudiced and reasonable person must necessarily agree in the opinion therein expressed by the German author.

The opinions of the French may be gathered from the works of Lejean, who recently visited Central Asia, and communicated two articles to the *Revue des deux Mondes* on Central Asian matters, "Les Russes en Boukharie" and "Les Anglais sur l'Indus." In these articles Lejean describes the present position of affairs in Central Asia with an absence of prejudice altogether foreign to the French character, in spite of which, however, his final conclusions are in entire accord with the opinion expressed by the press in England and India.

"I shall endeavour," he writes in the preface, "to prove conclusively three things of which I am myself firmly convinced, namely, (1) that the forcible entrance of the Russians into Turkistan, which was followed by the subjugation of that country, was a purely defensive, and therefore lawful, measure; (2) that this conquest does not imperil any European interests, and is no more a menace to the English in British India than to the French;

and lastly (3) that the proceedings of the Russians are not only devoid of evil consequences to those immediately concerned, namely, those who have been brought under subjection to Russia, but also that such proceedings are the only possible means of saving these people, who have from time immemorial been incapable of conducting their own administration." This three-fold task which the author thus proposed to himself, even if he had not fulfilled it so satisfactorily as he has, would of itself be sufficient to remove the labours of Lejean from the category of those superficial productions of French giddiness which glut the literary markets of Western Europe.

There is scarcely a single foreign author who, when writing regarding Russia, has not endeavoured to malign her to the best of his ability, and as far as the means at his disposal permit, and such being the case, any expression of a just opinion or a sound judgment by a foreigner excites an involuntary feeling of wonder as to the source whence it was derived.

Lejean, as we shall presently see, did not lose the opportunity of making some concessions to the general taste of the literary public, but we willingly pardon him for this in consider-

ation of the practical common sense exhibited in the rest of his work.

Lejean clearly is far from wishing that Russia should follow the example of the English in India, and surround herself by a series of petty States politically dependent upon her, but possessing full powers for the conduct of their own administration. On the contrary, he advocates the unconditional incorporation in the Russian Empire of Bokhara, Kokan, Khiva, and the lands of the independent Turkomans. For instance, with regard to Bokhara, he expresses himself in the following terms:—In Bokhara, “which stands in a state of semi-dependence upon Russia, but still preserves the right of administering its internal affairs, the prohibited trade in slaves will continue to be clandestinely carried on as extensively as it is at Constantinople. Treaties will no more be respected in Bokhara than they are on the Bosphorus. A real supervision by the Imperial officials can only be brought about by giving them the power of traversing the streets of Bokhara with no greater danger than at present attends them amongst the Trans-Caucasian auls.” In justice to Lejean, it should be added that

in this respect his words have been prophetic. Not only after the defeat at Samarcand, but even after the Khivan campaign of 1873, when the obsolete Treaty of 1868 was revived, the slave-trade continued to flourish in the bazaars of Bokhara under the very beak of the Russian Eagle.

Discussing the conquests of Russia from a purely material point of view, Lejean writes :—
“ If England has derived such marvellous profit from a country like Australia, so scantily gifted by nature, what good results may not be expected from regions such as Kashgar, Yarkand or Bokhara under the manly and well-regulated administration of Russia ?” In another place we meet with the following passage :—“ With respect to Europe, these remote conquests in Central Asia add nothing to the offensive capacity of the Empire. If Russia were even to subjugate the whole of Turkistan, she would thereby only gain a thinly populated territory barely equal to Moldo-Walachia in the number of its inhabitants, or to Moldavia in the amount of its wealth. Of course if the question were regarding Roumania instead of the country of the Uzbeks, Europe would have some reason

for fearing its absorption into the Russian Empire, since such an acquisition would afford an admirable military position along the course and up to the mouth of the most important river in Europe (the Danube) in a country which would, moreover, supply them with excellent soldiers. On the banks of the Oxus, however, it is quite a different matter. These provinces, which have been for years past exhausted by the incapacity of their rulers, and are so far distant from the centre of Russia, that their administration becomes ruinously expensive, form a territory which for a period of thirty or forty years will not repay the cost of its occupation. Lastly, the population, which has no energy or warlike propensities, cannot for a long time to come be expected to yield anything to Russia except a militia similar to that raised in Mingrelia in 1855 at the time of the inroad of Omar Pasha. It is true that the Tartars of Kazan and Astrakhan, when rendered liable to conscription, yielded Russia soldiers for her Crimean army, who have shown that they can stand fire as well as true born Muscovites, but Kazan and Astrakhan were conquered three centuries ago, and there has therefore been a sufficient interval to ren-

der the inhabitants effective troops. Doubtless in the course of a similar interval Bokhara too will be in a position to afford good soldiers, that is supposing the Russian Empire to be in existence three centuries hence, a point on which there are people to be found even in St. Petersburg, who do not feel altogether certain." Lejean, as the reader perceives, has not maintained the impartiality with which he commenced; and in portions of the above passage we see undoubted signs of French frivolity.

If he wishes to know what the Russians at St. Petersburg, and not French "coiffeurs," think of the matter, we would invite his attention to the following figures:—The present population of Russia amounts to nearly 90 millions, while a century hence it will number 270 millions, and with a population increasing at such a rate we may fairly hope to be in existence at the end of the disputed three hundred years. For the benefit of those who take an interest in the question of the time in which population doubles itself, I give here the calculation of Wippius, showing the percentage of yearly increase in different countries:—

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	Rate of yearly increase of population.	Number of years in which the population will double itself.
Norway	... 1·15 per cent.	61 years.
Denmark	... 0·89 "	71 "
Sweden	... 0·88 "	79 "
Saxony	... 0·84 "	83 "
Netherlands	... 0·67 "	103 "
Prussia	... 0·53 "	131 "
Belgium	... 0·44 "	158 "
England	... 0·23 "	302 "
Austria	... 0·18 "	385 "
France	... 0·14 "	406 "

The rate of yearly increase in Russia is 1·01 per cent., that is, she occupies the second place in the above table. Each million of the population in Russia gives a yearly increase of 10,100 souls, and thus the population will double itself in 66 years. Consequently in the year 1941 Russia will number 180,000,000, and again 33 years after that the total population will be 270 millions. The present population of England is about 32 millions, that of Prussia 25, and of France 36 millions. A century hence the above figures will be England about 42, and France and Prussia about 44 millions. In respect of providing for the increase of population which will thus take place, Russia has waste land in abundance, and there will be no deficiency in the necessaries of life, while England, France, and Prussia are not

similarly favoured in these respects. If in the present day the large population of Russia forms such an important element amongst nations, it is easy to anticipate, *pace* Lejean and others, an immense increase of influence when that population is trebled.

Let us now compare the conclusions of Von Hellwald and Lejean with those of Vambéry, premising by a few choice extracts from his works in order that the reader may be able to appraise his true worth. First of all, Vambéry considers that the one object of our advance in Asia is the conquest of India. This is stated by him most unequivocally in a short article which we have already mentioned, namely, "The Rivalry of Russia and England in Central Asia," and from which the following is an extract:— "Russia's designs on India are of three kinds:—in the first place, to insert these rich pearls in the splendid diadem of her Asiatic possessions; in the next place, as the possession of India implies in the eyes of the Mahomedans the *non plus ultra* of power and greatness, her design is to increase to the utmost, by this very acquisition, her influence over the whole world of Islam; and lastly, by subduing the British lion on the other side

of the Hindu Kush, to be able with greater ease to realize her intentions on the Bosphorus in the Mediterranean, and indeed throughout Europe; for no one at the present day will any longer doubt that the Eastern question can be solved with greater ease on the other side of the Hindu Kush than on the Bosphorus." To gain such important objects Russia will naturally be obliged to undergo many difficulties, to expend much money, and to sacrifice many lives; but in the opinion of Vambéry, she has already been striving to pave the way by feeding the populace with hopes for the future and inflaming their cupidity. The reader, however, is left in the dark as to the agency which is employed for this purpose. Vambéry assures us that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has surrounded Persia, India, and almost the whole of Southern Asia, as it were, with an electric wire along which she flashes the sparks of her all-powerful influence. Thus he writes regarding the Armenians:—"How many zealous subjects of the British rule in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras are registered at St. Petersburg as still more zealous promoters of Russian interests. Every member of this Church in Asia may be considered a secret agent of the Muscovite policy."

We know the Armenians to be an enterprising, business-like, practical and industrious people, who are perfectly well able to appreciate the benefits of any particular order of things. If Vambéry has ever had any communications with well-informed people, there is nothing remarkable in the fact that they should have struck a balance between England and Russia in favor of the latter, so far as their own personal advantages are concerned. It is very possible also that not only for the Armenians, but also for the Persians and the natives of India generally the supremacy of Russia might be both easier and more profitable than that of the English, but Vambéry on one occasion let slip an observation which he was never afterwards able to retract. Describing his well-known journey to Khiva and Bokhara, he concludes with the following words:—"We ought to wish full success to the Russian arms in Central Asia for the sake of the final victory of European civilization, and in the name of humanity."

Vambéry however is essentially a charlatan, and his writings abound in contradictions. If foreign periodicals for some reasons or other adopt an inimical tone towards Russia, Vambéry is the first to repudiate his former opinions

and to adopt a new rôle. The whole question turns on what happens to be in demand in the literary market. According as Russophobia or the reverse shows itself to be prevalent, Vambery adapts his writing to the general tone simply in order to find a ready sale for his works.*

In his article on "The Rivalry of Russia and England in Central Asia," for instance, we meet with such passages as the following:—
"A study of the history of Russian conquests in Asia displays invariably the same proceedings of intrigues and artifices, the scattering of the seeds of discord, and all the bribery and allurements by the lowest means which precede an invasion. They first come into contact with the foreign elements in their commercial relations, and the smallest disputes are easily converted into a *casus belli*. Where these fail, the political soil is undermined by emissaries, the Chiefs are allured by presents, are intoxicated by a rich distribution of vodka (rye whiskey), and are thus drawn into the fatal magic circle.'"
Such writing as this is simply ridiculous.

Again in another passage Vambery charac-

* This Vambery himself confessed to a Russian traveller, who occupies a tolerably high position in our Foreign Department.

terizes our policy in the following way :—“ In their contact with various nations, such as the Chinese and Tartars, they drop their own nationality, and show themselves Chinese or Tartars, and so forth, according to the circumstances of the case. Their advance is always like that of the tiger, first crawling cautiously and crouching until the favorable moment permits the fatal spring.” “ The smooth and sweet words of emissaries,” he adds, “ lull the fear and precaution of their victims, who gradually become inveigled into a position where opposition is impossible. In England the Government has until now considered it beneath its dignity to place itself in direct communication with the Ameers of Bokhara, and the British Government has acted through the medium of the Governor-General of India. In Russia the feeling has been different, for the Emperor in his dealings with the Tartar Princes in Central Asia styled himself not the Emperor of all the Russias, but a ‘ Khan on the Neva.’ ” Such Asiatic artifices display a depth of cunning, which is said by Vambéry to be “ of far greater use in political intercourse than the language of openness and justice which the English have on principle

always employed." Every syllable of this is false, for we have never on any occasion resorted to the Jesuitical line of action described by Vambery, nor has the Emperor ever adopted the title of a "Khan of the Neva." So far from the Emperor having made use of such a title, and thereby placed himself on a par with the Khans of Central Asia, the latter in official* communications are styled "your greatness," a title which might with propriety be applied to a man in no higher position than that of a merchant.

The whole of Asia recognizes the might of the Russian Emperor, who is known by the name of "Ak Padshah," *i.e.*, the "White Czar," a title which, moreover, is recognized by the Chinese, but since in the country of the latter the color of white is a token of mourning, while the royal color is yellow, the Chinese, as a sign of especial respect, style the Russian Emperor the "Yellow Czar." Vambery is the solitary specimen of an Asiatic who has dared to cast a slur upon our Emperor, and in so doing he has transgressed the first rules of civility and etiquette, in both of which respects he is immeasurably inferior to the ordinary Oriental.

* See foot-note page 109, Vol. I., for an explanation of this title.—(*Trs.*)

With regard to the characteristics of English policy as described by Vambéry, the English certainly cannot be accused of either "openness or justice"—witness their system of robbery in India, their bombardment of Copenhagen, and their poisoning the Chinese with opium.

In another place Vambéry draws the following picture of the Russians:—"Everywhere along that gigantic frontier line at which Russia touches Asia, we are struck by the startling inferiority of the Russian, both in point of culture and moral qualities, to the Asiatics. The Russian, as a child of the North, may perhaps exhibit more activity than the Asiatic *de pur sang*; still his strikingly dirty exterior, his religion bordering on fetichism, his servility, his coarse ignorance, his rude unpolished manners, place him in an immeasurably inferior grade to the keen-sighted oriental. I heard a cultivated Tajik speaking in Bokhara with contempt of the want of culture of the Russians."

We must, however, remind the reader that Vambéry has been already exposed by many European travellers, who have proved that his travels in Central Asia are a pure fabrication. It would of course be the easiest possible

matter for him with his knowledge of languages to collect extracts from the works of foreign travellers, embellishing them with anecdotes to suit the oriental taste, and, completing the whole by means of that barefaced impudence, on the possession of which quality in one passage he actually congratulates himself, to present to the public an interesting book of travels.

It has fallen to my lot personally to observe two things in Samarcand which are misrepresented by Vambéry, and prove that he never did visit that city. Firstly, he states that the throne in the Amir's palace consists of a large blue-colored stone, whereas in reality it is a splendid monolith of the purest white. Vambéry was led into the error by the vernacular words "kok-tash," which he translates blue stone,* but the word *kok* in the dialect of the

* Vambéry quite correctly translates these Turki words as "green stone" (they might also mean "blue stone"). He does not state "that the throne . . . consists of a large blue-coloured stone;" he makes no direct statement about its colour, but he refers to it by the name which the people of the country give it. It is true he does not add any special note as to the name being a misnomer; being probably well accustomed to the loose way in which the people of Central Asia and even India apply the names of colours (the word *kok* itself is used for both blue and green). As

Uzbeks also signifies "sky," and hence it would have been more correct if he had called it the "heavenly stone," which in the mouth of the natives is intended to express not the actual color of the stone, but the deep respect with which it is regarded by them.

Alongside of the throne is a small oval shaped slab of stone with an inscription inlaid in the wall. Vambéry described this as a cast-iron medallion, bearing a Cufic inscription. From the first glance, however, I was convinced that the letters of the inscription belonged to the Naskh character, though executed by an inexpert hand, and without the usual vowel marks, so that I could only decipher some few words. I therefore took a sketch of

a case in point the Indians use the word "sabz" (green) for what we should call a *grey* horse. If the author wants to prove him wrong, why does he not take him up on the subject of the dimensions of the stone, which Vambéry gives with great completeness in English feet? The fact of no error in this respect being mentioned by an author so anxious to convict him of misrepresentation makes it probable that he must be pretty correct. This is a much better test of his truth or falsehood than the mere adoption of the native name of the stone without comment. Grammatically he is quite right in translating *kok-tash* as "green stone." *Kok* as an adjective means green or blue. The substantive *kok* "sky" would affect the following substantive and make it "kok-tashi." In the present instance it is obviously used in the former sense.—R. B. S.

the inscription which was afterwards read without any difficulty in St. Petersburg by M. Naufall, the Professor of Arabic, and Baron Tisenhausen, the Secretary of the Archæological Commission. It is scarcely possible that a Professor such as Vambéry should have confused the Naskh and Cufic characters.*

Besides this, in the map which is attached to his volume of travels, he has inserted between the rivers Syr and Zerafshan a certain *Kizil Darya*.† Any school boy in Samarcand could

* As the *Cufic* character is that from which the *Naskhi* (or Arabic character in which the Koran is generally written) was formed (see Sale's Koran, Preliminary Discourse, Section I.), it does not seem so very impossible that a traveller after a hurried view should mistake an avowedly imperfectly executed Naskhi inscription for Cufic. Instead of casting doubt on the fact of Vambéry's visit to the spot, this appears to be a mistake much more likely to have been fallen into by a European eye-witness than by the Oriental writers and travellers, from whose description, according to our author, Vambéry compiled the account of his journey! The Arab writers would have known better, and the Persians and Turks would not be likely to have ever heard of Cufic.—R.B.S.

† Vambéry does not profess to have visited that neighbourhood. It appears that on his map he prolonged the stream which runs through Ura-tippa much too far through the desert. This need not impugn his veracity regarding the parts which he says he *did* visit; any more than does the erroneous position of a northern Vakhán, when he was misled by the Russian maps which have adopted the fictions of the mythical Baron Ludwig Von—exposed by Sir H. Rawlinson and others.—R. B. S.

have informed Vambéry that the steppe contains abundance of "Kizil Kum," red sand, but no "Kizil Darya," *i.e.*, red river. Vambéry was clearly drawing on his imagination in the most barefaced manner. Amongst those who took part in the Samarcond expedition of 1868, there was almost a rage for exposing the misstatements made by Vambéry and the result was numerous discoveries proving his want of veracity, a description of which however does not fall within the scope of the present work.

And so the imaginary Tajik, whom Professor Vambéry saw in his dreams, looks with contempt upon the Russians on account of their want of culture, and considers that the Tartar has nothing to learn from the Muscovite! As opposed to the views of this Tajik, or which is the same thing, of Vambéry, we would refer to such an authority as the aged Ali, the Sultan of the Diko-Kamenni Kirgiz, who on the occasion of a State interview thus expressed himself—"I rule over my people according to the orders of the Padshah. A tree, until it comes into the hands of the turner, is only a piece of timber. I and my people are a tree and the Russian offi-

cers are the turners. If the will of the Padshah had not placed them above us, we should still remain in the condition of rude logs." The authority of this Sultan carries more weight as being that of a living man, than that of Vambéry's imaginary Tajik, and also because the Sultan Ali never played the part of a charlatan as did Vambéry.

When the last hopes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were crushed by newly united Germany, the Austrian press adopted a humbler tone regarding Russia, whereupon Vambéry's writings were characterized by something akin to servility. I have heard, indeed, that he even went as far as to offer his services to Russia, which country up to that time he had done everything in his power to abuse. To the question why, if he is so anxious to enter into the service of Russia, he made use of such abusive language, Vambéry, as has been already stated, himself gave a reply, namely, that it suited his material interests. The double-faced, perfidious Hun, who was ready to sell himself body and soul to the highest bidder, would hardly be a reliable servant for Russia.

To complete this sketch, it remains only to

notice the opinions of Americans. Various reasons naturally led us to expect from them a comparatively more composed and disinterested verdict regarding our activity in Central Asia, but in these matters something is required beyond merely a sincere wish to be just, *viz.*, the capacity of forming a correct conclusion from certain given data. A traveller who endeavors to familiarize himself with a region, so to speak, as a bird of passage, must of necessity draw the greater portion of his materials from hearsay and books, rather than from ocular proof. In order, however, to arrive at any general conclusion from these materials, education is useless, unless accompanied by a certain amount of previous study regarding the particular country, and by some talent for grouping the data, thus obtained, into an intelligible whole. Unless under these conditions the conclusions of the traveller become simply a collection of empty words, to which the fact that he has been an eye-witness of what he relates adds no weight whatever.

In 1873 M. Schuyler, the Secretary of the United States Legation at the Court of St. Petersburg, visited Turkistan. The fact that he was an American, who had acquired a cer-

tain knowledge of the Russian language, particularly recommended him to Russians interested in the question, and would have enabled him to collect information on a variety of subjects. M. Schuyler however under-rated his advantages, and regarded the hospitality of the Russians as accorded to him in virtue of his official position. At all events the commencement of his well-known report, dated 7th March 1874, to the United States Government, supports this view. The following is an extract from that report as it appeared in the *Russian World* :—“ I have visited Central Asia without having any political objects in view, but *owing to my official position*, I was received everywhere with great hospitality, and had opportunities for collecting some information, which may not be without interest to Government, regarding the position of the Russians in Turkistan, and in the Khanates which still retain their independence.”

Regarding the data which he collected in connection with our position in Turkistan, they may all be included under one heading, namely, “the evil practices of Russian officials.” So long as M. Schuyler confines himself to relating what he heard, his writings are not open to

any particular objection, since no one suspects him of having wilfully misrepresented facts; but the moment he ceases to record facts and begins to form conclusions, he shows a decided tendency to wander. A series of contradictory conclusions produce such confusion as to leave the reader in doubt what the real opinion of the author is. As an example, some extracts are here given, the explanation of which I leave to M. Schuyler if these lines should ever happen to meet his eye:—

“In spite of the bad administration, the people are on the whole well contented with the Russian rule, finding it so much better than anything which had gone before, and their discontent is chiefly against individuals,—officials and others,—who harass and injure them; but it is evident that a continued series of such occurrences cannot but awaken general distrust towards the administration.

“When the Russians advanced into Central Asia they found many ready to welcome them, partly because they were discontented with the law of the Khan and the Ameer, the extortions which were practised, and the frequent executions, and desired anything for the sake of peace and quiet. Immediately after the

Russian occupation there was an immense feeling of relief that now every man's life was his own, and that his property was secure from arbitrary taxation and seizure. Besides this, the addition of a large non-productive population caused a great demand for labour, and for the necessaries and luxuries of life, and, consequently, prices began to rise, the advantages of which were felt by the land-owner and the merchant. Though the poorer class was not at first much affected, now, of course, prices as a whole have risen, and it costs twice as much to support a labouring man, however little his food, then as it did before the Russian occupation, but I do not believe that the common people would be able to trace this rise in prices to the fact of the Russian immigration. The mercantile class have many advantages for speculation by the large number of contracts necessary for the sustenance of the army. But these things must work in time, and it will require some skill on the part of the Government to avert a general feeling of discontent. Circumstances were exactly the same during the English occupation of Cabul, but things succeeded each other there more quickly, and the English were finally obliged to retreat.

“The inhabitants of Central Asia are by no means like the Afghans; they are much more pacific, and less patriotic in their nature; still they naturally prefer Mahomedan rule, other things being equal, and they are now beginning to forget the evils which they suffered from the Khan, and are thinking more of the evils which they suffer from the Russian officials. At the same time, however arbitrary their native rulers were, their actions were all confined within the sphere limited by the Shariat or Mussulman law, and it was thought that there were certain principles which not even the most tyrannical Beg would dare to contravene.”

Thus the reader perceives that the native population was originally “ready to welcome” the Russians, and that the Russian occupation was followed by “an immense feeling of relief,” but that afterwards, seeing no change for the better, the natives have begun to show a preference to “Mahomedan rule” and to indulge in “a general feeling of discontent.” In spite, however, of all this and of the bad administration, the “people are on the whole well contented with the Russian rule, finding it so much better than anything which had gone before.”

In another place the author says—"The surrender both of Shahr-i-Sabz and of Karshi was made against the wish, and in spite of the protests of the population, who much preferred to remain under Russian rule than to return again to that of the Ameer."

This again is hardly reconcileable with the alleged preference of the inhabitants for the supremacy of the Mahomedans. It should be remembered moreover that the rule of the Russians has now been of sufficient duration to enable the inhabitants to become familiar with the new *régime*, and hence it happened that the people of Shahr-i-Sabz and Karshi showed a decided preference for the Russian administration.

Whence has M. Schuyler derived his opinion that our position in Turkistan is precisely similar to that of the English at Cabul in 1839, who were forcibly expelled and nearly annihilated almost immediately they had entered the country? Is it M. Schuyler's intention to predict that a similar fate will overtake the Russians?

The apathy and want of patriotism amongst the natives are not the only causes of the present firmness of our position, but also the

fact that we do not as a rule treat them with severity, and that while we enable them to enjoy the blessings of peace, we give them at the same time a fair share in self administration. The whole difference between the case of the Russians and the English consists in the fact that, whereas the Russians entered as enemies and act as friends, the English entered Cabul as friends and began to treat the population as enemies. All the contradictions of M. Schuyler are ascribable to his endeavour to reproduce the numerous and different opinions which he heard expressed, but if so, he should have at least sifted them instead of presenting them to his Government in their crude shape.

The personal views of M. Schuyler are clearly described in the following lines:—"On the whole, the Russian influence is beneficial in Central Asia, not only to the inhabitants but to the world. Having once taken possession of the country, it will be almost impossible for the Russians, with any fairness to the natives, to withdraw from it."

Regarding our policy in Asia, M. Schuyler expresses his opinion that "there is not the slightest desire or incentive to make any attack upon India, but naturally the Rus-

sians would dislike to see England extend her influence nearer than it now does to Central Asia, and it is possible that at some time difficulties might arise with regard to the English policy in Kashgar. English criticism, however, and English diplomatic interference have had much effect upon the Russian policy. There is a strong objection felt in the Foreign Office to take steps of any kind in Central Asia, lest some difficulty with England might arise from them, and the consequence is, that the Governor-General does not always have the possibility of acting in the way he thinks best suits the state of affairs. Russia apparently does not feel herself strong enough to take her own course, without regard to what England might say or think."

As if to allay our timidity to advance, M. Schuyler points to the fact that England has shown indications that she will not raise any objections to a further southward movement on the part of Russia:—"It seems to me, and I think the same would be evident to any one who understands well the position of affairs in Central Asia, that the Russians must eventually occupy the whole country as far as the Oxus, and possibly as far as the Hindu Kush.

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The arrangements made last year with England with regard to the boundary of Afghanistan simply meant that, if Russia came up to the Oxus, nothing would be said."

The preceding extracts will have shown the reader the entire impartiality of M. Schuyler, and also his views regarding the objects and general utility of our movement into the heart of Central Asia.

With this we conclude our notice of the criticisms of foreigners.

CHAPTER XV.

FINANCIAL POSITION OF RUSSIAN TURKISTAN.

Are the Russian territories in Asia worth the money spent upon them?—

Cost of connecting the Orenburg and Siberian lines—Revenue of Turkistan—Discrepancy between the figures of the Exchequer and Control Departments—Payments made by the Russians and Natives respectively—Expenditure—Budget for 1874—Comparison between income and expenditure, estimated and actual.

It now only remains to answer the third argument of the opponents of our movement in the East, namely, that with regard to the financial aspect of the question.

Is it, in point of fact, true that the whole of Central Asia is, financially speaking, entirely worthless, and that the annual expenses in connection with the maintenance of the civil and military administration, which are thrown upon the Imperial Exchequer, are entirely unproductive?

First, regarding the cost of the actual conquest. For the connection of the Orenburg and Siberian lines the following sums were allotted:—Roubles 150,000 * (£21,428) to

* I have taken the Rouble throughout as equal to one-seventh of a pound or seven Roubles as the equivalent of one pound sterling.—(*Trs.*)

Cherniayef for the capture of Auliata, and Roubles 200,000 (£28,571) to Verefkin for the occupation of the insignificant town of Suzak : in addition to which a further sum of Roubles 50,000 (£7,142) was granted to Verefkin when he was compelled to march towards Turkistan. Verefkin's actual expenditure, however, amounted only to Roubles 234,000 (£33,428), the balance of Roubles 16,000 (£2,285) being made over to Cherniayef, who was very much in need of funds.

The military duties connected with the "Novo-Kokanian line" were performed by the whole of the Siberian detachment, together with a part of that of Orenburg. Thus the maintenance of these troops and the provision of their requirements fell under the joint control of the two Intendancies of Tomsk and Orenburg. For some reason or other, however, neither of these Intendancies took the slightest trouble in the matter, and not only omitted to provide the troops with the ordinary necessaries of maintenance, but left them without funds. In order to provide the soldiers with provisions, Cherniayef was obliged at first to utilize their pay, and afterwards also the monies remitted by post to private persons

servicing in the region, being ultimately forced to have recourse to loans from natives. Every movement of troops required the hiring of camels and "arabas" (two wheeled carts), and in place of cash the drivers were paid by means of cheques to be cashed at some future time. In fact, we had conquered the region on credit.

In one case only, from Auliata to Chemkent, the movement of the troops involved no expense, as the Kirgiz supplied the camels free of charge; and in this way Cherniayef effected the occupation of Auliata and Chemkent at a cost of Roubles 150,000 (£21,428). The passage of troops from Turkistan cost Roubles 5,000 (£714); the *reconnaissance* of the head waters of the Chirchik Roubles 4,000 (£571); the taking of Niazbeg, Tashkent, and the whole trans-Chirchik region Roubles 10,000 (£1,428); the conveyance of artillery from Vernoe, the maintenance of militia and postal communications, and, lastly, the expenditure on secret service money, gifts, &c., amounted to Roubles 50,000 (£7,142). The entire excess of the actual cost over the sum allotted was Roubles 85,000 (£12,142), and a glance at the map is sufficient to show how moderate

this expenditure was. The Orenburg troops spent as much as Roubles 234,000 (£33,428) on the occupation of the town of Turkistan alone, from which sum must be deducted the cost of the transport of one battalion from Orenburg, *viz.*, Roubles 100,000 (£14,285). The Committee of Adjustment, which was soon afterwards appointed to clear up the obligations of Government, disbursed in all Roubles 317,105 (£45,300), out of which a sum of Roubles 197,650 (£28,235) represented the arrears due to the troops, the balance, amounting to Roubles 119,455 (£17,065), being devoted partly to the payment of the cheques previously given for provision supplied, transport, &c., and partly to the repayment of private remittances which had been intercepted. The grand total of the expenditure, therefore, on the connection of the Orenburg and Siberian lines, or in other words the acquisition of an extensive territory including the towns of Turkistan, Chemkent, and Tashkent, was Roubles 519,500 (£74,214).

Romanofski found himself in the same position as his predecessor Cherniayef, and on starting for Khodjent was compelled to raise a loan of Roubles 3,000 (£425) from a

native. It was not until the arrival of Krihanofski that funds began to be supplied from the Intendancy; but I am ignorant of the exact sum spent on the campaign of 1866 (the taking of Khodjent, Oratippe, and Jizzakh), which probably amounted to about Roubles 250,000 (£35,714). The Samarcand Expedition involved an expenditure of Roubles 150,000 (£21,428). Thus the total cost of the acquisition of the whole Turkistan region amounted to about Roubles 900,000 (£128,571), of which Roubles 500,000 (£71,428) were liquidated by the war indemnity paid by the Ameer of Bokhara on account of the Russian campaigns against him, leaving a net deficit, chargeable to the region, of approximately Roubles 400,000 (£57,142).

Before I proceed to give statistics showing the revenue of the Turkistan region, it should be explained that while the cash accounts of the Treasuries close on the 31st December (O.S.) in each year, those of the Control Department are not closed until the spring. Hence we have two different sets of figures involving nominal discrepancies. I, however, give the preference to the figures of the Control Department, as being based on a more

scientific system, and as giving more accurate data, since the period for which the Control accounts are made up corresponds with the revenue year. The following figures show approximately the revenues of the Provinces of Semirechye and Syr Darya (1) according to the Treasury returns, and (2) according to the accounts of the Control Department :—

Year.	According to the Treasury returns.		According to the accounts of the Control Dept.	
	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£
1868 ...	1,204,906	(172,130)	1,643,237	(234,748)
1869 ...	2,358,241	(336,608)	2,205,909	(315,130)
1870 ...	2,915,983	(416,569)	2,007,837	(286,834)
1871 ...	2,102,955	(300,422)	2,021,138	(288,734)
1872 ...	2,008,374	(288,910)	2,019,296	(288,471)
Total for 5 years ...	10,588,459	(1,512,637)	9,897,417	(1,413,917)

The figures, therefore, of the Control Department are less by Roubles 691,042 (£98,720) than those of the Treasury returns. The yearly variations depend in the case of the Treasury accounts on the varying number of the inhabitants, the condition of the harvests, combined with the zeal of the District officials in the different years; whereas the figures of the Control Department are not liable to the last mentioned cause of variation.

The figures of 1868 and 1869 include the war indemnity paid by the Ameer of Bokhara,

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while those of the remaining years show the normal receipts as amounting to a trifle above two millions of Roubles.

The excess of receipts during 1869 over 1868 speaks very favorably for the results of the labors of the Committees appointed during the former year chiefly for the purposes of preparing a census of the population and dividing the inhabitants into "volosts" (parishes).

The fact that the receipts of 1871 and 1872 stand at such a high figure, in spite of the failure of the crops, is due to the taxes having been calculated by a percentage of the grain and converted into a money payment on the basis of the current market rates. In consequence of the dearth, these market rates were abnormally high during these years, and hence the amount realized in cash was unusually large, in other words the cash revenue increased in inverse proportion to the yield of the harvest.

In the middle of 1868 the Zerafshan circle, including Samarcand, was annexed, which yielded the following revenues:—

Year.				Roubles.	£
1868	335,468	(47,923)
1869	454,932	(64,090)
1870	782,058	(108,865)
1871	1,414,093	(202,013)
			Total	<u>2,986,541</u>	<u>(423,791)</u>

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Up to the year 1872 the revenues of this comparatively small circle appeared most flourishing, which was, however, only in consequence of the inhabitants paying one-fifth of the produce instead of one-tenth, as was the case in the other circles of the Turkistan Province. When it was determined to commute the payment in kind to a cash payment, and the produce was therefore appraised at the current market rates, it became apparent that in reality the taxation amounted to more than one-third of the gross produce. This was owing to the people, on the approach of the date for payment of the taxes, taking at once the Government share of the produce to the bazaars, which naturally glutted the market and compelled them to sell nearly twice as much grain to realize a given sum of money than would have been the case at the ordinary normal rates.

This circumstance produced a serious derangement, economical and agricultural, in the position of the natives of the Zerafshan circle, which quickly showed itself, at first by arrears, complaints, and deputations to the Governor-General, and ended in crimes against property and in emigration. The people began to move

en masse into the neighbouring territories, and indeed two Kishlaks (villages) migrated bodily across the frontier.

In 1873, on the eve of the Khivan Expedition, the Governor-General communicated to the Zerafshan deputation the intelligence that the Emperor had been graciously pleased to lower the taxes by one-half. This measure, which equalized the taxation of the Zerafshan circle to that paid elsewhere (one-tenth of the produce), was introduced only just in time to prevent complications. The taxes to be levied from this circle for 1874 were estimated at Roubles 1,031,310 (£147,330).

In the Kulja circle the revenues amount to about Roubles 100,000 (£14,285), which are expended upon local requirements. In the absence of exact data I do not include these figures in the general total.

From the Amu Daryan circle no revenues were realized in 1873, since by the Treaty with Khiva the collections for that year appertained to the Khan. In 1874 the amount realized was about Roubles 140,000 (£20,000).

Taking into account only the Districts of Syr Darya and Semirechye, together with the Zerafshan circle, we get a total revenue for the

year 1873 of Roubles 2,716,770 (£388,110). Adding to this the revenues of the Districts of Kulja Roubles 100,000 (£14,285), and of the Amu Darya Roubles 140,000 (£20,000), the grand total of the revenues of the Turkistan region stands at Roubles 2,956,770 (£422,381).

It should be remarked that the incidence of the taxation on the native population is extremely light. In my "Statistical Sketches of Russian Central Asia" I have made the following calculation regarding the Syr Darya District:—While the Russian population, numbering 21,549 souls (including troops), paid for the year 1870 on account of direct and indirect taxes (namely, a tax for the right of trading, excise on liquors, licenses for the sale of liquors, tobacco, &c.), a total amount of Roubles 182,839 (£26,119), that is, nearly at the rate of 8 Roubles 44 Copeks (25s. 4d.) per head of the population, the native inhabitants, numbering 931,660 souls, paid only Roubles 940,199 (£134,314), which gives an incidence of only 1 Rouble 9 Copeks (3s. 3d.) per head. Thus the incidence of taxation falls on the Russian nearly eight-fold as much as on the native population.

With reference to the two main points on which the amount of revenue is dependent,

viz., the accuracy of our knowledge regarding the number of the population, and the method of collection, we have no accurate information regarding the former, while regarding the latter it is probable that, under the present system, only one-third of the total collections reaches the Government Treasury, the remainder being intercepted by the Tax Collectors. No doubt these and other obstacles will in time be removed, and the revenues of the Turkistan circle probably increased to as much as Roubles 6,000,000 (£857,142).

With regard to the expenditure, the maintenance of the local administration, including the Treasury, Control, Postal, Public Works, and other Departments, amounted to the following sums:—

Year.			Roubles.	£
1868	620,750	(88,679)
1869	1,229,084	(175,580)
1870	1,177,125	(168,161)
1871	1,878,768	(196,967)
1872	1,695,732*	(242,247)
Total for 5 years ...			6,101,439	(871,634)

These figures include the *general* expenses of the entire region, but the *local* expenses of

* Of this amount 650,000 Roubles (£92,857) are debitable to the Postal Department alone.

only the Districts of Semirechye and Syr Darya ; the expenditure on the local administration of the other districts, namely, Kulja and Samarcand, being debited to special local taxes raised for that object. From 1873 the expenditure on the Zerafshan circle was also added to the general account of the province. The following statement shows income, expenditure, and balance :—

Year.	Income.		Expenditure.		Balance.	
	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£
1868 ...	1,643,237	(234,748)	630,750	(83,679)	1,022,487	(146,670)
1869 ...	2,205,909	(315,130)	1,229,064	(175,590)	976,845	(139,549)
1870 ...	2,007,837	(286,934)	1,177,125	(163,161)	830,712	(118,673)
1871 ...	2,021,138	(288,734)	1,378,768	(196,967)	642,370	(91,767)
1872 ...	2,019,296	(288,471)	1,695,732	(242,247)	323,564	(46,223)
1873 ...	2,716,770	(388,110)	2,396,621	(342,375)	320,149	(45,736)

The total balance for the six years ending with 1873 is, therefore, Roubles 4,116,127 (£588,018).

In order to explain the sources of income and the nature of the expenditure, I give here the Budget for 1874 :—

Income.

	Roubles.	£
I.—Regular ...	2,455,107	(350,730)
II.—Fluctuating ...	250,000	(35,714)
III.—Miscellaneous ...	266,782	(38,112)
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	2,971,889	(424,556)
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Details of I. (Regular.)

	Amount collected.		Cost of collection.	
	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£
(a) Tax on kibitkas* ...	563,735	(80,534)	57,688	(8,241)
(b) Land taxes† ...	1,302,110	(186,016)	40,195	(5,742)
(c) Taxes on trade (Zyaket)‡ ...	279,472	(39,924)	24,028	(3,433)
(d) Cash commutation§ for taxes in kind	181,511	(25,930)
(e) Poll-tax on 570 "Meshchans" of the Semirechye...	1,368	(195)
(f) Taxes on the popu- lation living on the upper course of the Zerafshan	6,000	(714)
Total ...	2,333,196	(333,313)	121,911	(17,416)

II.—Fluctuating.

	Roubles.	£
Amount derived from excise and licenses for sale of spirits, &c.	250,000 (35,714)

* Total number of kibitkas 225,972 at 2 Roubles 75 Copeks per kibitka.

† Including the *tanap*, *khiraj*, *koshpul* and *kipsen* levied from the settled population, which amount to Roubles 442,305 (£63,186) for the Syr Daryan and Roubles 900,000 (£128,571) for the Zerafshan Districts respectively.

‡ For the Syr Daryan District, Roubles 220,000 (£31,428), and for the Zerafshan, Roubles 83,500 (£11,928).

§ From the nomad population of the district of Semirechye at 25 Copeks from 105,048 kibitkas; in the district of Syr Darya at 75 Copeks from 120,924 kibitkas. From the settled population of the Syr District at 75 Copeks from 71,928 houses, and in the Zerafshan District at 25 Copeks from 42,440 houses.

|| A lower middle class in Russia between the peasant and the citizen proper, consisting chiefly of petty working tradesmen, who, in lieu of the tax on larger merchants assessed by guilds, have to pay a fixed rate per head.—*Trs.*

III.—Miscellaneous.

	Roubles.	£
(a) Obrok tax on crown lands and cotton plantations	34,691	(4,956)
(b) Guild tax from Russian merchants ...	60,000	(8,571)
(c) Duty on Tea imported from the Khanates	6,054	(865)
(d) Stamps on deeds for sale of real property and fees	6,000	(857)
(e) Sale of stamped paper	18,000	(2,571)
(f) Fines	3,000	(429)
(g) Passports	397	(57)
(h) Occasional items	60,000	(8,571)
(i) Receipts on account of the <i>Turkistan Gazette</i>	3,500	(500)
(j) Rents on Government shops* at fairs ...	30,000	(4,286)
(k) Receipts from forests in the Semirechye District	9,000	(1,286)
Ditto ditto Zerafshan District ...	2,000	(286)
(l) Subscriptions to the Tashkent Public Library	140	(20)
(m) Receipts from the Governor-General's Printing Press	4,000	(571)
(n) Repayment of advances to agriculturists (made at sowing time)	30,000	(4,286)
	<u>266,782</u>	<u>(38,112)</u>

The total revenue, therefore, amounts to Roubles 2,971,889 (£424,556), to which must be added :—

	Roubles.	£
(1) Receipts from the Postal Department ...	108,240	(15,463)
(2) Ditto the Telegraph Department...	42,000	(6,000)
(3) Balance of previous years, according to estimate of Control Department	1,200	(171)
	<u>151,440</u>	<u>(21,634)</u>

Making the grand total of receipts from all sources Roubles 3,123,329 (£446,190).

* Including caravanserais, which yield Roubles 20,000 (£2,857).

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Expenditure on maintenance of the Administration.

	Roubles.	£
(1) Maintenance of Governor-General's Office	83,400	(9,057)
(2) Ditto District Offices ...	439,897	(82,814)
(3) Officers deputed on special duty ...	21,500	(3,071)
Total ...	524,697	(74,942)

Extraordinary Expenditure.

	Roubles.	£
(1) Extraordinary proper ...	127,860	(18,266)
(2) Transport of troops, &c. ...	55,000	(7,857)
Total ...	182,860	(26,123)

Expenditure on local requirements.

	Roubles.	£
(1) Maintenance of communications and general rural expenses ...	181,511	(25,929)
(2) Schools ...	31,100	(4,443)
(3) Stationery ...	2,000	(286)
(4) Geological explorations ...	25,000	(3,571)
(5) Cost of collecting the taxes ...	121,911	(17,416)
(6) Expenses connected with the Tashkent fair ...	61,440	(8,777)
(7) Maintenance of town hospital at Samarcand ...	7,125	(1,018)
(8) Expenses connected with the Samarcand Jail (including maintenance of prisoners, &c.) ...	16,100	(2,300)
(9) Expenses connected with the Governor-General's printing press ...	10,000	(1,429)
(10) Publication of the <i>Turkistan Gazette</i> ...	12,000	(1,714)
(11) Cost of encampments in the Zerafshan District ...	45,000	(6,429)
(12) Erection of store houses for grain in the Zerafshan District ...	30,000	(4,286)
(13) Building expenses ...	300,000	(42,857)
(14) Grants-in-aid to Russian immigrants ...	3,000	(429)
(15) Forest conservation ...	4,500	(643)
(16) Miscellaneous expenses ...	13,100	(1,871)
Total ...	863,787	(123,398)

Thus the total expenditure under the above

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heads is Roubles 1,571,244 (£224,463), to which must be added—

	Roubles.	£
(1) Maintenance of Post Offices, Postal Stations and Postal service	713,901	(101,986)
(2) Maintenance of Telegraphs	68,960	(9,851)
(3) Maintenance of Control Department of Turkistan	28,848	(4,121)
(4) Maintenance of treasuries of Turkistan	118,444	(16,206)
(5) Expenses connected with the Agent of the Minister of Finance	5,000	(714)
(6) Maintenance of School of Sericulture, Chemical Laboratory and Government Gardener	12,760	(1,823)
Total	942,913	(184,701)

Thus the grand total of expenditure is Roubles 2,514,157 (£359,165).

It is necessary to add that the revenues have always exceeded, and the expenditure always fallen short of the estimates. Thus the following figures show a comparison of the Income, estimated and actual, for four years :—

Year.	Estimated.		Actual.		Surplus.	
	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£
1868	... 1,000,000	(142,857)	1,643,237	(234,749)	643,237	(91,891)
1869	... 1,514,619	(216,374)	2,205,909	(315,130)	691,290	(96,756)
1870	... 1,771,930	(263,133)	2,017,837	(288,262)	246,907	(36,130)
1871	... 1,669,538	(242,834)	2,028,138	(289,734)	328,300	(46,900)
Total	... 5,966,387	(855,198)	7,895,121	(1,127,874)	1,908,734	(272,677)

Thus for the four years the actuals exceeded the estimate by 1,908,734 Roubles (£272,677), giving an average yearly excess of about 480,000 Roubles (£68,571); on the other hand, the

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expenditure was less than the estimate by the following amounts:—

			Roubles.	£
In 1868 by	45,622	(6,517)
„ 1869 „	2,010	(287)
„ 1870 „	35,684	(5,098)
„ 1871 „	149,064	(21,295)
„ 1872 „	259,800	(37,114)
„ 1873 „	48,540	(6,935)
		Total	540,720	(77,246)

The falling off in 1873 is due to the fact that the revenues of the Zerafshan District were suddenly diminished, owing to the lowering of the land tax to one-half the rate at which it was previously levied. It should be remembered also that more or less considerable sums are constantly spent from the civil estimates on purely military requirements, such as the building of barracks, camps and hospitals, the expenses of reconnoitring parties, equipment of detachments, &c. Thus the following sums were spent:—

			Roubles.	£
In 1869	59,439	(8,491)
„ 1870	72,912	(10,416)
„ 1871	60,308	(8,615)
„ 1872 [from Jan. 1st to Aug. 1st (O.S.)]	13,936	(1,991)
		Total	206,595	(29,513)

Besides the above sums, Roubles 46,000 (£6,571) per annum from the revenues of the zerafshan District were devoted to military

requirements in other districts, over and above the sums which were spent in the Zerafshan District itself.

In the estimates for the years 1873, 1874, &c., a fixed entry of Roubles 35,381 (£5,054) appears in the civil estimates for military requirements, and deducting these figures, which are properly a military charge, the annual actual expenditure would stand at about an average sum of Roubles 120,000 (£17,143) less than the estimate.

Comparing now the excess of actuals over estimated receipts with the surplus remaining after deducting the expenditure, we get—

Year.	Excess of actual over estimated receipts.		Surplus.	
	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£
1868	643,237	(91,891)	1,022,486	(146,069)
1869	691,290	(98,756)	976,846	(139,549)
1870	245,907	(35,130)	830,712	(118,673)
1871	328,300	(46,900)	642,370	(91,767)

From these figures it is clear that the surplus is not due to an unexpected rise of revenue, but to economy in the expenditure, since the surplus in each year is larger than the excess of actual over estimated receipts.

The above-quoted figures show that the Turkistan region has never as yet had a deficit, and that the receipts are capable of great expansion should we, at any future time, desire to make the region a source of revenue.

CHAPTER XVI.

FINANCIAL POSITION OF RUSSIAN TURKISTAN.—(Continued.)

Mistaken method of proving the unprofitableness of Russian territories in Central Asia—Should the maintenance of troops in Central Asia be debited to the districts occupied by them?—Comparison of the frontier region of Turkistan with other frontier provinces—Average cost of maintenance of the troops in each of the fourteen Military Circles—The army forms the largest consumer of Imperial revenues—The deficit explained—We ought not to grudge the expenditure on maintaining our position in Central Asia—The reasons why the Kirgiz sympathize with the Russian advance—Present safety of the routes across the steppes—Instances of long trips accomplished without an escort.

THOSE who oppose the Russian movement in Central Asia and the system of administration at present in force throughout Russian territory in those parts do not deal quite fairly with the financial aspect of the question. In order, for instance, to show that the movement has proved a financial loss, they add to the figures on the expenditure side the whole charge for maintenance of the troops, while without any reason they exclude from the receipts the

revenues of the Zerafshan District. Thus the expenditure on the Zerafshan District is entered without any corresponding revenue, and the result is a false view of the financial position of Turkistan.

We should not have referred particularly to this mistaken idea had it not lately been very much in vogue. Persons who interest themselves in the matter, but who do not know the secret of the erroneous figures thus produced, have been naturally led into a misapprehension, which has been increased by the official source from which these figures are said to have been derived. There is some excuse for those who unwittingly misrepresented the figures, but none for such as intentionally did so.

Setting aside however this question, we proceed to consider whether the charges for the maintenance of troops can be fairly debited to the budget of the provinces over which those troops are distributed.

First of all, the primary object of troops is the protection of the empire from external enemies, and hence they are concentrated in the border tracts where danger is most imminent, the interior provinces being sometimes left entirely ungarrisoned. Since therefore the

burden of billeting the troops falls necessarily on the frontier districts, the remaining expenses on their equipment and maintenance ought to be regarded as a general Imperial charge. The duty of protecting the empire, whether enforced by general liability to military service, or by the payment of taxes, is universal; it falls upon every individual citizen, and is not confined to the point at which the empire may be attacked. Thus it would be unreasonable to impose on Poland exclusively the duty of protecting Russia against Prussia and Austria; or on Finland the duty of protection against Sweden. To throw the charge of maintaining the Russian troops on the border tracts only would be both unjust and impossible. It would be unjust, because the whole burden of billeting and maintaining the troops of the Empire would be thereby thrown on those tracts, and it would be impossible, because the resources of the frontier provinces would not suffice to meet the whole of the military requirements. Our military expenses swallow up a third of the Imperial revenues, and clearly this large proportion could not possibly be paid by the border districts alone. If the view adopted by the opponents of our Central Asian movement be

carried to its logical conclusion, it follows that all the Russian frontier provinces are a source of loss, and therefore that we must either abandon them or reduce the number of troops, and thereby be left with no protection against external enemies.

The number of troops concentrated at any point of the frontier depends on the degree of danger by which that particular point is threatened. The cost of maintaining troops varies according to their numbers, the general condition of agriculture, manufactures, &c., and also according to the proximity of the centres of production, and the condition of the means of communication. In order to see clearly the relative position which the frontier tracts occupy in regard to each other, it is interesting to compare the strength of the forces and the cost of their maintenance in each. Thus in the military circles of St. Petersburg, Warsaw, the Caucasus, and Turkistan, exclusive of expenditure on the artillery and the Engineer Department, the following statistics show the number of troops, and the actual cost of their maintenance (clothing, food, pay, &c.), according to the estimate of the War Office for 1875:—

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(a) Strength of the Forces.

HORSES.			
	No. of men.	In the regular ranks.	Irregulars and baggage horses, &c.
In the St. Petersburg Circle ...	84,353	13,103	1,088
In the Warsaw Circle...	113,686	16,727	5,807
„ Caucasus „ ...	151,161	26,905	14,865
„ Turkistan „ ...	83,893	8,014	6,893

During 1875 the details of the Turkistan troops were—

	Batta- lions.	Compa- nies.	Sotnias.	Pieces of artillery.	Depôts.
Regulars ...	18	5	...	48	13
Irregulars ...	1	...	37	8	...
	—	—	—	—	—
Total ...	19	5	37	56	13
	—	—	—	—	—

Of the 18 battalions of regulars, 12 of the line contain 13,440 men; 4 Fusilier battalions 3,639 men; and 2 garrison battalions 1,200 men. Four batteries number 2,181 men, and 2,467 men are attached to ten district and local depôts. The total number of regulars including non-combatants is 25,769 men.

The following table shows the cost of maintenance of the troops in the various circles:—

(b) *Cost of maintenance.*

	Petersburg.	Warsaw.	Caucasus.	Turkistan.				
	Roubles.	£	Roubles.	£				
Cost of provisioning and equip- ment	1,981,952	(275,279)	2,849,218	(407,031)	4,084,399	(583,471)	843,157	(120,471)
Extra Commissariat allowances ...	1,679,371	(239,896)	2,061,332	(294,476)	1,893,510	(270,501)	700,068	(100,018)
Pay of lower ranks	490,407	(70,058)	537,851	(76,886)	974,266	(136,177)	209,918	(29,968)
Additional grants for extra ser- vice	46,769	(6,681)	47,368	(6,767)	53,119	(7,446)	7,877	(1,126)
Extra expenses under the same head	101,135	(14,448)	49,646	(7,092)	9,569	(1,367)	11,833	(1,690)
Permanent Military Hospitals ...	625,412	(89,346)	323,096	(46,157)	567,643	(81,092)	88,316	(12,002)
Field Hospitals, &c.	32,799	(4,686)	30,170	(4,310)	8,247	(1,178)	53,533	(7,648)
Forage for horses in the ranks ...	1,791,258	(265,894)	2,328,152	(323,307)	2,134,673	(304,953)	685,849	(97,976)
Forage for horses not in the ranks	40,523	(5,790)	124,560	(17,794)	362,365	(51,481)	138,991	(19,437)
Remount of horses for ranks ...	207,480	(29,633)	2,307	(329)	41,463	(5,926)	160	(23)
” horses not in ranks ...	6,643	(949)	12,194	(1,742)	19,758	(2,823)	3,934	(563)
Office expenses	34,249	(4,893)	42,713	(6,102)	36,604	(5,239)	7,743	(1,106)

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Expenses on education of illiterate men	6,094	(970)	8,791	(1,256)	10,856	(1,551)	1,960	(290)
Extraordinary expenses	89,824	(5,689)	104,500	(14,929)	128,000	(18,286)	30,000	(4,266)
Pay of irregulars	18,217	(2,602)	25,302	(3,615)	563,799	(80,543)	62,827	(8,975)
Semi-military mounted Police (Gens d'armes)	31,500	(4,500)	61,290	(9,748)
Baths and fuel	61,586	(8,796)
Unforeseen and supplementary expenses for the army of the Caucasus	400,000	(57,148)
Sundry items* of equipment during 1875	87,885	(12,555)	11,117	(1,588)	762	(109)
For keeping the above in order, and expenses connected with men returning from leave of absence	392,415	(53,059)	358,088	(50,870)	341,173	(48,789)	101,668	(14,524)
Total	7,563,788	(1,080,541)	9,085,311	(1,290,745)	11,629,182	(1,647,026)	2,987,751	(419,679)

* The word in the original is "reshchi," which means simply "things."—(Tr.)

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Thus the total expense of maintenance is greatest in the Caucasus, after which follows Warsaw, then St. Petersburg, and lastly, Turkistan.

The average cost of maintenance per man in the various circles is as follows :—

			Rbls.	Cpks.	£	s.	d.	
St. Petersburg	22	90	or	3	8	8
Turkistan	24	87	„	3	14	7
Warsaw	25	6	„	3	15	2
Caucasus	27	2	„	4	1	0½

The following table shows the cost of maintenance per man of the troops in the various military circles of the Empire according to calculations made by myself from the estimates for 1875 :—

Circle.	No. of troops.	Cost of maintenance per head.		£	s.	d.	
		Rbls.	Cpks.				
1. Eastern Siberia	... 18,673	31	6	or	4	13	2
2. Caucasus	... 151,161	27	2	„	4	1	0½
3. Warsaw	... 112,686	25	6	„	3	15	2
4. Finland	... 14,787	25	5	„	3	15	1½
5. Turkistan	... 33,893	24	87	„	3	14	7
6. Vilna	... 93,370	24	22	„	3	12	7
7. Odessa	... 63,391	23	92	„	3	11	9
8. St. Petersburg	... 84,353	22	90	„	3	8	8
9. Orenburg	... 14,680	21	48	„	3	4	5
10. Moscow	... 85,024	19	94	„	2	19	10
11. Kief	... 58,816	18	69	„	2	16	0½
12. Kharkof	... 65,457	17	38	„	2	12	2
13. Kazan	... 34,300	16	83	„	2	10	6
14. Western Siberia	... 16,256	12	49	„	1	17	6

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These figures include the savings under the head of the Military Hospitals, and also the cost incurred in provisioning detachments moving from one place to another, for instance, sotnias returning home from service, recruits joining their corps, &c. Exclusive of these items the cost of maintenance per man of the active forces in the above circles stands as follows:—

Circle.	Total cost of	Average per				
	maintenance.	head.		£	s.	d.
	Roubles.	Rbls.	Cpks.			
1. Eastern Siberia ...	566,684	30	34	or	4	11 0
2. Caucasus ...	3,998,788	26	52	„	3	19 6½
3. Warsaw ...	2,821,374	24	81	„	3	14 5
4. Finland ...	362,156	24	49	„	3	13 6
5. Vilna ...	2,262,183	24	25	„	3	12 9
6. Odessa ...	1,518,412	23	95	„	3	11 10
7. Turkistan ...	789,680	23	30	„	3	9 10½
8. St. Petersburg ...	1,891,882	22	41	„	3	7 3
9. Orenburg ...	292,978	19	96	„	2	19 11
10. Moscow ...	1,693,408	19	91	„	2	19 9
11. Kief ...	1,099,834	18	61	„	2	15 10
12. Kharkof ...	1,140,905	17	43	„	2	12 4
13. Kazan ...	540,227	15	75	„	2	7 3
14. Western Siberia...	187,266	11	52	„	1	14 6½

Thus the cost of maintenance in Turkistan is less than even that in Odessa.

The cheapest circles are those which comprise Governorships with well developed agriculture, while the cost increases in proportion to the absence of agriculture and deficiency in the means of transport.

The excessive cheapness in Western Siberia is to a large extent due to the small number of troops there, which number only 16,000, and hence the demand for provisions, &c., is comparatively small.

In point of the strength of the troops the Turkistan circle occupies the tenth place in the above list, the numbers being less than even in Kazan, which is situated almost in the heart of the empire. From this fact the conclusion appears to follow that the present number of troops in Turkistan cannot be said to be normal, and must sooner or later be increased, the additional cost being debited to the Orenburg and Kazan circles. To diminish the strength of the troops in Turkistan is out of the question, and such a proposal would imply an entire ignorance of the circumstances of the region, and the tasks which Russia may sooner or later have to fulfill there.

When it is remembered that the present Turkistan army by its march from Siberia and Orenburg into the heart of Asia has accomplished no mean service, that it has not only conquered the region but has also constructed a series of towns, laid the foundation

for future colonization, and improved the means of communication, it must be admitted that the money spent on these troops has been devoted to a good purpose. They cannot be reproached with a single failure in their duty, and in no other circle of the Russian Empire, or indeed in the whole world, has the labor of troops been followed by such fruitful results as in Turkistan. So true is this, that they may be appropriately called working gangs (*artyel*), taking up their arms only for short periods for the sole purpose of driving away or chastising the uncouth inhabitants who interrupt their labors.

In view of all this we cannot regard the Turkistan circle as a source of loss even with regard to the maintenance of troops, since (1) the troops would have had to be maintained in any case in Orenburg and Western Siberia only with less benefit to the empire; (2) the cost of the maintenance is very moderate; (3) the expenditure is repaid a hundred-fold by the tranquillity thereby afforded to the Trans-Volga and Western Siberian provinces; also by the development of trade under the protection thus afforded, and by the position which Russia has gained in respect to British

India; and (4) since the maintenance of troops is an Imperial concern, benefiting the empire at large, the expense thereby involved cannot be fairly debited to the resources of any particular province.

The figures representing the total military expenditure in the Turkistan circle for the five years ending with 1872 are as follows:—

			Roubles.	£
For 1868	4,392,940	(627,563)
„ 1869	4,592,480	(656,066)
„ 1870	6,114,888	(878,555)
„ 1871	6,820,945	(974,420)
„ 1872	7,576,186	(1,082,312)
		Total	29,497,414	(4,213,916)

The revenue for these five years amounted to Roubles 9,897,417 (£1,414,488), and hence the result shows an enormous deficit of Roubles 19,600,000 (£2,800,000), but this really means nothing, since all our frontier tracts are in precisely the same position. The only remedy for such a deficit is the disbandment of our troops, which would imply a cessation of self-protection, a repudiation of our long established policy, and a withdrawal from our border possessions.

Clearly this is impossible, since the maintenance of a standing army is necessitated by the political condition of the empire, and before

a consideration of this nature all others must give way. Moreover, it is obviously necessary that such an army should be distributed so as to provide for the protection of the various frontier provinces. The reasons are so self-evident that it would be absurd to enlarge upon them, if it were not that a contrary opinion is held by a large section of the public. At any rate, enough has been said to show the reader that the entire military expenditure cannot properly be debited to the Turkistan circle, in which case the average annual surplus of receipts over expenditure amounts to about Roubles 686,000 (£98,000).

It would be interesting to enquire to what extent the expenditure of Russia has increased in Central Asia since the conquest of Turkistan. This can be calculated by comparing the cost of protecting the old line of frontier, which now forms a saving, with the expenditure incurred on the three newly-formed battalions, which represents the additional expenditure consequent on the occupation of Turkistan. Allowing also for the large sums annually spent on the old system of flying detachments, it will be clear that, upon the whole, the expenditure has not increased;

and, indeed, even if we were losers by having to pay an additional half million or so for the protection of Western Siberia, Orenburg and the Ural tracts, it would be beneficial to incur this small loss in view of the following considerations:—Firstly, granting, for the sake of argument, that such additional expense is not followed by any corresponding advantages from the newly-occupied regions, or from the development of our trade (though it has increased nearly twenty-fold), there still remains a weighty argument in favor of it, namely, that, by this annual expenditure upon the maintenance of our position in Central Asia, we are direct gainers from a political and material point of view, inasmuch as we are thereby acquiring an influence over England which could not otherwise have been effected without the expenditure of hundreds of millions on a war.

It should be remembered that the English have emulated the Tartars, Poles and Swedes in becoming the rivals of Russia, and that a European war must necessarily cost hundreds of millions and involve serious risk, not only in regard to loss of life, but also in the payment of heavy war contributions in the event of

defeat. Whilst England formerly took advantage of every opportunity to entangle us in a war, at the present time, on the contrary, she will not rashly venture to undergo the risks which a contest with Russia would imply. Had it not been for our admirable position in Asia, we could hardly have "torn to pieces" the Treaty of Paris. At all events, such a proceeding would have involved a war, and this would have swallowed up at least a hundred millions of money for the saving of which we are indebted partly to our position in Central Asia and partly to the Franco-Prussian war, while Austria, after her recent misfortunes, could not venture upon opposition. Indeed, the time could not have been better chosen, although had England acted, as in former times, with boldness and resolution, she might, if combined with Austria and Turkey, have given us serious trouble. Thus, the nearer our Central-Asian frontier approaches to India, the more guarded is the behaviour of England towards us, the less opposition we have to encounter in Europe, and the less probability there is that we shall be involved in war. All these advantages are bought at the cost of a larger or smaller deficit in our Imperial

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Budget, but it must be remembered that the millions, which we now spend upon Asia, save us hundreds of millions in Europe.

If these arguments are not sufficiently convincing, let us take as an example the case of the Kirgiz. At the time of the Perovski's Campaign in 1839, they voluntarily gave up a number of their camels; again, on the march of Cherniayef from Auliata to Chemkent, they conveyed without payment the baggage of his detachment; while in 1873, as a token of their appreciation of the tranquillity that they had enjoyed from the time of the Russian occupation of the region, they declined to accept payment of the sum of about Rubles 800,000 (£114,284) due to them for the hire of camels, &c., during the Khivan Expedition. All these sacrifices on the part of a poor nomad nation really represent the premium which they pay Russia for ensuring their safety. The Kirgiz have undergone many calamities, and more than once they have had to migrate *en masse* from one end of Asia to the other, in order to escape a hopeless contest with their savage neighbours. Such migrations were caused by pressure from without, and it is easy to imagine what hardships they must have involved. If

these semi-barbarous nomads value so highly the blessings of tranquillity and security, surely it is not too much to expect that educated Russians will appreciate the true worth of such benefits. As in the feudal period the petty Dukedoms of Russia inclined towards Moscow in spite of the many hardships involved thereby, so at the present time the Kirgiz incline towards us by virtue of that same historical necessity of gaining protection from external enemies, which in such cases can only be procured by becoming united with a more powerful State. So long as the petty Dukedoms were not united, Russia groaned under the dominion of the Tartars, but the moment that Moscow had formed Russia into a united whole, the aspect of affairs became changed. The power which liberated Russia from the ignominious yoke of the barbarians was that of *unity*, and so it has happened on the Central-Asian Steppes. The inroads of masses of barbarians (for instance the Zungars in the eighteenth century) have invariably compelled the Kirgiz to seek protection from one or other of their neighbours, and with this object their choice fell on Russia. It is true that at first, before they

became familiar with our ways, they had recourse to forcible measures, and, as it were, thrust themselves upon our protection, but in course of time they adapted themselves to circumstances and perceived that safety was only to be gained by living peaceably under the protection of Russian forts. Afterwards when the audacity of the savages, whose haunts were in Khiva or Kokan, increased to such an extent that even the proximity of our fortified line was insufficient to protect the Kirgiz from plunder, it is clear that the latter could not otherwise than hail with joy every forward step on the part of Russia, for it implied an additional pasture-ground for themselves where they could live in safety, while at the same time it restrained the tyrannical Khans, and effected a comparative clearance of the Steppes from marauding bands.

In the present day the entire Steppes may be said to be free from danger, whilst Russian forts, detachments and patrols render the countries on the Rivers Syr and Amu safe from depredation. Where ten years ago there was no safety even for a whole "aul," to-day solitary travellers may be met, and Russian officers, alone and unattended, frequently

accomplish long stages, even in places where no regular postal route exists. It has frequently fallen to my lot to undertake such excursions; for instance at the time of the Samarcand Expedition of 1868, on the third day after the battle of Chapan Atin, I left the troops, which were advancing to reinforce the vanguard, at the last stage but one before Samarcand, and in company with Lieutenant N made my way to the main body. So strong was the impression produced by the recent victory of the Russians, that several parties of horsemen, whom we happened to meet, respectfully made way for us. On a second occasion, after the reconaissance of the Bukan Mountains in 1869, I crossed the "Hungry" Steppe from Jizzakh to Chinaz (115 versts) without a single attendant. I had, it is true, a narrow escape, but this would never have happened if I had had more experience, and exercised greater care. I would recommend every one in a similar position never to allow even a single horseman to ride immediately behind him, as the natives are easily able to conceal arms under their long garments (khalat).

At the time of the recent Khivan Expedition it was a common practice to cross the Steppe

without an escort, one of the most remarkable instances being the reconnoitring trip from Khiva to the well of Ortakui which Markozof failed to reach. This reconnaissance was undertaken by Sub-Colonel Skobelef, who voluntarily offered himself for the service, and accomplished it with only one Cossack, his private servant, and two Turkoman guides. By this bold and daring exploit through a tract of considerable extent, in which there was a great probability of meeting with parties of the enemy, Skobelef well earned the decoration of St. George which was conferred upon him.

A few years hence we shall live in Central Asia as safely as in our own homes.

CHAPTER XVII.

METHOD OF CONDUCTING OUR POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA.

The Asiatic custom of offering gifts—The value of the gifts is in proportion to the respect to be conveyed—Errors of Bekovitch and Muzaffar-ud-din—Extortion of gifts—Measures of Government against undue frequency of Native embassies—Inconveniences attending the system of gifts—Would the position of Russian Agents in the Khanates be dangerous?—Instance of Nikiforof—Ought *khalats* to be worn by those to whom they are presented?—Diplomatic niceties of Orientals—Difficult position of the Envoys from Kokan and Kashgar at St. Petersburg—How Russian Ambassadors used to conduct themselves in Central Asia—Ivan Hakhlof and Boris Pazukhin—The reasons why the persons of Russian Envoys are sacred.

THE process of familiarizing ourselves with Asia and with Asiatics has a tendency to give an Oriental turn to our thoughts and mode of life, and thus to lessen the gap that separates the conquerors and the conquered; but it should at the same time never be forgotten that the secret of our strength consists in the fact that we are of a different race. An instance of this process may be seen in the custom of offering on every possible occasion *douceurs*—a mode of proceeding which appears to fall in exactly with the taste of many Russians. It should be remembered that this practice is one which enters into

almost every dealing of an Asiatic. Russian merchants in their visits to the Khanates have to take a stock of presents for the Khan and his courtiers, and envoys dare not present themselves at a Native Court unless well provided with the customary gifts. Hence the exchange of presents has grown into a necessary part of all our diplomatic intercourse with Asiatic rulers, the value of the presents being regarded as a measure of the degree of esteem and respect due to the donee.

It is well known for example how insulted the Khan of Khiva felt when Bekovitch Cherkasski presented him on behalf of Peter I. with some velvet which had been cut up into pieces of five arshins each instead of being left uncut. Bekovitch had previously remonstrated on this very point to the Duke Samanof, feeling a presentiment how it would exasperate the despot.

Again in the year 1742, in the time of Nepluyef, Sultan Barak of the "Middle" horde despatched some envoys to the Imperial Court and intended himself to repair to Orenburg, but went off in high dudgeon insulted by the insignificance of the gifts offered to him by a Russian official.

In 1759 Governor Davydof omitted to present the customary gifts to the Khivan Khan, who thereupon left his presence smarting under the insult, and the Kirgiz forthwith began their robberies. Subsequently the Russian Government, acting in opposition to the advice of Davydof, assigned a fixed allowance both to the Khan and to his brothers, which was followed in 1761 by the cessation of the depredations.

The meanness of the gifts sent by the Ameer of Bokhara in 1866 to the Governor-General of Orenburg showed the absence of any respect towards the chief representative of Russian power in Central Asia, and cost the Bokhariots the two forts of Uratippe and Jizzakh.

The English have also experienced the results of offering inadequate gifts to the Khans of Central Asia, and the British Embassy, which appeared in Bokhara simultaneously with that of Butenef, turned out a fiasco for this very reason. On this subject Mr. Hutton writes—"His" (that is Nasir Ullah's) "contempt for the English may partly be due to the shabby presents sent to him by Colonel Sheil, and which were almost an insult. They

consisted of a silver watch and two pieces of cloth, altogether not worth above £6."

Our Agents are sometimes obliged actually to keep their goods and chattels concealed from the inquisitive glances of visitors, for it has happened more than once that a Khan, discovering from his courtiers that the Russian Agent had some article which took his fancy, insisted politely that it would form a very acceptable present. Indeed one of our Agents was in this way entirely stripped by Yacoob Beg of all his property, including even his camp bed and revolver, without which his journey could not be continued.

The Russian Government have conceded in this respect to Oriental custom, and for many years past have adopted the system of offering presents, and the Khans by sending embassies almost every year used to derive a considerable profit therefrom. This practice however has since ceased, and under present arrangements Native embassies are only received once in every three years, while ordinary matters are settled in direct communication with the head officials of the frontier districts, and it is only on very special occasions that an Asiatic Ambassador is permitted to present himself at the Imperial

Court. A considerable expenditure is involved upon the presents given to Ambassadors, and upon their reception and maintenance, the Governor-General of Turkistan being allowed an annual assignment of Roubles 35,000 (£5,000) on this account, which sum, however, is altogether insufficient to cover the actual expenditure. The Governor-General is consequently sometimes obliged to pass on the gifts presented by one Ambassador to another, or to cause some of them to be sold, purchasing return gifts with the sale proceeds. The latter is the preferable system, since it obviates the possibility of the recurrence of such ludicrous *fiascos*, as it is said, used formerly to take place, the Ameer of Bokhara, for instance, recognizing the gifts from Kokan as being the self same as those previously presented by him to the Beg of Tashkent. It has also happened that the robes of honor sent to Tashkent from the various Khanates have got mixed up; and that one of Bokharian manufacture through some mistake or other has found its way back to Bokhara, an impression being thereby produced that the Ameer's gifts had been declined and returned to him.

The system of gifts however cannot be

defended, and is not only inconvenient in practice, but also liable to great abuse. The chief Russian officials receive a fixed allotment on this account which, including the sale proceeds of gifts sold, is all expended. Articles which remain unsold are not regarded as Government property, and a man, if so inclined, may appropriate such as he chooses and thus obtain a choice collection at the expense of Government. Every official deputed into any of the Khanates receives from the Governor-General an assignment for the purchase of gifts, the procedure above described is repeated, and the Agent need not return empty handed. As a rule, it happens that such missions are entrusted exclusively to members of the political service, and the gifts which such officers receive are entirely abnormal. The Khan of Kokan, for instance, conferred upon M. Struve the rank of a "Toksab" or Field Marshal of the Kokan forces, and presented him with a uniform of velvet embellished with golden epaulettes, pearls, and other precious stones, while it is also whispered that a grant of land is attached to that particular dignity.

If, in conformity with the existing treaty stipulations, we had permanent Agents, of the

nature of Consuls, in the various Khanates, the necessity for despatching extraordinary missions from Tashkent would cease to exist. While, however, the advantages which would be derived by Government from exercising such a perpetual supervision over our neighbours are indisputable, the view hitherto adopted has been that the maintenance of Russian Consulates in the Khanates of Central Asia would be attended by inconveniences far greater than the benefits to be gained thereby. In my opinion the greatest disadvantage which such an arrangement might involve, would be the loss of importance which a political officer thus deputed would infallibly have to undergo, and which would naturally show itself in a visible falling of the signs of respect and good feeling on the part of the Khan towards him. However the fact is certain that the maintenance of Consulates has been hitherto regarded as involving great risks, and the position of a political officer has consequently been a very lucrative one, though, in the view of the author, it would have been far better for the interests of the State had such not been the case.

The system of gifts has also another disad-

vantage, namely, that it has made the Khans look upon the practice of deputation of their officials to the Russian authorities as a profitable speculation. The presents brought by these Native Ambassadors consist exclusively of articles of local manufacture, the monopoly of which is in the hands of the Khans and the cost consequently trifling, while the return presents made to them comprise velvet, satin, brocade, bronzes, articles of gold and silver, &c. The transaction in fact is of the nature of an exchange, in which all the profits are on the side of the Khans, who consequently persist in sending messenger after messenger to Tashkent, deriving therefrom a very handsome profit.

The messengers themselves also receive presents, and hence the courtiers of the Khans strive by every means in their power to take part in missions. Moreover since the deputation of an official on such missions is regarded as a means of rewarding him at the cost of a foreign State, such posts depend more on intrigue and family interest than on capacity and knowledge. Almost all such missions are consequently wholly without any benefit, either in drawing closer the bonds of union, bringing

about a more intimate acquaintance with our neighbours, or improving mutual intercourse. It cannot of course be said that the presentation of gifts has the necessary effect of buying over the donee to the interests of the donor, but still in diplomatic intercourse it would be advisable to bear rather more frequently in mind the well known saying "times Danaoset dona ferentes," and even if the practice is admitted in the case of gifts properly so called, to receive money at all events is certainly open to serious misconception. It may be urged that in view of the advisability of familiarizing our neighbours with Russian industry, the interchange of specimens of manufacture can do no harm, but on the other hand, an exchange of sums of money is simply unreasonable, and has moreover the tendency to appear in the light of a bribe. The Governor-General himself has frequently issued distinct orders that our Agents should decline to receive gifts of money. Thus on one occasion the Khan of Kokan offered a sum of money to Colonel Sh....., who reported the matter for the orders of the Governor-General, and received speedy instructions to decline the offer. On another occasion the Ameer of Bokhara, after the restoration of

Karshi and Shahr-i-Sabz, sent two thousand golden tils to General Abramof, who, not wishing to hurt the Ameer's feelings, received the money, and lodged it in the treasury where it was entered as an Imperial receipt. In spite however of this, the Governor-General reprimanded Abramof, and repeated his order that no gifts in money should be received on any pretext whatever.

One of the usual arguments against maintaining Consulates in the various Khanates is the dangerous position in which a handful of Russians would be placed in the midst of a hostile population. Examples can, however, be adduced of a handful of Russians having held their own against a whole town, as for instance the case of Yermolof's embassy to Persia. A semblance of fear is sufficient to produce disrespect and insolence on the part of the Asiatic, who readily takes advantage of any carelessness, over-credulity, or unguardedness, but by preserving a bold front, retaining presence of mind, and keeping on guard against possible surprises, respect is always insured. "Caress the hand which you cannot cut off" says a Turkish proverb, and in this saying we see the secret of all Asiatic policy. Greboyedof might have been

victorious if he had combined firmness with circumspection, while if a Commander lacks these qualities, a whole army will not save him. Bekovitch, who might have conquered the whole Khanate of Khiva by means of his detachment, numbering three thousand men, sacrificed himself and his troops by falling into a simple *ruse* and distributing his soldiers in small parties throughout the Khivan villages.

On the other hand, the best reply to all apprehensions may be found in the conduct of Captain Nikiforof, who was deputed to Khiva in 1841 for the purpose of concluding a treaty after the disastrous expedition of Perovski. From the very first Nikiforof not only transgressed every previously adopted principle in his communications with the Khan's Ministers, but also acted most unceremoniously with them whenever they thrust their attentions upon him at inconvenient times. Under the influence of "peculiar circumstances" (*spiritus vini*) Nikiforof at times became altogether intractable, and on such occasions ordered his Cossacks to show his guests the door. This unusual treatment staggered the Ministers, while the populace were loud in their expressions of wonder and respectfully made way before the uncertain tempered

envoy. The impression was the stronger as Nikiforof had only twelve Cossacks, and there was no hope of assistance, had he required it. Even to the Khan himself he adopted the same demeanour, boldly discussing matters with him, and threatening him with a variety of calamities. Finding at last that the negotiations were being protracted and led to no result, Nikiforof cut them short by a declaration in which he defined the new frontier with Russia and threatened with the punishment of death any Khivan who should cross it. When it is remembered that only shortly before two English Agents, Stoddart and Conolly, had been executed at Bokhara, while two others, Shakespear and Abbott, had escaped the same fate at Khiva only owing to the intercession of a Russian Agent, the boldness of Nikiforof's conduct will readily be appreciated.

Mention has already been made of Lieutenant Vitkevich, who finding himself at Bokhara, rode about the streets in the uniform of a Russian officer. This, as in Nikiforof's case, occurred before our occupation of the mouths of the Syr, and is the more remarkable since the later missions, which were deputed to Bokhara after the decisive victories at Samarcand

and Zerbulak, did not dare to show themselves in the streets of the city without a Native escort. Take for instance the mission deputed to Bokhara in 1870 under the command of a certain Colonel, who was warned by the Khooshbegi that in view of the many bad characters at Bokhara it was desirable that the members of the mission should not show themselves in public. "Do not let your people ride about openly," said he, "you are guests, and it shall be our care that nothing unpleasant may happen. We have many bad characters amongst us whom we cannot control without the bastinado, the prison, and the executioner." The warning was accepted, and the members of the mission did not appear in public except with a Native escort, consoling themselves with the statement of the Khooshbegi that there was really nothing to see except a circle of mud walls, while, the Khooshbegi added, "our troops are undisciplined and badly armed. To witness their manœuvres may be a sight for the Uzbeks, but for Russian officers it would be stupid and uninteresting." These arguments were sufficient to damp the desire to gain information, which is natural to travellers in general, and our mission passed the greater part of their time con-

fined to their quarters issuing thence only on official occasions. At the State audience, when the Ameer presented the customary gifts, the Russian Colonel, in spite of the protests of the members of the mission, insisted on their parading about the town clad in their newly presented robes. "Let the people," said he, "know what a reception the Ameer has given to us!" They say also that one of the junior members of the mission, M. B—f on the occasion of the farewell audience bowed so lowly over the proffered hand of the Ameer, that to bye-standers it seemed as though the ceremony included something more than a mere bow and a shake of the hand. B—f himself however stoutly denied that he had been guilty of any unnecessary servility. All this naturally evoked much comment amongst the Russian officials in Turkistan, and it may readily be imagined that the general impression was not altogether flattering to the mission.

Very different was the conduct of another Colonel under similar circumstances who was deputed, in 1871, to express to the Ameer our sympathy on the occurrence of the death of his favorite son, the Tora Jan. Far from observing all the niceties of diplomatic etiquette, the envoy

refused in the most decided terms to wear the robe presented to him, explaining to the Bokhariots that it was unbecoming and impossible for a Russian officer to cover the Czar's uniform with any dress except one presented by his sovereign. The Bokhariots urged that even General Struve had conceded this point and had worn the robe, but being told in reply that Struve not being a military officer could do so without impropriety, they ceased to press the point. I have heard that M. Weinberg, M. Struve's successor, on the occasion of his first visit to Kokan also declined to wear the *khalat*, urging the same reasons for his refusal.

The question whether a certain robe should or should not be worn, appears at first sight one which is beneath discussion, but, if it is regarded (and it cannot properly be regarded otherwise) from an Asiatic point of view, it becomes one of some importance. The presentation of a robe or *khalat* in Central Asia is regarded in the light of a reward; somewhat as an "order" in Europe. It would of course be most unusual to ask for special permission from Government "to receive a *khalat* and to wear it according to rule," yet a case has

actually occurred when such an application was made. I refer to General Kolpakofski, the Military Governor of the Semirechye, who, in recognition of the aid rendered by him to some Chinese fugitives from the Taranchees and Dungans, was presented by the Emperor of China with a dress of honor, embellished with dragons—the highest reward which an ordinary mortal can receive in China—to the acceptance of which the Emperor's permission was asked.

If the bestowal of the *khalat* is regarded as a reward, then it follows that by its acceptance we recognize the right of the Khans to confer rewards upon Russian officials, in which case the ceremony of robing would have some meaning, but if, on the other hand, the *khalat* is regarded simply as a gift, the robing ceremony is superfluous, since all that is necessary is to acknowledge its acceptance by either throwing it over one's arm or handing it to a servant. To regard, however, the *khalat* as a reward is to enhance the importance of the donor and to diminish that of the receiver, while to regard it simply as a gift places both parties in the position of equals. There is moreover no reason whatever why we should add to the

importance of the Khans at the expense of our Russian representatives. On the contrary the Khans must be taught to look upon themselves as only "temporarily acting" and as occupying their posts during such time only as it may be agreeable to the pleasure of the Governor-General of Turkistan.

That which appears to us to be altogether of no importance, frequently appears to the Asiatic to possess a peculiarly weighty significance. A Bokharian diplomat for instance is exalted by his partisans to the seventh heaven if he is supposed to have outwitted the Russians even in the most trifling matter of etiquette. The unsuspecting Russian official is in fact surrounded by an absolute labyrinth of details, and one false step is sufficient to make an Asiatic exult in having overreached his European rival. The following case is an example:—A Russian officer was deputed to the frontier to meet a Bokharian envoy, and the custom of Asiatics requires that at a meeting with a superior, or with a person to whom it is desired to show honor, the inferior should invariably dismount and allow the "great man" to pass by on horseback, persons of equal rank dismounting at the same time.

On this particular occasion the Russian officer knew of the custom, and observing that the envoy had taken one foot out of the stirrup and was apparently preparing to dismount, did the same and unsuspectingly leapt off his horse. This was just what the Bokhariot was waiting for. Seeing what had happened he quietly resumed his seat in the saddle, and appeared to have had no thought of dismounting. The Russian officer naturally found himself in a rather awkward position, but was helpless, and had to endure the exulting glances and smiles, which beamed on every face of the Bokharian mission.

In 1869 the envoys from Kokan and Kashgar, Mirza Hakim and Mirza Shadi, happened to be in St. Petersburg at the same time, and although both went to see the various sights of the capital, they could never agree on the question of precedence when they happened to meet. Of course Khudayar Khan refuses to recognize the idea that Yacoob Beg, who was formerly the General of the Kokan troops, is at the present time not only his equal in name, but also possesses full independence. For this reason the representative of Kokan, Mirza Hakim, endeavored to ignore the Kashgarian

envoy, and took no notice of his presence, while Mirza Shadi's behaviour was precisely the same, though this demeanour was not preserved when they happened to come to close quarters. Who should take the precedence was the momentous question corresponding to Hamlet's "to be or not to be," and so little were the envoys disposed to concede this point, striving on the contrary each to get before the other, that on one occasion I saw them literally stuck fast between some folding doors which were half closed, the opening being only wide enough to allow Mirza Shadi with his fur coat to pass through.

Such a spectacle afforded amusement to the Russians, but to the envoys the question was one of imperial importance. European diplomats, if placed in a similar position, would of course have endeavored each to overcome the other by the most refined marks of attention, but the matter is otherwise regarded in Asia, and whether we wish to do so or not we cannot avoid taking into consideration what the Asiatics think on such points, not in order ourselves to adopt their customs, but to avoid displaying an unnecessary amount of politeness and attention in cases in which it would easily be construed to imply cringing servility.

The spot at which any one should be met, how he should be received and treated, these questions form a veritable science for Orientals. For one man it is necessary to advance as far as the gate, his stirrup leather should be held, and his horse led under a canopy, another should be met at the threshold of the house with crossed arms and a deep bow, for a third it is sufficient to rise from the carpet, a fourth should only be received with a nod of the head, a fifth not noticed at all, and so on. It is easy to lose one's way and fall into error in this labyrinth of finely marked distinctions, to show an unnecessary amount of attention to a man of no position, or to wound the feelings of some great personage by some unintentional oversight, and the only method of avoiding these difficulties is to make it a rule, in receiving natives, not to allow too marked distinctions, and as far as possible to receive every one with the same formalities. Asiatics respect a man who is not over lavish in granting marks of his favour much more than one who confers them without distinction upon all comers.

This chapter may be properly closed by a few examples showing the light in which our ancestors regarded the duties of an Envoy.

In the year 1620 a nobleman by name Ivan Danilof * Hakhlof was deputed to Iman Koolee Khan of Bokhara. The envoy was instructed, amongst other things, to decline to pay any douceurs which might be demanded from him before he could gain permission to have an interview of the Khan, and rather to return than comply with such a requisition, while in the event of the Khan inviting him to his table he was instructed to accept the invitation only on one condition that any other foreign envoys who might be present should take a lower seat. Hakhlof reached Samarcand in safety, where he was received by the Ameer. On entering the court-yard of the palace one of the courtiers wished to take from him the Imperial letter, but he refused to give it up, and afterwards when he had made his obeisance and offered the usual complimentary address in the name of the Emperor, noticing that the Khan remained seated, he remarked that under similar circumstances it was the custom for all sovereigns to rise as a mark of respect to the name of His Imperial Majesty. The Khan instantly apologized, ex-

* See memoirs of the Russian Imperial Geo. Soc., 1851, No. 5. Explanatory note by M. Khanikof.

curring himself on the ground that a long time had elapsed since a Russian envoy had appeared before him, which had caused him to forget the sound of the Imperial greeting, and to omit to rise at the mention of the Emperor's name—adding that the omission was not intentional and did not arise from any want of cordiality or respect.

In 1669 Czar Alexis Michaelovich despatched two embassies, one to Khiva and the other to Bokhara, the latter of which consisted of the two brothers Pazukhin, by name Boris and Semen.

On receiving notice the evening before the day appointed for the audience, in the end of December, the envoys demanded, firstly, that no other Ambassador should be allowed to be present, and secondly, that horses should be sent for them. To the explanation that this was not the received custom in Bokhara, and that such concessions were made to no other envoys, Boris retorted that in St. Petersburg horses were furnished to the Bokharian envoys from the Czar's stables, and that therefore Russian envoys had a right to expect similar treatment at the hands of the Bokhariots. At last the Khan, forced to yield,

sent the obstinate envoy his own steed, while the suite and Semen Pazukhinof rode their own horses. The Khan received them in great state, the throne, a quadrangular raised platform with six steps leading to it, being covered with golden brocade, on either side of which to the number of one hundred sat the courtiers and high dignitaries on carpets. The proceedings were opened by one of the Khan's officers counting and taking a list of the presents sent by the Emperor, after which the master of the ceremonies demanded from the envoy the Imperial letter, but Boris declined to give it, saying that he had been ordered by the Emperor to entrust it to no one but the Khan himself. After a protracted argument Boris insisted that they should inform the Khan, who thereupon agreed to receive the letter in person. Two courtiers led the envoy by the hand and he mounted the steps of the throne, upon which the Khan rose to meet him, and receiving the letter with reverence placed it unread before him. Then the envoy mentioned the presents sent by the Czar, uttered some complimentary speeches, and demanded the liberation of the Russian captives. The Khan thereupon invited the envoys to sit in the

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midst of his high dignitaries, and concluded the audience by a few customary questions regarding the time of their departure from Russia, their journey, &c. A month afterwards having previously agreed to the question of etiquette, and having summoned the Begs from the nearest towns, the Khan prepared a State banquet in honor of the Russian embassy, our envoy being informed beforehand that there would be no other Ambassadors at the table. At the banquet the Khan, before himself tasting the various dishes, invited the Russian envoy to partake of them, while buffoons amused the guests with songs. Afterwards a rhinoceros was brought, and the dinner being concluded, the health of the Khan was drunk in "Kumis" (fermented mares' milk).

Before their departure, the envoys received from the Khan nine Russian captives together with an assurance that he would send the remainder on the arrival of his Ambassador from Russia. The Pazukhins also bought out of captivity twenty-two other men at an average cost of Roubles 27 per head. The farewell audience took place on the 20th October 1870, and was attended by the same

pomp as the reception. The Khan declared that he would send a special envoy with his letter to the Czar, but Pazukhin replied that it was impossible for the mission to return to the Emperor without a letter, and requested the Khan to entrust it to them. The Khan thereupon agreed and afterward took leave of the envoys.

In this way the Russian Ambassadors of the seventeenth century understood how to maintain their dignity as well as, if not better than, those of the nineteenth, in spite of the fact that at that time our frontiers had not been advanced so far into the heart of Central Asia, and the various "burgs"* which now exist were scarcely known even by name.

It should be remarked that up to the present time there has never been an instance of a Russian Agent in any of the Khanates of Central Asia having been overtaken by such a fate as has happened to the English, Italians, and others. It was not fear which restrained the Asiatic despots in this respect, but necessity; for Russia, on account of her goods, was too

* Orenburg was founded in 1735 on the present site of Orsk. Afterwards in 1739 it was removed to the present site of the Krasnogorsk post; and again in 1744 the town was finally transferred to its present situation.

valuable to them. A large number of Asiatic merchants were perpetually making their way to Kazan and Astrakhan, in some cases residing at those places for considerable periods, in others settling there altogether, attracted by the privileges granted to them by the Russian Government. In Siberia the Bokhariots actually formed a privileged class of the nature of a nobility. Besides this fact no one gained such large profits from trade with the Russians as the Khans themselves, for in the first place it was usual to reserve for the Khans the choicest articles in each caravan, which were valued at low rates and exchanged for goods very highly appraised, and in this way the Khans derived a very considerable profit. Secondly a transit tax at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* was levied on all imported goods, the proceeds of which were the perquisite of the Khan, and under such circumstances a rupture with Russia would clearly have involved considerable disadvantages. In the present day matters have changed in one important respect. The Russians have occupied the heart of Central Asia, Russian bayonets glitter at the backs of Russian envoys, and a rupture would therefore be accompanied by still greater disadvantages.

to the Khans. One would have thought that such a condition of affairs would have produced in the minds of our Agents a complete confidence in their personal safety, though we frequently see the reverse to be the fact.

It remains for us now only to express a hope that the conduct of our present and future Agents in Central Asia may be marked by more firmness and resolution than has lately been the case ; and by somewhat more of the spirit which characterized the proceedings of such men as Hakhlof and the Pazukhins.

CHAPTER XVIII.

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE ORTHODOX GREEK CHURCH AND MAHOMEDANISM.

Necessity for care in the matter of uniting the nationalities of the Turkistan Region—Difference between toleration and protection—The Koran—Preaching of fire and sword—Measures of Catherine II. for protecting Mahomedanism from the spread of heresies—Printing of Mahomedan books at St. Petersburg and Kazan—Duly empowered (ukaznoi) Moollahs—Hunt after Bokharian Moollahs in the region of Fort No. 1—Propagation of Mahomedanism amongst Christian Tartars and others—Building of mosques at the expense of Government—Conduct of Russian officials of Tartar extraction—Question regarding the possibility of orthodox Missionaries working in Central Asia at the present time—Rôle of the West with regard to the East—Mission of the Russians—Introduction of our code of laws—Education of Natives—The office of "Rais" ceases to exist—Prayer of the Natives for introduction of the Russian language into their schools—Commission for preparing elementary text-books—Question regarding the introduction of the Russian alphabet—Policy of granting equality of rights.

THE beneficial results of singleness of nationality in the composition of an empire, as compared with a state of variety of races, variety of speech, and variety of belief, are regarded as axiomatic, and need not therefore be supported by argument. The union, however, of different nationalities can seldom be initiated from religion, but most generally is the result of causes working from without,

and commences in the adoption of the dominant language, and in submission to the general laws of the empire. No uniform method can be prescribed for effecting this union, and any given system is not necessarily applicable in all places and to all times. The conditions of the Turkistan region, for instance, are such as to require that no reforms should be introduced without the most careful consideration and forethought, and it should never be forgotten that any errors on our part may evoke severe criticism on the part of England, whose position in this respect is that of an inexorable judge.

On the other hand the numerous errors committed by England in India should be a warning to us. We are in a position to benefit by the results of the experiments made by England, without the necessity for repeating them, which is at all times a hazardous process. Indeed if we embark on this undertaking with the necessary circumspection, the advantage will be with us, and the position of a critic will be ours. Such criticism England is naturally anxious to avoid, but it depends not upon her will, but upon the course of events, though by her action she may possibly evoke it, and so to speak, precipitate history.

Take for example the labours of missionaries. We know that Missionary Societies have for a long time been at work in India, who in the present day count their converts by hundreds of thousands. Let us consider how the question of missionary work is regarded in Russia. The principle which has guided us in this respect is essentially that of complete toleration. It is true that at different periods of our historical life this principle has been differently interpreted, but from the time that Peter I. adopted the policy of attracting foreigners to Russia, the question has practically been settled, since the principle on which such a policy was based was clearly inconsistent with intolerance.

In Russia, however, confusion has not unfrequently taken place between the principles of toleration and protection, which are essentially different. To permit full freedom of conscience, provided that there is no interference with the beliefs of others, is to observe the principle of toleration in its true sense. If, on the other hand, Government agrees to recognize, for instance, Mahomedanism, and to permit its followers to adhere to their tenets undisturbed, but at the same time requires that no new

dogmas should be introduced, that the commands of the prophet should be respected in their integrity, while Korans are printed at the public expense and distributed at the cheapest possible rates, mosques and schools built for the education of Moollahs, to whom diplomas are given, and from which privileged class all competitors are rigidly excluded, if, lastly, Government prosecutes every heresy which may arise in the Mahomedan community, the policy ceases to be one of simple toleration, but becomes one of decided protection.

The Mahomedan regards the Koran as the code of all possible law, both judicial, moral, and social, and also as the corner-stone of knowledge embodying, in the opinion of "true believers," the wisdom of all ages and of all peoples, while outside of that holy book all is darkness and sophistry. There is an anecdote that Omar, who ordered the famous Alexandrian library to be burnt, when asked what should be done with the books, replied—"If the volumes contain nothing but what is in the Koran, they are useless; if otherwise, they are mischievous. Let them be burnt." Such indeed was the actual view which each true Mahomedan was bound during the first centu-

ries of Islamism to take of everything not derived from the Koran, which is in truth the enemy of reform, research, and of every advance of science. All the fables, myths, and miracles, attributed to the prophet, are regarded in the present day as the irrefutable truth. The most learned men will discuss the question of the seven-storied heavens supporting their arguments exclusively by quotations from the Koran, and no fable is regarded as so childish that a man may not by the help of Allah believe it.

The most powerful and natural enemy of all antediluvian theories and of all legends regarding the first days of our earth is to be found in the earth itself. Here is an open book whose lines are traced in the fissures of mountain ridges, precipices and caves, and which each one, to whom has been revealed the secret of nature's workings, may freely read. Thus while on the one hand geology proves that whole trillions of years must have been required for the formation of the world, the Mussulmans, who preserve the traditions of the Jews, recorded only forty centuries ago, maintain their seven days and eight thousand years. The simple method of reconciling

these diverse theories is to remember that no considerations of time or space exist with Him who knows no beginning or end, and that therefore our account of days, months, and years, is misplaced with a Deity who at the creation of the world may have embraced, by what mortals term a day, millions of years.

Mahomet who, as is well known, appropriated the traditions of the Jews, introduced into the Koran many also of his own peculiar speculations. There is no necessity, however, to enlarge on the visions of a victim to epilepsy [from which Mahomet is well known to have suffered], but the following passage may be quoted :—

“ O true believers ! kill ye the infidels where-soever ye may meet them, if they refuse to accept the religion of Mahomet. Fight for Islam—the religion of God. He will reward you with his favors and give you happiness. It is not thou that killest the unbeliever, but God himself. It is not thou that dischargest the arrow, but God ! ” Thus Islamism is a religion of fire and sword, and of death to unbelievers.

One would have thought that the less such a book came into the hands of the unenlightened and impulsive masses, the better,

but the Government of Catherine II. took a different view of the matter, and in order to preserve the purity of Mahomedanism, it was resolved to introduce into Russia the printing of Mussulman books, and thereby to avoid the errors of transcribers. Printing was considered by the Mussulmans as a sin, and their books were usually transcribed by hand, with the natural result that errors crept into the original text, while at the same time the works thus copied were sold at high prices. The prejudices of our Tartars in this respect however were overcome, at first by a declaration that such was the Imperial will, and afterwards by the cheapness of the Government publications.

Originally in 1797 only three thousand six hundred copies of the Koran were printed at St. Petersburg, but in the beginning of the present century the printing press was transferred to Kazan, and operations were carried on upon a much larger scale. As an example we take the period between the years 1853-1859 which embraced the "holy war" between the Turks and Russians. During these seven years, as if for the purpose of assisting the proclamations of the Turkish Sultan, the Kazan Press pub-

lished as many as 326,000 volumes, including 82,300 copies of the Koran, 165,900 copies of extracts from the Koran, and 77,500 copies of the Catechism. The price of the last mentioned was about two copeks (less than three farthings) a copy, besides which there were other pamphlets sold as cheap as one half* a copek (one-sixth of a penny). There can be no doubt that had an equal amount of zeal been shown in the diffusion of Christian books the result would have been—but to return to Mahomedanism.

A second measure for preserving the purity of Mussulman teaching consisted in an order prohibiting untrained persons from fulfilling the duties of a Moollah. The degree of efficiency was determined by an examination held before the Mahomedan Ecclesiastical Committee at Orenburg, and each one who succeeded in passing the examination received a diploma [*ukas*] from the Provincial Administration, whence arose the name of “*ukaznoi*,” or duly installed Moollah.

Although the Moollahs thus appointed have

* These figures are taken from an article by E. Vorontsa “The Seminary for Teachers at Kazan,” *Russki Vesnik*, 1873, July.

occasionally been convicted of acting* against the interests of the Russian Government, nevertheless their monopoly has been carefully guarded by the Russian local administration. In the fifth decade of the present century, when a report reached Orenburg that certain Bokharian Moollahs were busy in propagating Mahomedanism amongst our Kirgiz, instructions were issued to the Commandant of Fort No. 1 [the present Kazalinsk] to catch the Moollahs in the various encampments and to chastise them. The Commandant accordingly issued a proclamation amongst the Kirgiz offering a reward of three roubles for every Moollah brought before him. The chase began, and the Kirgiz at the first haul succeeded in catching a very considerable number who were duly admonished by the Cossacks, and dismissed with a warning that if they were caught a second time, the dose would be doubled. The Commandant, however, finding that his funds could not keep pace with the zeal of the Kirgiz, lowered the reward to half a rouble per Moollah, but even this did

* For instance it is well known that the most prominent cause of the disturbances amongst the Orenburg Kirgiz in 1869 was the wilful misinterpretation, by some Moollahs, of the reforms introduced by Government.

not quench their ardour and thus they were soon relieved of the oppressive prayers, tiresome discourses and particularly of the exactions of these uninvited preachers. The order regarding the reward for each Moollah, though practically obsolete, has not been rescinded, and may be at any time again enforced at the will of the district officials. Such behaviour on the part of the Kirgiz was very natural, for if they have any religion at all, which is more than doubtful, it certainly is not Mahomedanism. It is moreover clearly more to our interest to keep these primitive tribes in their present condition than to let them fall victims to the corrupting and deadening influence of Islam. If these recognized [ukaznoi] Moollahs do not hesitate before the very eyes of the Russian authorities to teach the people doctrines wholly opposed to the principle of toleration, and if more than that, they sometimes even incite them to disturbances, what can be expected from the ordinary Moollah of Bokhara? Our Moollahs, however, not satisfied with their own flocks, are engaged in very actively diffusing their doctrines amongst Tartar and other converts to Christianity, and official reports alone show that in one district of the Kazan Governorship,

namely that of Chistopolsk, more than 3,000 converts seceded during the year 1862 to Mahomedanism. Again in 1866 the number of newly-converted Mahomedans in the Governorship of Kazan, where whole villages fell away *en masse*, was as large as ten thousand.

During the conscription in 1855 a large number of Tartar recruits fled to Bokhara and Tashkent declaring that it was impossible for them to fight against their fellow believers, and after the war a migration of Crimeans, and subsequently also of inhabitants of Kazan, took place to Turkey. In a word, the services of these "recognized" Moollahs are of a somewhat ambiguous character.

But we have not stopped here. Our action has not been confined to books and Moollahs, but we have even gone so far as to build mosques, with what degree of success may be judged from the fact that we have been obliged on more than one occasion to defend them against the Mahomedans themselves. It is well known for instance that a mosque built by Government in the Caucasus was demolished owing to the Russian workmen having whitewashed the walls with the usual brushes made of pigs'

bristles,* which produced the idea that the mosque had been intentionally defiled. Again in Irkutsk, and also in Omsk, the Government mosques had to be carefully guarded for a considerable time, and independently of the expense thus involved, the buildings themselves are finished in an elaborate fashion which is wholly unnecessary. In the course of eight visits to Orenburg, I have never once succeeded in seeing the interior of the mosque there which was built at the expense of the Bashkirs. It is generally closed and guarded by the same sentry who is stationed over the Governor's palace.

We know, however, that some Tartar interpreters, when conversing with Native envoys, call the Russians "idolaters," their images "idols," and their Churches "But-khanas" (idol-houses) as opposed to "Urus-Mechets," or Russian mosques. Complaints are frequently heard that the natives do not value their mosques, often selling them together with the ground attached thereto to the Russians, or that in Uratippe a mosque has been converted into a Russian Church, and in Samarcand into a Club. Such

* The greased cartridges formed the pretext for the rising of the Sikhs in India in 1857. Rumour asserted that pig's grease had been used, and hence arose the insurrection.

complaints, however, have no foundation in fact, since the Mahomedans, as a rule, do not regard their mosques as particularly sacred, except when the grave of some Saint happens to be located in them. The natives, moreover, themselves not only frequently use their mosques as store-houses for grain, but also occasionally chose them as the most convenient place for convivial meetings.

So long as the Turkistan authorities adhere to their present views regarding the propagation of Christianity, such incidents as these will never evoke the fanaticism of our Mahomedan subjects. Hitherto not only has the preaching of the Gospel amongst Mahomedans been forbidden, but even requests on the part of natives for permission to join the orthodox religion have been refused, on the plausible pretext that want of knowledge of the Russian language was an insurmountable obstacle. An attempt on the part of one of the members of the Altai Mission in 1870 to lay a foundation for Missionary enterprise in Turkistan failed of success, all his arguments being defeated by the difficulties with which such an attempt would be attended. Such experiments indeed, are peculiar to the English, who by their preaching

have excited universal hatred, have aroused the religious fanaticism of the people, and have thereby created for themselves innumerable difficulties in the future.

Fanaticism is fed by every aggression upon religion, and therefore consists, so to speak, of a lawful reaction against all foreign interference. As an Afghan, well acquainted with both the English and the Russians, said "every Sunday the English moollahs go out into the bazaars to prove that Hazrat-i-Isa (Jesus Christ) is greater than our Paighambar (prophet), and that their faith is the true one and ours is worthless. . . . They traduce and malign our prophet in every possible way. . . . You Russians do not act thus—the report of this has reached even India, where all praise you for it." What benefit can England possibly gain from acquiring a hundred thousand of *indifferent* Christians, who understand but little of the new religion and confuse their new and old beliefs, when it will ultimately cost them an equal number of *good* Christians imported from England?

The good Mussulman, who adheres to every iota of our civil laws, is in our view better than the knavish Christian convert, although the latter may at the same time follow all the

minutiæ of religious observances. The Calmucks, Solons, and Sibos, who fled from Kulja and took refuge with us from the unbridled Mussulman fanatics, came over to Orthodoxy by hundreds, but being idolaters, they were more tractable than Mahomedans. Our religious observances were in no way opposed to their customs, and did not excite their wonder, for with them as with us, it was usual at the time of service to make use of images, pictures, incense, and candles.* To the Mussulman, on the other hand, the chief stumbling-block is the use of images, as he considers it impossible for either the painter or sculptor to depict the Deity. Their hearty reception showed the Solons still more clearly the difference between the intolerant Mahomedans, who slaughtered them like sheep, and the

* The Brahmins too preached regarding the birth of Krishna (which name is pronounced by them "Khrista") from a maiden, and, it is said, went to Palestine to worship the Saviour. The Hindoo God Trimurta is represented with three faces and one head. The Buddhists profess toleration and freedom of conscience. "We do not think," they say, "that we alone know how to pray." The system of caste produced a reaction against the Buddhists, who were driven out by the professors of Brahminism. Lassen, Remusat, and other authorities regard Buddhism as the Christianity of the East.

Christians who fed them when starving and half dead.

The advocate of Orthodoxy might, it is true, find a variety of arguments on the coincidences which undoubtedly exist. The East, for instance, is the cradle of Christianity: to the East look the altars of our churches; to the East the pilgrim turns his face for prayer; to the East we place the head of our dead at burial; but in the East of the present day Mahomedism has smothered all progress. All is impenetrable darkness and lifeless stagnation. The East, in short, which once rendered such services to humanity, is now looking for similar services from the West.

We have advanced from the West into the heart of Central Asia, and with us has come "the great truth," ready to penetrate with its rays the nations now wandering in the darkness of ignorance. Why then do we so jealously preserve the light for ourselves alone, and why do we repulse every Mussulman who longs to know the truth? Is it not because sound policy demands the most extreme care in the matter of diffusing Christianity amongst *conquered* nations? Is it not that it is unbecoming Christianity, as being the religion of

mercy, love, and peace, to erect its edifice on the success gained by arms? Is it not that "the Word" ought, independently of arms, to subdue the heart? Lastly, is it not that we have no missionaries to spare, and that some of our large Russian Governorships, having themselves fallen short in the faith, are still more in want of preachers?

Such are our true reasons for not promoting the spread of Orthodoxy, to which it should be added that the preachers of Christianity must be removed far from the scene of war to places whither the thunder of cannon, the shouts of triumph, and the groans of the dying cannot penetrate. Under such circumstances the Christian Missionary would not be regarded as the precursor of fire and sword, but as the benignant shepherd armed with nothing save the Gospel. On the other hand, to propagate Christian doctrines under the protection of bayonets and accompanied by the roar of cannon would produce unmixed evils.

Be this as it may, the apprehensions of the Central Asian Mahomedans regarding their freedom of conscience have long since been set at rest; but can it be said that we are inactive, and that we are not introducing

the first principles of Christianity into the social structure and belief of the people of Central Asia? With the thunder of cannon and the shouts of victory we are solemnly introducing our civil laws which are based on the principles of Christianity, and in which the law of retaliation finds no place. By prohibiting theft, murder, perjury, &c., our laws practically prohibit all that is most opposed to the spirit of Christianity, while at the same time by the eradication of slavery we are preparing an everlasting monument for Russian laws and for Russian religion.

It is of course an indisputable fact that Christianity exercises a softening influence over the character, ennobles human nature and facilitates the development of science, &c., but the time has not yet come for attempting to propagate it in Central Asia. The soil must first be prepared to receive the seed, and this can best be effected by establishing schools for the natives, by means of which the Russian language could be taught, and the Russian alphabet brought into general use.

The native course of education is of a most colourless and superficial nature, consisting

of learning by rote the unintelligible* text of the Koran, supplemented by some poetry of Hafiz, Sadi, and Firdausi, the latter being far from universal to all schools. An education of this nature requires some eight or nine years, and under such circumstances, when the degree of efficiency is measured by the number of years which the students may have spent at school in mastering by heart the text of the Koran, progress is clearly impossible. To support such an abnormal system of national education cannot be conformable to the objects of Russian civilization, especially as the natives themselves recognize the barrenness of the teaching in their schools.

The introduction of the system at present in force, which is known as "the project for introducing new rules for the administration in the Provinces of Semirechye and Syr Darya," has effected the removal of many of the native peculiarities which hindered the progress of Russian intelligence. Amongst the greatest evils of this nature which have been removed by the new system, has been the semi-spiritual and semi-police office known as

* Arabic is very little understood in Central Asia.

that of the "Rais,"—a personage who exercised jurisdiction over offences against public decorum and good order, against the code of morals prescribed by the Koran, and over breaches of religious ceremonial. In short, the "Rais" was a most important police official who rode through the town attended by a suite, and settled matters with each criminal on the spot where the offence had been committed. The terrible "darrah,"* which was never idle, and the strokes of the lash, scattered indiscriminately on all sides, combined with the knowledge that not a single fault could be concealed from the jealous eye of the various agents who quietly went their way amongst the populace, all supported the authority of the "Rais" and naturally led to hypocrisy and dissembling amongst the people. But besides these public duties the "Rais" had others and far more important ones, namely, the supervision of domestic life and education. He was in fact as it were the "Inspector General of Education," and under the system of compulsory schooling which existed amongst the settled population, he was vested with the right of

* Of the nature of a whip, but having, in the place of whip cord, strips of leather sewn together.

interfering even in domestic life. No one was safe from the "darrah," which on some pretext or other (either omission to send a son to school, or to offer up the usual prayers, or to show the proper respect to an elder) fell on the back of every citizen.

Supposing that even the police duties could have been left in the hands of the "Rais," it was clearly impossible to allow them to continue to have the right of supervising education. A system of compulsory schooling, although undoubtedly an admirable arrangement when anything is really taught in the schools, only blunts the capacity of children with the ordinary Mahomedan schools of the present day, the course of education in which is entirely superficial and wanting in depth. The acquirement simply of the ability to read and write (the only practical result of a nine years' course of education in a native school) does not justify such a waste of time and trouble. There was clearly no reason why the Russian administration should maintain this useless institution, the results of which were in no way beneficial, and it was accordingly resolved by degrees to abolish the office of "Rais." This object has now been

effected in the easiest possible way by declaring that the office should cease on the death of actual incumbents. Thus each "Rais" knew that he would have no successor, and the consciousness of this fact, combined with the knowledge that his office was no longer required, and the absence of all incentive to zeal, cooled his ardour, while on the other hand, a multitude of posts with considerable emoluments created by the Russians tempted him into new fields of employment. Thus the "darrahs," the emblems of the former authority of these officials, have by degrees been surrendered into the hands of Russian Commandants, the office of Rais is becoming a thing of the past, and the benches of the Mahomedan schools, left to themselves, have begun to grow empty—a fact which shows that the people recognize how unsatisfactory these schools were. At the same time the mass of the inhabitants are beginning to acknowledge the superiority of the Russian system of education, and the necessity in the interests of their children, as being Russian citizens, of such a training as will enable them to be equal to meet the requirements of the new

régime, and to be of use both to themselves and to the public generally. A few isolated instances of native children having been sent to Russian schools in spite of complete ignorance of the Russian language, afford the best proof of this fact. There is no doubt that the emptying of Mahomedan schools will increase, in which case we shall be obliged to compensate them by something better, and to introduce into the darkness of the hardened Mahomedan world the light of science and practical knowledge. In fact the natives themselves are calling upon us to do this. In the beginning of 1871 some respectable inhabitants of the town of Tashkent and of the Kuraminsk District presented the Governor-General with an address praying for the reorganization of one of the Tashkent *Madrasahs* (high schools) upon the Russian model, and requesting that the Russian language might be included amongst the subjects of study. On this occasion a merchant named Syud Azim contributed 2,500 silver roubles towards the necessary additions and changes to the building. The Governor-General received the address very favorably, and appointed a commission,

consisting of all the available interpreters under the presidentship of the author of this work, which was charged with the following duties: (1) to elaborate rules for transliterating words of the native dialects into Russian letters; (2) to compile a hand-book for teaching the Russian language in the schools of Central Asia; and (3) to transliterate and draw up a Chrestomathy for popular reading.

The honor of such a flattering appointment was the more appreciated by me since I had for a long time past turned my attention to compiling elementary books on the Eastern languages, and was thus enabled to apply my small knowledge to the matter in question. Much to my disappointment, however, the interpreters nominated to act with the commission were too much taken up with their own official duties to be able to devote much time to the work, and finding that our sittings led to no practical results, I ultimately ceased to call meetings, and continued the work alone.

The question regarding transliteration had already been worked out by me as long ago as the year 1866, when I drew up a parallel dictionary, with conversations, for my work called "Tolmach" (the interpreter), which was

published in 1867.* Then, as subsequently, I came to the conclusion that the Russian alphabet was capable of expressing nearly all the sounds of the Toorkee, and admitting that the soft Russian “*kh*” and the soft “*u†*” are more correctly transliterated, the former by the French “*h*” and the latter by the French “*u*,” still I did not consider that this formed any sufficient reason for importing those letters into our alphabet. Indeed, every introduction of new letters, taken from other languages, as a rule only overburdens the alphabet, and does not make matters any clearer, especially for people who are unacquainted with the languages from which the new letters are taken. It is impossible to represent sounds on paper, and therefore no sign can show the secret of the pronunciation of any particular word until the reader has not actually *heard* it spoken. Even the Russian letters when accompanied with a variety of diacritic marks, inverted commas, &c., make reading so difficult that it is scarcely possible to grasp the meaning.

* The full title of the book was “Tolmach, a companion for Russian soldiers, containing conversations for every day use in Russian, Turkish, Servian and Greek.”

(† In Russian represented by *y*.—*Trs.*)

As regards the manual for conveying instruction in reading and writing the Russian tongue, I made myself acquainted with the best methods and decided in favor of the handbook of M. Stolpyanski, which professes to teach writing and reading at the same time. Applying myself to the conditions in which a teacher and his pupil would stand, I translated into the Uzbek dialect all those phrases which are, so to speak, necessary for a teacher, and without which study cannot be carried on. Thus, I first drew up "A Manual for the Teacher" and afterwards "A Russian Spelling book for schools in Central Asia," both of which elementary works were published in the beginning of 1875 at the expense of the Governor-General of Russian Turkistan. A Chrestomathy is also now passing through the press, and thus nothing prevents us at the present time from commencing operations.

Meanwhile it is proposed to open in Tashkent a school for preparing teachers, and afterwards to establish district schools for native children. A hope may be indulged that the effort will be attended with success if only future Governors-General display in this respect an equal degree of sincerity and favor to that

which has characterized the conduct of General Von Kauffman. It may be that a hundred years hence the Russian language will be as familiar to the natives of Central Asia as that of the Uzbek and Tajik at present are, and when that is the case, there will be no objection to missionaries appearing on the scene. On the other hand, to allow them to attempt to diffuse Christianity without a complete and full knowledge of the native language would be equivalent to sowing chaff instead of wheat, or diffusing heresies instead of the truth. If even the question as to how the *name* of our Saviour should be written is sufficient to produce a schism, what might not be expected to happen if a missionary had to look for the meaning of each word into a dictionary or to have recourse to an interpreter?

It is true that even at the present time missionaries might be found who fulfil the necessary conditions, but this is only possible amongst natives, and Europeans will not be forthcoming for some years to come. In any case, all advances in the direction of assimilating the various nationalities of the Turkistan region belong to the future, but there is one powerful means to this end which has invari-

ably been applied by Russia to all people brought into subjection to her, namely, the conferment of equal rights. Our policy with regard to nations whom we have subdued is a policy of strict equality of civil rights. The inhabitant of the recently occupied Kulja or of Tashkent, Samarcand, &c., becomes at once a Russian citizen, to all intents and purposes, in the same degree as the inhabitant of Moscow, except that probably more extensive exemptions and privileges are conferred upon the former.

Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and Poland enjoy rights greater than those which Russia proper expects to receive for some time to come, and while the Christian of Great Russia pays to the State double as much as the Pole, he receives in return, in the shape of schools, hospitals, roads, and bridges, perhaps ten times less. Our Asiatic subjects pay altogether only at a rate of about 1 rouble 10 copeks per head to the State, and they are not required to billet the troops, supply means of transport, or military recruits, while at the same time they enjoy wider privileges in the matter of their self-administration by means of chosen deputies, and in the national mode of administer-

ing justice according to their customs. If such a system leads to the implanting of our principles, and induces the true Mahomedan to guide his conduct, with regard to those around him, by the rules of Russian law, and consequently by the spirit of Christianity, we may rest content and feel assured that our mission is not a fruitless one. Our policy with respect to regions subdued by us is invariably distinguished by especial magnanimity and, so to speak, self-sacrifice. This policy has been pursued during the whole course of our history, forming one of its most brilliant characteristics, and it is in it, and in this "Christian cosmopolitanism," that our strength both in the present and future really consists.

END OF VOL. II.

